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ABSTRACT
COUNTERPOSSIBLES
FEBRUARY 2012
BARAK KRAKAUER, B.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker

Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The problem
of counterpossibles is easiest to state within the “nearest possible world” framework for
counterfactuals: on this approach, a counterfactual is true (roughly) when the consequent is
true in the “nearest” possible world where the antecedent is true. Since counterpossibles
have necessarily false antecedents, there is no possible world where the antecedent is true.
On the approach favored by Lewis, Stalnaker, Williamson, and others, counterpossibles are
all trivially true.
I introduce several arguments against the trivial approach. First, it is counterintuitive to think that all counterpossibles are true. Second, if all counterpossibles were true,
then we could not make sense of their use in logical, philosophical, or mathematical
arguments. Making sense of the role of sentences like these requires that they not have
vacuous truth conditions.
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The account of counterpossibles I ultimately favor is an extension of the “nearest
possible world” semantics discussed above. The Lewis/Stalnaker account is supplemented
with the addition of impossible worlds, and the nearness metric is extended to range over
these impossible worlds as well as possible worlds. Thus, a counterfactual is true when its
consequent is true in the nearest world where the antecedent is true; if the counterfactual’s
antecedent is impossible, then the nearest world in question will be an impossible world.
Once the framework of impossible worlds and similarity is in place, we can put it to use in
the analysis of other philosophical phenomena. I examine one proposal that makes use of a
theory of counterpossibles to develop an analysis of the notion of metaphysical dependence.
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INTRODUCTION

Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The aim of this
dissertation is to provide an analysis of counterpossibles that makes sense of their use in
natural language as well as philosophical practice. Below is a summary of the various
chapters of this dissertation. In the remainder of this introduction, I explain what kinds of
statements are properly called ‘counterfactuals,’ and briefly discuss some different kinds of
ways in which a statement is impossible.

1. Summary
In chapter 1, I discuss the “nearest possible world” analysis of counterfactuals
developed by Lewis and Stalnaker: a counterfactual is true (roughly) if the consequent is true
in the “nearest” or “most similar” possible worlds where the antecedent is true. While I am
sympathetic with the “nearest possible world” account, and assume that such an account is
appropriate for at least most counterfactuals, it cannot straightforwardly accommodate
counterpossibles. The problem of counterpossibles can be seen clearly enough: how can we
determine whether a counterpossible is true if there is no possible world where the
antecedent is true, and thus no possible world at which we may evaluate the truth of the
conditional?
According to the approach favored by Lewis, Stalnaker, and others, all
counterpossibles are true; they are said to be vacuous, since they all express the necessary
truth. There is no difference in content among counterpossibles, or even between
counterpossibles and other necessary truths.
1

I introduce several of arguments against the vacuous approach. First, it is simply
counter-intuitive to think that all counterpossibles are true; consider, for example, ‘If nine
were prime, then there would be fewer kangaroos.’ Second, if all counterpossibles were true,
then we could not make sense of their (non-vacuous) use in logical, mathematical, or
philosophical arguments. Consider counterpossibles such ‘If Platonism were true in
mathematics, then we would have no way of knowing about numbers,’ or ‘If there were
finitely many prime numbers, then there would be some number n equal to the product of
every prime number + 1.’ Making sense of the role of sentences such as these requires that
they not be vacuous.
The behavior of ‘might’ counterpossibles is also problematic for the defender of the
vacuous approach. According to Lewis, ‘might’ counterpossibles are all false. In addition to
introducing a new family of counterpossibles with counter-intuitive truth values, the falsity
of ‘might’ counterpossibles undercuts many of the defenses of the truth of all ‘would’
counterpossibles. The falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles also introduces widespread
violations of some plausible principles about the behavior of counterfactuals, such as the
principle that a ‘would’ counterfactual entails its corresponding ‘might’ counterfactuals.
Ultimately, only a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles is capable of making sense of
our linguistic intuitions and philosophical practice, and only a non-vacuous account of
counterpossibles is capable of explaining the failure of the logical principle related to the
behavior of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals.
In chapter 2, I attempt to formulate several versions of a non-vacuous approach to
counterpossibles that addresses at least some of the worries presented above in chapter 1,
without the addition of impossible worlds.
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One such approach is the “nearest possible proposition” account of
counterpossibles. On such an account, a counterpossible is evaluated not at the nearest
possible world where the antecedent is true, but at the nearest possible world where the
nearest possible antecedent is true. That is, a similarity metric is applied not only to possible
worlds, but to propositions as well; the impossible antecedent of some counterpossible is
nearby to some possible proposition that could serve as the antecedent of some
counterfactual. We then evaluate whether the counterpossible is true by evaluating whether
this counterfactual (whose antecedent is this relevantly similar, possible proposition) is true.
Of course, it is difficult to say just what the nearest possible proposition might look like, and
it is difficult to see why we will get the intuitively correct truth conditions for
counterpossibles by making use of other, nearby counterfactuals.
Another such approach is to analyze a counterpossible such that it is true when its
consequent can be derived, in some non-classical logic, from the antecedent and other
background propositions. Such an approach, however, faces embarrassing questions related
to how one chooses the logical system, and whether one could ever make sense of
counterpossibles whose antecedent express some impossibility relative to the logic of the
counterfactual conditional.
In chapter 3, I present my favored account of counterpossibles, which is an
extension of the “nearest possible world” semantics discussed above in chapter 1. The
Lewis and Stalnaker account is supplemented with the addition of impossible worlds, or
worlds where logical, mathematical, or metaphysical impossibilities obtain (and do not
necessarily result in absurdity). The similarity metric between worlds is extended to range
over these impossible worlds as well as possible worlds. Thus, a counterfactual is true when
its consequent is true in the nearest world (possible or impossible) where the antecedent is
3

true; if the counterfactual’s antecedent is impossible, then the nearest world in question will
be an impossible world.
One advantage of this approach is that it is a straightforward extension of semantics
of counterfactuals that has been highly influential. In particular, the similarity metric is one
based on the “default” similarity metric Lewis discusses in his [1979]. On this view, we take
Lewis’s dictum that we should avoid widespread violations of law while maximizing the
region of perfect match of fact to apply to logical law. We can determine the logical,
mathematical, and metaphysical laws of a world in a manner analogous to how we determine
the nomological laws of a world: we try to fit the world into a deductive system that best
makes sense of what is true at the world. A world is similar, then, to the extent that it
minimizes changes in law and maximizes matches of matters of fact.
In chapter 4, I discuss the nature of impossible worlds. Since the proposed solution
makes use impossible worlds, a controversial extension of an already-controversial
apparatus, it is necessary to explain what impossible worlds are and why they are
ontologically cheap.
Possible worlds can be used to build structured propositions, which can in turn be
used to build “structured worlds.” An impossible world is simply a structured world: a set of
structured propositions. Such a set need not be complete or consistent, so impossibilities
can be represented straightforwardly by these worlds. Furthermore, these worlds are
ontologically cheap, requiring belief merely in possible worlds and set-theoretic
constructions of those worlds. In this chapter, I also discuss Lewis’s argument against
impossible worlds, and how to best understand what is true and false at these worlds.
In chapter 5, I apply the theory of counterpossibles defended in chapter 3 to the
problem of metaphysical dependence. I hold that dependence is best understood in terms of
4

explanation and counterpossible exclusion. That is, A depends on B iff A explains B, and the
following counterpossible is true: if one of A or B were to be false, then A would be false.
The counterpossible exclusion claim adds the requisite hyperintensionality and asymmetry
required to make the supervenience account plausible; it also suggests the right kind of
modal relation between the grounding and grounded entities.
One can then use this analysis to evaluate claims of metaphysical dependence. I
argue that this approach gives the intuitively correct results, albeit with a complication
related to subject matters. In cases where the counterpossible is more difficult to evaluate,
the analysis at least points toward where the difficulty comes from: evaluating these
counterpossibles will ultimately be a matter of determining the logical and metaphysical laws
of various impossible worlds, which in turn is a matter of determining what the best way of
systematizing these worlds are. Cases where the dependence claims are more controversial
are cases where we are less sure about how to understand facts related to explanation or the
structure of the impossible worlds in question.

2. Counterfactuals
I have described counterpossibles as a kind of counterfactuals. Unfortunately, it is
not entirely clear what counterfactuals are. They are often glossed along lines such as
‘conditional sentences in the subjunctive mood.’ If this is correct, then there is a clear
syntactic test to determine whether a statement is a counterfactual: we can determine
whether a sentence expressed a counterfactual by looking at its form.
These kinds of tests might be a guide for some cases, but it seems highly implausible
to say that counterfactuals are usually expressed in this form. Philosophers and prescriptive
grammarians often express counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood, but ordinary speech
5

generally eschews the subjunctive mood. Indeed, there are questions about what the
subjunctive mood comes to, and whether this test would work across languages that do not
seem to have anything rightly called a subjunctive mood or tense.
Indeed, many counterfactuals are not even expressed as conditionals. Consider
Lewis’s example, ‘No Hitler, no atom bomb,’ which expresses a counterfactual, even though
one could not guess this merely by looking at the form of the sentence. One could multiply
cases: ‘Sure, but then they’d topple over,’ is a counterfactual whose antecedent is not
expressed, but is rather (presumably) anaphoric on some previous sentence in the discourse;
‘Had you cut off their tails, they’d have toppled over’ is a counterfactual that lacks the
‘if/then’ structure. Looking to surface syntax as a guide could be misleading.
A semantic account of counterfactuals seems far more fruitful than a syntactic
account. A statement need not include words such as ‘if’ and ‘would’ (or their correlates in
other natural languages) to be a counterfactual, but rather needs to express the right kind of
proposition. That is, a counterfactual is a kind of statement that expresses what would
occur, given some state of affairs. Counterfactuals are so-called because the state of affairs
in question does not actually obtain; evaluating a counterfactual is a process of determining
what would happen if the antecedent were true (though it is not). If the antecedent of some
counterfactual is true, then the utterance of the counterfactual is infelicitous; this does not,
however, mean that the utterance is not a counterfactual in the relevant sense.
But what would happen if the antecedent conditions were impossible?

3. Impossibility
The other part of our definition of counterpossibles that needs unpacking is the
notion of impossibility. We say that a counterpossible is a counterfactual when its
6

antecedent is impossible, but when is something impossible? The nature of impossibility is
itself a thorny issue, so here I will merely highlight different kinds of impossibility that might
be employed in some counterpossibles.
It is important to note that words we use to express possibility and impossibility,
such as ‘can’ and ‘must’ and so on, are themselves highly context-dependant with respect to
their application (see, for example, Kratzer [1977]). We might truly say that it is not possible
for me to run a mile in six minutes, but we are not thereby committed to the claim that there
is no possible world where I can run a six-minute mile. Rather, we deem those worlds to be
irrelevant in the given context. If we change the context, perhaps by bringing up the
possibility of having devoted some time to training and practice, we would no longer be
inclined to say that I couldn’t run a six-minute mile. We also sometimes restrict the set of
worlds in question when discussing belief (‘John must be in Boston by now’), physical laws
(‘The bowling ball can’t float in mid-air’), and normativity (‘You cannot torture children for
fun.’) But these are not the modal notions of interest here; the notion of impossibility in
play is grounded by the ways things might turn out, not what we believe, or what the best
physical theory of this world is, or what we should do.
The notion of possibility relevant to a study of counterpossibles is unrestricted
possibility. When I say that something is impossible unrestrictedly, I do not mean merely
that it is impractical, or would violate some law (but see below); rather, I mean that it is
absolutely impossible. I mean that there is no possible world where it is true; I mean that the
scenario described is not a genuine possibility. Once we have decided that something is
metaphysically impossible, we cannot then change the context in such a way that it would
then seem possible after all. One could attempt to get a better understanding of what is
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meant by impossibility, in the relevant sense, by examining some different ways in which the
antecedent of a counterfactual could be impossible.
A conditional whose antecedent is not logically possible could be called a
counterlogical. I assume the truth of classical logic, so the antecedents of counterlogicals would
express a formal contradiction. This could be some statement of the form P and not-P, or
some statement that entails something of the form P and not-P. This formulation could be
modified, however, to apply to any logical theory as long as it admits of valid and invalid
rules of inference.
A conditional whose antecedent is impossible with respect to a correct philosophical
theory is a countermetaphysical. This occurs when the antecedent asserts the truth of a false
philosophical theory whose truth value is a matter of necessity. ‘If properties were
universals, then redness would be repeatable’ expresses a countermetaphysical.
A conditional whose antecedent is analytically false is a counteranalytical. This occurs
when the antecedent expresses something that is semantically or conceptually false. ‘If some
bachelors were married, then they’d have wedding rings’ is a counteranalytical.
A conditional whose antecedent is not mathematically possible is a countermathematical.
This occurs when the antecedent is false according to arithmetic, set theory, geometry, and
so on. ‘If 9 were prime, then it would not be divisible by 3’ expresses a
countermathematical.
There are also other notions of impossibility in the literature, such as the proposal
that laws of nature are genuinely necessary, as in Shoemaker [1998], and that what has
occurred in the past is genuinely necessary, as in Prior [1957]. These proposals could be
understood as kinds of metaphysical necessity in the sense of countermetaphysicals, or as
some sui generis kind of unrestricted necessity.
8

Perhaps some of these categories collapse into others. If the logicist or neo-logicist
project is successful, for example countermathematicals will reduce to counterlogicals. If
false theories in metaphysics and ethics somehow entail contradictions, then they will reduce
to counterlogicals. If these false theories are conceptually or linguistically defective in such a
way that the phenomena they analyze fail to match our initial concepts of them – perhaps it
is constitutive of properties that they be repeatable, or constitutive of rightness that the
organ harvest cannot be right – then countermetaphysicals will reduce to counteranalyticals.
This discussion, of course, is quite inconclusive. Determining which kinds of
necessities reduce to other kinds of necessities is a project beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Nonetheless, it may be helpful, as one is attempting to evaluate analyses of
counterpossibles, to keep in mind the various kinds of counterpossibles, and how they might
relate to each other. If a non-trivial account of these conditionals is possible, it must be able
to account for these various kinds of counterpossibles. A theory should be judged on how
well it matches our intuitive judgments about the truth of these sentences, as well make
sense of how these sentences are used in math, logic, and philosophy.

9

CHAPTER 1
COUNTERPOSSIBLES ARE NOT VACUOUS

1.1 Introduction
Counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents, or counterpossibles, pose problems
for standard treatments of counterfactual conditionals. We seem to have robust intuitions,
at least in many cases, about the truth of counterpossibles. Consider, for example:
(1) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be no tables.
(2) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be tables.
(3) If I were a horse, then I would have hooves.
(4) If I were you, I wouldn’t eat that.
(5) If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.
(6) If Hume had squared the circle in secret, then giraffes would have wings.
(7) If some bachelor were married, then it would be false that some bachelor were
married.1
These sentences seem natural enough, either in philosophical or ordinary contexts. Indeed,
(5) is in at least somewhat common usage as a proverb. We have fairly firm intuitions that
(1) and (3) are true, that (4) is can be asserted in some contexts, and that (2), (6), and (7) are
false. But the standard account of counterfactuals, from Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968],

Perhaps some of these examples are not counterpossibles. For a conditional to be counterpossible,
the antecedent must be impossible, but determining which antecedents are possible and which are
impossible requires a fully-developed account of possibility, as well as a settling certain logical,
mathematical, and metaphysical questions. Clearly, (1) and (2) are not counterpossibles if
mereological nihilism is true; (3) and (4) need not counterpossibles if Kripkean essentialism is false;
(4) is not a counterpossible if the proper analysis of ‘If I were you’ is by relevant properties and roles
instead of identity, and so on. I do not intend to take a stand on such issues presently. If these
examples are not counterpossibles, they may be replaced with other examples whose antecedents are
impossible.
1
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does not deliver these results. For reasons discussed below, Lewis and Stalnaker hold that
counterpossibles are vacuous. Such a view, however, is wrong for several reasons. First, it
does not respect our linguistic intuitions, and any adequate theory of counterfactuals must
respect our firm intuitions about their truth. Second, such a view does not respect
philosophical practice, insofar as these sentences are used to draw out the consequences of
various philosophical, logical, or mathematical theories. Third, a more careful consideration
of the use of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals shows that the reasons Lewis and Stalnaker
give for treating counterpossibles vacuously are in tension with their treatment of the logic
of ‘might’ and ‘would.’ Indeed, only an account of counterpossibles according to which they
are non-vacuous has the tools to explain the behavior of counterpossibles with respect
various plausible logical principles.

1.2 Lewis, Stalnaker, and Counterfactuals
At least in English, counterfactuals are generally expressed as conditionals in the
subjunctive mood. Yet this is obviously not a definition of what it is to be a counterfactual;
as discussed in the introduction, the most obvious problem is that not all counterfactuals are
expressed as subjunctive conditionals, even in English. Consider, for example, the bumper
sticker that reads ‘No farms, no food:’ even if it does not look like a conditional, it is clearly
meant to be evaluated as a claim about what would happen if there were no farms. It is not
helpful to think of counterfactuals in purely syntactic terms. Rather, counterfactuals are
propositions that express a certain kind of modal condition between the antecedent and
consequent; they make the claim that, at least in some relevant space of possibility, the
consequent of the conditional is true where the antecedent is. Because of this modal
connection, counterfactuals are often written as A  C, where A and C are propositions
11

(intuitively, the antecedent and consequent, respectively) and the connective  stands for
the counterfactual conditional.
Counterfactuals generally carry the presupposition that the antecedent is false. If I
were to utter, ‘If I had missed the bus, then I would be late to class,’ one would generally
assume that I had, in fact, caught the bus. If the antecedent of a counterfactual is true – if,
for example, I utter the above sentence even though I did miss the bus – then what I said
was infelicitous. What I had said is not necessarily false, however, and it is not clearly no
longer a counterfactual.
There is, of course, more to say about these issues, but they need not be settled for
our present purposes. One could take nearly any view of what a counterfactual is and still
face the problem of how to evaluate counterpossibles. Whether a counterfactual is best
construed syntactically or semantically or whether its antecedent must be false for it to be a
genuine counterfactual is a question that should be settled in giving a complete account of
counterfactuals. However these questions are answered, one can still formulate
counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents.
According to Lewis and Stalnaker, a counterfactual is true (roughly) iff its
consequent is true in the most similar, or “nearest” possible world or worlds where the
antecedent is true. According to Lewis [1973], a counterfactual is true iff no world where
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false is “closer” to the base world than any
world where the antecedent and consequent are both true. A world is “closeby” to the
degree that the world is, in some contextually relevant sense, similar to the base world.
Lewis gives some of the logical properties of similarity in his [1973], and discusses a
particular metric of similarity in his [1979]. The truth conditions are stated in the way that
they are in order to allow for the falsity of both the limit assumption, according to which there
12

is at least one possible world where the antecedent is true that is closest to the actual world,
as well as the uniqueness assumption, according to which there is at most one possible world
where the antecedent is true that is closest to the actual world. Since Stalnaker [1968]
accepts both of these assumptions, his statement of the truth conditions of counterfactuals is
simpler: a counterfactual is true iff the consequent is true in the selected world where the
antecedent is true. For Stalnaker, a selection function determines the world of evaluation,
and if the consequent is true in that world of evaluation, then the counterfactual is true.
I will assume that the limit assumption is true, but that the uniqueness assumption is
false. Not much hangs on this choice, and nothing discussed herein depends on these
assumptions; one could easily translate the analyses to be given to include or exclude either
of these assumptions. I make this choice largely because the uniqueness assumption seems
so implausible,2 and because stating the truth conditions of counterfactuals is far easier with
the limit assumption. Thus, when I discuss the ‘Lewis-Stalnaker’ view, I really mean a view
that neither of them had: a counterfactual is true iff the consequent is true in all the closest
possible worlds where the antecedent is true.
What if the antecedent of the conditional is impossible? When there are no possible
worlds where the antecedent is true, there are obviously no “nearby” or “selected” possible
worlds where the antecedent is true at which we might attempt to determine the truth of the
consequent. For Lewis and Stalnaker, all counterpossibles are vacuously true. In light of the
previous examples, this seems quite unintuitive. Sentences such as (1)-(7) seem to be
meaningful, and capable of being true or false; indeed, some of them are false! Our project,
then, is to motivate, describe, and defend an account of counterpossibles according to which
their truth conditions are not vacuous.
2

But see Stalnaker [1980]
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1.3 Counterpossibles, Language, and Philosophical Practice
The examples above are meant to provide intuitive evidence for the view that
counterpossibles cannot all be trivially true. Many of these kinds of sentences are used in
natural language, and would not strike a speaker as being vacuous. These sentences clearly
have content, both in the sense that they seem to be genuinely meaningful and in the sense
that they could be either true or false. Analyzing these sentences as vacuous is a mistake,
even if there is a pragmatic story at hand to explain why they seem non-vacuous. Ignoring
our intuitions about truth conditions in a wide range of cases undercuts our original project
of providing plausible truth conditions for conditionals in general.
Furthermore, counterpossibles are regularly used in philosophy, math, and logic: we
judge the adequacy of necessarily true or necessarily false theories in metaphysics, ethics, and
epistemology by what follows from their truth. Sentences such as (1) could be used in part
of an argument against a particular philosophical view; we might also have reason to accept
sentences such as ‘If Platonism were true, then we would have no way of knowing about
numbers’ or ‘If Utilitarianism were true, then the organ harvest would be morally obligatory’
or ‘If intuitionism were true, then the law of double negation elimination would fail.’ We are
invited to accept sentences such as these as (non-vacuously) true, and take their truth as
having some force with respect to how we understand and evaluate certain theories. That is,
counterpossibles are used to express the commitments of theories, even in cases where these
theories are acknowledged to be necessarily false. A necessarily false theory is not
committed to everything, but it might be committed to certain unacceptable consequences.
Insofar as these consequences are deemed unwelcome, we are inclined to reject the theory in
question. Even if arguments about the commitments of various necessarily false theories are
14

not conclusive, counterpossibles whose antecedents suppose their truth cannot be vacuous
without rendering meaningless broad swaths of philosophical discussion. Since the
meaningfulness of counterpossibles is so important to philosophical and mathematical
practice, it would be a mistake to offer an analysis according to which counterpossibles are
vacuous.3
The view that counterpossibles are all trivially true leads to some rather strange
results when we form counterpossibles about the semantics of counterpossibles. Consider
the following example:
(8) If some counterpossibles were false, then Lewis would be right about
counterpossibles.
For Lewis, (8) is a counterpossible, and therefore (trivially) true. The proper analysis of
conditionals in a language, after all, is a necessary truth, even if the facts about natural
language are contingent. But (8) is obviously false – Lewis’s theory of counterpossibles, after
all, would be wrong if there were false counterpossibles! The antecedent of (8) gives the
very condition that would falsify Lewis’ account, so it would be bizarre to think that (8) is
true.4

These considerations might also be related to the question of how to understand arguments by
reductio ad absurdum. In such arguments, we reason from assumptions that are (at least in conjunction
with other premises) contradictory. Nonetheless, we are able to reason from these inconsistent
propositions in a fairly robust fashion; certain reductio deductions are licit, but others are not. To be
sure, however, at least formal arguments that make use of reductio ad absurdum function in a very
syntactic fashion: we can make an assumption, use known rules of inference to show that the
assumption (and possibly other premises) lead to a formal contradiction, and then accept the negated
assumption. It is not clear that counterpossibles in general behave in such a fashion. There is
further discussion of this point in chapter 2.
4 There is also another kind of argument we could use against Lewis and Stalnaker that is more
clearly ad hominem. Lewis and Stalnaker clearly understand counterpossibles in a non-vacuous fashion
because they make use of them! Consider, for example, Lewis in his [1986:25]: “If, per impossibile, the
method of dominance had succeeded in ranking some false theories above others, it could still have
been challenged by those who care little for truth.” The details of this particular argument are not
important, but it does seem that Lewis thinks he can reason about what would happen if some
impossible condition were to hold.
3
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Furthermore, we cannot lay the blame for this problem simply at the feet of Lewis
and Stalnaker’s approach to counterfactuals, and use this as an argument against possible
worlds approach to counterfactuals in general. Other approaches to counterfactuals deliver
the same result. Non-worlds-based accounts, such as [Goodman 1947], hold that a
counterfactual is true whenever the antecedent, along with other background propositions,
entails the consequent. Whether or not this approach is ultimately preferable to the possible
worlds account as a treatment of counterfactuals, it too is unable to deliver our intuitive
judgments about counterpossibles. If the antecedent is impossible, then (presumably) it
entails some contradiction, a statement of the form P and not-P.5 And if the antecedent and
other statements entailed by it include a formal contradiction, then, by the principle of
explosion, any consequent will come out true. For example, if our antecedent is ‘I am a
horse,’ then it, as well as certain other metaphysical theses, such as that ‘I’ is a rigid
designator, and that in every world where I exist, I am a human and not a horse, entail that
both I am a horse and I am not a horse. And from this, we can deduce any consequence we
would like. Thus, for logical entailment-based approaches, counterpossibles will be trivially
true, since any consequent is entailed by a contradiction.6
Of course, this does not mean that any theory of counterfactuals will make
counterpossibles trivially true; nonetheless, since the other approaches to counterfactuals
face the same difficulties with respect to impossible antecedents, we cannot merely take the
problem of counterpossibles as an argument against Lewis and Stalnaker’s views in
particular. Indeed, the fact that both worlds-based approaches and entailment-based

This may conflate the distinction between logically and metaphysically impossible antecedents. In
either case, this argument certainly holds for counterpossibles with logically impossible antecedents.
6 The same argument can be lodged against more complex versions of the entailment account, such
as that of Kvart [1986].
5

16

approaches are incapable of giving non-vacuous truth conditions to counterpossibles
suggests that the problem is more general than it might have seemed.

1.4 ‘Might’ Counterpossibles
There are now several reasons to reject a vacuous analysis of counterpossibles on the
table. But the problem is even worse than this: given their treatment of ‘might’
counterfactuals, Lewis in particular is in an especially poor position to claim that
counterpossibles are vacuous.
Lewis and Stalnaker differ with respect to their treatment of ‘might’ counterpossibles
(represented as A C, and read as ‘If A were the case, then C might be the case.’). For
Lewis, the ‘might’ counterfactual is defined as the dual of the ‘would’ counterfactual: A 
C is equivalent to (A  C). Intuitively, a ‘might’ counterfactual is true when the
consequent is true in some of the nearest worlds where the antecedent is true; if there are no
possible worlds where the antecedent is true, the conditional is false. Since all ‘would’
counterpossibles are true for Lewis, all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false.
According to Stalnaker [1980] , ‘might’ counterfactuals are to be analyzed as ‘would’
counterfactuals embedded in an epistemic modal. A  C is roughly equivalent to ‘For all
I know, A  C.’ Since A  C is always true whenever A is impossible, it cannot be
ruled out by anything that I know. Nothing that any agent knows can be incompatible with
something that must be true, so nothing any agent knows could ever rule out the truth of a
‘would’ counterpossible. Since ‘might’ counterpossibles are epistemic modals applied to
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necessarily true propositions, ‘might’ counterpossibles will be vacuously true on Stalnaker’s
account.7
Stalnaker’s analysis of ‘might’ counterfactuals introduces a somewhat surprising
asymmetry between ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals. A ‘would’ counterfactual is
analyzed by determining which possible world is closest to the actual world (in his terms,
‘selected’), so a ‘would’ counterfactual could be true or false regardless of what is known by
the speaker or evaluator. A ‘might’ counterfactual, on the other hand, uses an epistemic
modal, so the truth conditions of ‘might’ counterfactuals always rely on what is known by
one or more participants in a conversation. While uses of ‘might’ often suggest a kind of
epistemic modality, there are many cases where they do not: consider, for example, ‘I am a
philosopher, but I might have been a lawyer instead.’ Insofar as we think that ‘might’ and
‘would’ counterfactuals are closely related, we should be hesitant to adopt an approach that
treats them differently.

1.4.1 ‘Might’ Counterpossibles and Entailment
Lewis [1973] , Williamson [2007], and others worry that our judgments about the
truth values of counterpossibles, such as those mentioned above, do not stand up to
scrutiny. When we consider counterpossible situations in the proper way, perhaps, we realize
that “anything goes” when we reason about impossible antecedents. Consider (6), for
example. We are inclined to judge (6) to be false, and take this judgment as evidence against
Lewis’s account. But what would it take for Hume to have squared the circle? A priori
truths about Euclidean geometry would have to be vastly different! And if we waive certain
To be sure, Stalnaker does have some tools at his disposal to explain away some of the discomfort
associated with the view that that we believe all necessary truths, as in his [1987]. The second chapter
discusses an approach to the truth conditions of counterpossibles that is inspired by some of these
views.
7
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fundamental truths about Euclidean geometry, who knows what might follow? Perhaps (6)
is true after all (though not in any interesting way), since in these worlds, anything at all is
true! Once we consider what things would be like if mathematical or logical truths differ, it
seems hard to sustain our initial reading of the counterpossible over the vacuous reading.
Indeed, the vacuous approach would then get the truth conditions right after all: when we
consider what the world would be like if something impossible were to happen, anything at
all would be true!
This response is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, it is not at all clear that these
considerations compel us to abandon our intuitions about the truth conditions of
counterpossibles; instead, we should hold that these considerations compel us to accept that
‘anything goes’ in some contexts of evaluation. All that the defender of the trivial account of
counterpossibles has shown is that there is at least one reading of (6) according to which we
are hesitant to assert that it is false. But it is no surprise that counterpossibles have more
than one admissible reading. Consider an example from [Jackson 1977]:
(9) If I had jumped out the window, I would have injured myself.
We take (9) to be true in most contexts. The nearest world where I jump out the window is
a world where I land on the concrete and injure myself. But another reader might balk at
this conclusion: I am a reasonable person, and I would not jump out the window if I thought
I might injure myself. I would only jump out a window if I had (say) placed a net beneath it
beforehand. Now, (9) seems to be false, since the nearest world where I jump out the
window is a world where I place a net beneath the window and land safely. We need not let
these considerations drive us into a deep skepticism about the status of counterfactuals;
rather, we merely realize that how we evaluate counterfactuals depends on context. On the
first pass, we sort worlds in a manner that places importance on the height of the window
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and the ground, and thus in the nearby worlds, I injure myself. On the second pass, my
cautious nature has become salient, and thus we sort worlds in a manner that places greater
importance on my fear of injury, and find that in these nearby worlds, I am uninjured
because I have taken precautions.8 Neither reading is the correct analysis of (9); our
judgment of the truth of (9) varies depending on what kinds of considerations have been
brought to our attention.
Something very similar occurs in (6). At first pass, (6) seems false, since Hume’s
squaring of the circle in secret has no obvious effect on the anatomy of giraffes. We sort
worlds in a manner that places importance on a match of facts about the world. On the
second pass, however, we re-sort worlds, and now place importance on the deductive
closure of geometry. Once we are forced to admit that something impossible has happened,
we are simply not sure what to think. Perhaps now, the nearest antecedent world is the
“explosion” world where every proposition is true. Neither way of sorting is the correct way
to sort worlds, and neither of these is the correct analysis of the counterpossible absent of
any contextually salient considerations; different contexts merely establish different similarity
metrics, and so the non-vacuous reading of (6) remains licit in the context in which it was
presented. A counterpossible is a kind of counterfactual, and thus our judgments of the truth
values of counterpossibles are similarly malleable and sensitive to context. There are, no
doubt, contexts in which we might say that ‘anything goes’ in a counterpossible situation, but
this does not mean that anything goes in counterpossible situations tout court, or even in
some ‘standard’ context. We need not conclude that counterfactuals are vacuous because of
this shiftiness, and we need not conclude that counterpossibles are vacuous because of this
Indeed, on this reading of (9), the salience of my fear of injury is great enough to allow
“backtracking” in the analysis of the counterfactual. We change some facts about the past (viz., my
placing a net beneath the window) in order to get the proper reading of the counterfactual. What’s
important for this example is merely the ease with which we re-order the similarity of worlds.
8
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shiftiness. Since Lewis’ analysis of counterpossibles never allows counterpossibles to have
non-vacuous truth-values, we have reason to doubt Lewis’ analysis.
Consideration of ‘might’ counterpossibles, however, gives us a second reason to
reject this argument. Lewis and Williamson claim that careful consideration of
counterpossibles suggests that anything follows from an impossibility. Recall, however, that
at least for Lewis, all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false. If we think that all ‘would’
counterpossibles are true because we are inclined to shrug our shoulders in the face of an
impossibility, how can we account for the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles? There may be
contexts where it seems plausible to say that anything at all would be true if Hume had
squared the circle, but it seems harder to imagine any context where nothing at all might be
true if Hume had squared the circle. If the strangeness of ‘would’ counterfactuals inclines us
to say that anything at all would be true in these cases, how could it also incline us to say
nothing at all might be true in these cases?
Defenders of the vacuous approach sometimes claim that the result that all
counterpossibles are trivial is not as bad as it seems. The counterpossibles that we want to
assert (such as (1)) will be true and assertible, while the counterpossibles we don’t want to
assert (such as (2)) may be true, but some pragmatic strategy could explain why they are not
assertible (see Lewis [1973]). Of course, such a pragmatic strategy would need much more
detail to be plausible, and it seems difficult to say what kind of Gricean mechanisms would
deliver the desired result. Even leaving the details of this strategy aside, it does not account
for the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles. ‘Might’ counterpossibles that we want to assert
(such as, ‘If mereological nihilism were true, then we might never find out’) will be false. To
be sure, we could attempt to develop some additional pragmatic account for why sentences
such as these are false but nevertheless assertible, but this would be still more difficult than
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accounting for why some sentences are true but not assertible. The vacuous approach as
advanced by Lewis and others requires not only a pragmatic theory according to which
‘would’ counterpossibles that are intuitively false are actually true but not assertible, but also
an error theory according to which ‘might’ counterpossibles that are intuitively true are
actually false but assertible. These considerations, of course, are not decisive, and it is
possible that some elegant pragmatic strategy could explain the patterns of assertibility in a
satisfying fashion. Nonetheless, such a view would still be an error theory, and would still
require significant pragmatic machinery in order to account for intuitive judgments. Other
things being equal, it would be far better to get the semantics of the conditionals right, rather
than have the heavy lifting done by poorly-understood pragmatic processes.
A further argument offered in defense of the vacuous approach is also in tension
with the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles. Lewis [1973] and Wierenga [1998] argue that if
A logically entails C, the counterfactual A  C is true. Call this principle Entailment:
(Entailment) If A  C, then A  C
Given the “nearest possible worlds” semantics for counterfactuals, it seems that classical
entailment guarantees counterfactuality: if A entails C, then all A-worlds are C-worlds, and
so the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds. And since, in classical logic, a contradiction entails
anything, A  C will be true for any C as long as A is a contradiction.9 Thus, ‘would’
counterpossibles are all vacuously true, and the vacuous approach to counterpossibles is
vindicated.

We need not appeal to the possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals to defend Entailment,
though it is as a good way to illustrate the principle. Entailment seems highly plausible, and is also
guaranteed by other approaches to counterfactuals. It is clearly valid on entailment approaches to
counterfactuals, such as those offered by Chisholm [1946] and Goodman [1947], which are the
leading contender to possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals.
9
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It is important to note that not all impossible antecedents clearly entail a logical
contradiction. For example, counterpossibles with metaphysically impossible antecedents
might be immune to the argument from Entailment sketched above. It may be that a theory
of properties according to which they are immanent universals is necessarily false, but that
such a theory does not entail any kind of formal contradiction. Indeed, it would be
incredible if every false theory in metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics were such that, under
analysis, one could derive a contradiction from a statement of the theory: Frege’s set theory
is perhaps the only serious philosophical theory that can be shown to result in logical
inconsistency. It is much more plausible that the argument from Entailment is directed
toward the proper subset of counterpossibles whose antecedents do entail a contradiction.10
Even setting this caveat aside, the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles is difficult for
the vacuous theorist to account for. After all, it seems just as plausible to say that if A
logically entails C, the ‘might’ counterfactual A  C is true. Call this principle ‘Might’
Entailment:
(‘Might’ Entailment) If A  C, then A  C
If all A-worlds are C-worlds, then some of the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds. Since a
contradiction entails everything, A  C should be true for any C, as long as A is a
contradiction. Indeed, as long as we think that the ‘might’ counterfactual is weaker than the
‘would’ counterfactual, we should think that ‘Might’ Entailment is valid because Entailment
is valid. However, even though A will entail C, Lewis holds that A  C will be false in
every instance where A is a contradiction. Thus, it seems difficult for Lewis and Wierenga to
appeal to Entailment to defend the vacuous approach to ‘would’ counterpossibles, when the

10

For further discussion of this point, see Zagzebski [1990].
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equally plausible ‘Might’ Entailment principle is incompatible with the vacuous approach to
‘might’ counterpossibles under consideration.
Such a tu quoque argument, however, exposes an awkward tension with respect to the
status of Entailment. The Entailment principle was presented as quite plausible, yet the
Lewisian is unable to accept the equally-plausible principle of ‘Might’ Entailment. For all
this, it is still unclear what to make of the intuitions that made Entailment seem plausible in
the first case. If there is tension within Lewis’s view over the status of the ‘Might’
Entailment, there is also tension within the non-vacuous theorist’s view over what to make
of the plausibility of Entailment and ‘Might’ Entailment. Of course, one could accept the
failure of these principles with some degree of equanimity: perhaps consideration of our
intuitions of certain examples is sufficient to reject Entailment as well as ‘Might’ Entailment.
Yet one could also attempt to reformulate weaker, more acceptable versions of the
principles:
(Entailment*) If A  C and not: A  C, then A  C
(‘Might’ Entailment*) If A  C and not: A  C, then A  C
Entailment* (and ‘Might’ Entailment*) allows one to reject the claim that, if some
proposition entails everything, then if that proposition were true, everything would (might)
be true. Entailment* and ‘Might’ Entailment* is silent about counterfactuals if the
antecedent entails everything; if some proposition entails something and its negation, then all
bets are off with respect to which counterfactuals that make use of that proposition as an
antecedent are true. The non-vacuous counterpossible theorist can endorse these weaker
principles and blunt the force of this version of the ‘anything goes’ argument.
However we ultimately settle issues related to the Entailment principle, the falsity of
‘might’ counterpossibles stands in tension with many of the defenses offered for the vacuity
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of counterpossibles. We may be inclined to think that ‘would’ counterpossibles are all true
because ‘anything goes’ in counterpossible situations, or because logical entailment entails
counterfactuality; we might think that the result that all ‘would’ counterpossibles are true is
not as unintuitive as it seems, so long as a pragmatic account could tell us why many ‘would’
counterpossibles are not assertible. But if ‘might’ counterpossibles are false, then we are at a
loss to explain why it is also true that ‘nothing goes’ in counterpossible situations, or how
logical entailment fails to entail ‘might’ counterfactuality, or how a pragmatic strategy could
deliver that result that a wide range of sentences are false but assertible.
Given these considerations, then, we might think that Stalnaker’s treatment of
counterpossibles has a clear advantage over Lewis’s treatment. If ‘might’ counterpossibles
are all true, then the arguments in favor of vacuity given above remain plausible. Given
some impossibility, we could still hold that ‘anything goes’ (since all ‘would’ counterpossibles
are true) and ‘anything might go’ (since all ‘might’ counterpossibles are true as well). Since
all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false, we need not offer some error theory about the
assertibility of any false counterpossibles. And, finally, Stalnaker is able to endorse both
Entailment and ‘Might’ Entailment. These advantages, of course, come at the cost of
denying the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals, it is nonetheless clear that the
replies given to the arguments that counterpossibles are vacuous target Lewis’s semantics,
and not Stalnaker’s. Though I have given independent reasons above for favoring a nonvacuous account of counterpossibles, it seems that a vacuous account along Stalanker’s lines
is at least more plausible than a vacuous account along the lines of Lewis’s.

1.4.2 ‘Might’ and ‘Would’
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The definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual in terms of the ‘would’ counterfactual as
described by Lewis delivers very unintuitive results when applied to counterpossibles.
Consider, for example, the following counterpossibles:
(10) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there would (still) be tables.
(11) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there would not be any tables.
(12) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there might (still) be tables.
(13) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there might not be any tables.
According to Lewis (and Stalnaker), (10) and (11) are both true; according to Lewis (but not
Stlanker) (12) and (13) are both false. These results are unacceptable for several reasons.
First, it seems very clear that our intuitive judgments hold that (11) and (13) are true, and
(10) and (12) are false. Lewis and Stalnaker cannot deliver this result. Second, it seems odd
that sentences of the form (10) and (11) could both be true; this is because even if
mereological nihilism were true, it can’t be the case that a pair of contradictory things would
be true. Third, it seems odd that sentences of the form (12) and (13) could both be false;
this is because even if mereological nihilism were true, it can’t be that there is nothing true to
say about what might be the case. Finally, it seems odd that sentences of the form (10)
could be true while (12) is false, or (11) true and (13) false. This is because it seems odd to
say that something would happen under certain counterfactual conditions, but also hold that
it’s not the case that it might happen under those conditions. We will examine each of these
claims below.

1.4.3 Would Law of Non-Contradiction (WLNC)
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One plausible principle for counterfactuals is the would law of non-contradiction
(WLNC). According to this law, there cannot be a pair of ‘would’ counterfactuals with the
same antecedent, but contradictory consequents.
(WLNC) Not: A  C and A  C
Intuitively, given some antecedent condition, it cannot be the case that some pair of
contradictory things will be the case. Possible worlds, after all, are consistent. It cannot be
the case that both C and not-C are true in any world, and therefore C and not-C cannot be
true in all nearby A-worlds. WLNC, then, is valid on Lewsis’s account of counterfactuals
with possible antecedents.11
Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, however, will introduce widespread
failures of WLNC for Lewis and Stalnaker. Since all ‘would’ counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents are true, both members of some pair of counterpossibles of the form A  C
and A  C will be true when A is impossible. Thus, WLNC will fail for every such pair
of counterpossibles.

1.4.4 Might Law of Excluded Middle (MLEM)
Another plausible principle for a logic of counterfactuals is the might law of excluded
middle (MLEM). According to this law, for any pair of ‘might’ counterfactuals with the same
antecedent and contradictory consequents, at least one counterfactual of the pair is true.
(MLEM) A  C or A  C is true

I assume throughout that the set of nearby possible worlds is held fixed in a pair of
counterfactuals. There are apparent failures of WLNC in pairs of counterfactuals such as, ‘If Caesar
were in charge in Korea, he would have used catapults’ and ‘If Caesar were in charge in Korea, he
would have used nuclear weapons (and not catapults).’ But, presumably, we switch contexts between
these two sentences, and thus the set of worlds that are deemed to be the nearest worlds changes.
This kind of case does not represent a genuine failure of WLNC.
11
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Intuitively, some antecedent condition might give rise to the truth of some proposition, and
it might give rise to its negation, but it can’t be the case that it might lead to neither. Given
some antecedent condition, we should expect that some proposition might follow, or the
negation of that proposition might follow, but it would be odd if neither of a pair of mutually
exhaustive possibilities might be obtain. Possible worlds, after all, are complete: MLEM will
be valid for Lewis whenever the antecedent is possible, since either C or not-C will be true in
any world, and therefore C or not-C will be true in any of the nearby A-worlds.
According to Lewis’s semantics, MLEM is not valid for counterfactuals with
impossible antecedents. Since all ‘might’ counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are
false, both members of some pair of counterpossibles of the form A  C and A 
C will be false whenever A is impossible. Thus, MLEM will fail for every such pair of
counterpossibles.

1.4.5 Would Implies Might Principle (WIMP)
Another highly plausible principle concerns the relation between ‘might’ and ‘would’
counterfactuals. Specifically, a ‘would’ counterfactual implies its corresponding ‘might’
counterfactual.
(WIMP) If A  C, then A  C12
It follows from the fact that if some antecedent conditions obtained, then some consequent
would be true that if those antecedent conditions obtained, then that consequent might be
true. That is, if something would happen given some counterfactual circumstance, it follows
that it might happen given those circumstances. It seems obvious that if it were true that
kangaroos would topple over if they lacked tails, we could infer that kangaroos might topple
12

WIMP is also discussed in Vander Laan [2007].
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over if they lacked tails. This principle is also valid for Lewis, at least when the antecedent is
possible: if all nearby A-worlds are C-worlds, then some nearby A-worlds are C-worlds.
According to Lewis’s approach, WIMP is never true when the antecedent is
impossible. All ‘would’ counterpossibles are true, and all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false.
This means that any counterpossible of the form A  C will be true when A is
impossible, regardless of the content of C, since ‘would’ counterpossibles are all true.
However, the corresponding ‘might’ counterfactual of the form A  C will never be true,
since might counterpossibles are all false. Thus, on this view, WIMP will never hold when
the antecedent of the pair of conditionals is impossible.13

1.4.6 True Mights and False Woulds
According to Lewis’s analysis, all ‘would’ counterpossibles are vacuously true and all
‘might’ counterpossibles are vacuously false, but this choice is somewhat arbitrary. We could
also hold that all counterpossibles are true, as Stalnaker and Wierenga do14, or that all
counterpossibles are false. Doing so, however, would not get us out of the problems
discussed above. If all counterpossibles were true, then we would still have to contend with
One might think that this discussion is less compelling when the modal operators are understood
as quantifiers over worlds. We can, for example, restate WIMP in terms of quantifiers and possible
worlds by saying that if all of the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds, then some of the nearest A-worlds
are C-worlds. Yet when there are no A-worlds at all, as will be the case in counterpossibles, this
principle simply fails. After all, it can be true that all A-worlds are C-worlds if there are no A-worlds,
but it cannot be true that some A-worlds are C-worlds if there are no A-worlds; the universal
quantifier does not have existential import, but the existential quantifier does. But it seems like this
response simply avoids the intuition behind WIMP in favor of a particular formalism of modal logic:
WIMP is plausible quite apart from any understanding of necessity as a universal quantifier or the
question of the existential import of the universal quantifier. WIMP is plausible because, in natural
language, ‘would’ is stronger than ‘might.’ It would be absurd for a ‘might’ claim to be true and a
‘would’ claim to be false. If this is correct, then the modal operators in this kind of context are not
best captured as classical quantifiers over worlds. Perhaps they are not quantifiers at all, or perhaps
the ‘would’ is a universal quantifier with existential import.
14 Wierenga [1998] entertains a might operator that would make WIMP and MLEM valid. According
to him, A  C =df  (A  C) or A  C.
13
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violations of WLNC. If all counterpossibles were false, we would still have to contend with
violations of MLEM, Entailment, and ‘Might’ Entailment. In both cases, we would also
have to reject the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals.
We could, however, preserve the duality of the two counterfactuals while answering
most of the logical issues raised above by making ‘would’ counterpossibles false, and ‘might’
counterpossibles true.15 If this is the case, worries about WLNC, MLEM, and WIMP vanish.
If ‘would’ counterpossibles are all false, then there will be no violations of WLNC in the case
of impossible antecedents. For any impossible antecedent A and consequent C, neither A
 C nor A  C will be true. Similarly, if ‘might’ counterpossibles are all true, then
there will be no violations of MLEM in the case of impossible antecedents. For any
impossible antecedent A and any consequent C, both A  C and A  C will be true.
Furthermore, there will not be violations of WIMP when the antecedent is impossible. Since
every ‘would’ counterpossible is false, we need not worry about cases where some ‘would’
counterfactual is true, but its corresponding ‘might’ counterfactual is false. And, of course,
we can make these changes without threatening the duality of the ‘might’ and ‘would’
counterfactual operators: regardless of whether or not the antecedent is possible, the
operators will be such that A  C =df (A  C).16

Lewis briefly considers such operators in his [1973], though he does not consider them as a pair.
He rejects them as being intuitively inferior to his preferred ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactual
operators, but as we have seen, it is unclear what to make of his judgments about the plausibility of
these operators.
16 It should be noted that making all would-couterpossibles false would commit us to massive
violations of what we might call the would law of excluded middle (WLEM). But, pace Stalnaker, the
WLEM is not plausible. It does not seem true to say either ‘If I were to flip this coin, it would land
heads’ or ‘If I were to flip this coin, it would not land heads.’16 And making all ‘might’
counterpossibles false would commit us to massive violations of the might law of non-contradiction
(MLNC). But MLNC clearly is not plausible. It seems true to say both, ‘If I were to flip this coin, it
might land heads’ and ‘If I were to flip this coin, it might not land heads.’
15
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Note that, unlike the other vacuous approaches on offer, the ‘true mights and false
woulds’ approach is not capable of endorsing Entailment. The defender of such an
approach would need to endorse the weaker notion of Entailment that the non-vacuous
theorist is committed to.
Making all ‘would’ counterpossibles false and all ‘might’ counterpossibles true allows
us to treat the most of the logical principles discussed above as valid. If we are to accept a
vacuous approach for counterpossibles, this is the approach we should accept.

1.5 Counterpossibles and Negation
There are, however, further worries that face the principle discussed above. For
example, it seems true to say, ‘If France were a monarchy and France were not a monarchy,
then France would be a monarchy’ and also true to say, ‘If France were a monarchy and
France were not a monarchy, then France would not be a monarchy.’ It seems false to say,
‘If France were a monarchy and France were not a monarchy, then there would be fewer
kangaroos.’ For ease of exposition, I will replace a proposition such as that France is a
monarchy below with P:
(14) P & P  P
(15) P & P  P
At least arguably, (14) and (15) are both true: if P and not-P were both true, then P
would be true, and not-P would be true. If there were a truth value glut with respect to some
proposition P, we should expect that both P and not-P to obtain. Taken together, however,
these counterpossibles violate WLNC, since (14) and (15) are a pair of counterpossibles with
the same antecedent, but contradictory consequents.
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The fault is not merely with WLNC, since it is not difficult to make trouble for the
other putative principles as well. MLEM, for example, fails when we consider pairs of
counterfactuals whose antecedents express that there is some truth value gap:
(16) (P  P)  P
(17) (P  P)  P
Intuitively, both of these sentences are false: if neither P nor not-P were the case, then it is
false that P might be true, and false that not-P might be true. If this is correct, however,
then we cannot endorse MLEM.
The truth of WIMP is also in question. According to WIMP, (14) and (15) imply the
following sentences, respectively:
(18) P & P  P
(19) P & P  P
At least according to Lewis’s definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual, however, (18) and (19)
are equivalent to:
(18’)  (P & P  P)
(19’)  ( P & P  P)
Yet (15) and (18’) cannot be true together, and (14) and (19’) cannot be true together.
One potential response to this worry would be to rephrase our various logical
principles in terms of truth and non-truth, and hold that such reformulated principles could
accommodate the kinds of cases discussed above.17 We can understand what is happening in
these cases by introducing a new kind of negation, built from classical negation, represented
by the symbol ~. I will continue to use the symbol  for classical negation, and read P as

17

This kind of proposal is also discussed in a somewhat different context by Goodman [2004].
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‘P is false.’ By contrast, ~P can be read as ‘P is not true’; the ‘not’ here is understood as the
‘not’ of classical negation.18 This ~-negation, then, is a generalization of classical negation,
since whenever propositions are “only” true or false, ~-negation behaves just like negation. In the non-classical cases, however, ~-negation is a kind of glut- and gap-closing
negation, since even in counterfactual cases where, for some proposition P, P and P are
both true (or both false), P and ~P will remain mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Consider,
then, a replacement principle such as:
(WLNC*) Not: A  C and A  ~C
Note that (14) and (15) make no trouble for WLNC*. This is because if P and P were
true, then obviously P would be true, but we would not be inclined to think that ~P were
true. After all, ~P is the claim that P is not true, and since P is true, ~P would not obtain in
the scenario described in these counterpossibles.
Use of this kind of negation can also be of use in amending the other principles
discussed above:
(MLEM*) A  C or A  ~C is true
If MLEM* is true of ‘might’ counterfactuals, then (16) and (17) are not problematic. The
falsity of these sentences is compatible with the truth of MLEM*; if (P  P) were true,
then it would not be the case that P might be true, but it does not follow that ~P might not
be true. Indeed, it seems that ~P is true if neither P nor P were true, since ~P is
equivalent to the claim that P fails to be true. If there were a truth value gap with respect to
P, then it would follow that P is not true.

This kind of negation is similar to Meyer’s Boolean negation and Sainsbury’s option negation. See Meyer
[1974] and Sainsbury [2007]. Unlike these kinds of negation, however, ~-negation is not related to
choosing or options, and it is constructed from classical negation, rather than being a kind of sui
generis operator.
18
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What can we say about the failure of WIMP? This problem can also be solved by
making use of ~-negation. We had previously defined the ‘might’ counterfactual from the
‘would’ counterfactual and -negation. Instead, we could define the ‘might’ counterfactual
in the following way:
(Might*) A  C is equivalent to (A  ~C).19
If this is how ‘might’ counterfactuals are to be understood, sentences such as (18) and (19)
are no longer problematic, since they are not equivalent to (18’) and (19’). Rather, they are
equivalent to the following ‘would’ counterfactuals:
(18’’)  (P & P  ~P)
(19’’)  (P & P  ~P)
These sentences state that it is false that, if P and not-P were true, then P would fail to be
true, and it would be false that, if P and not-P were true, then it would be untrue that P is
false. These sentences are compatible with (14) and (15), so long as we are careful about not
conflating the two notions of negation.

1.5.1 Many Negations
Such a proposal faces problems, however, since it is just as easy to formulate
counterpossibles that make claims about what would follow from propositions that are true
and not true, rather than true and false. WLNC*, then, will face problems when we consider
what would be true if some proposition P were true and not true. Consider, for example:
(22) P & ~P  P
(23) P & ~P  ~P

See Vander Laan [2007] for further discussion of this treatment of the relation of ‘might’ and
‘would’ counterfactuals.
19
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Just as the pair of (14) and (15) are a counterexample to WLNC, the pair of (22) and (23) are
a counterexample to WLNC*. After all, if P were true and not true, then P would be true,
and P would be not true. The challenge, then, becomes how to handle counterpossibles
whose antecedents express the failure of ~-negation. The same challenge can also be raised
against MLEM* and WIMP that make use of Might*.
Perhaps we could respond to this worry by formulating a new principle that
generalizes WLNC*. We could consider a third kind of negation, built from ~-negation: –P
is true whenever P is not true, where the ‘not’ is read as the ‘not’ of ~-negation. That is, –P
is true whenever ~P is “only” true, or where neither P nor ~P is true; it is false in cases
where P and ~P are both true, or where P is “only” true. This negation closes truth value
gluts (and gaps) such as those opened by sentences (16) and (17). This allows us to state a
different principle about the behavior of counterfactuals:
(WLNC**) Not: A  C and A  –C
Sentences (22) and (23) make no trouble for WLNC**. Even if P and ~P were true, we
would not be inclined to think that –P were true. Similar changes could be made to shore up
MLEM* and Might*.20 It is easy, however, to see here how we could create trouble for
WLNC** by formulating counterpossibles whose antecedents assert that both P and –P are
both true. For any kind of negation we could imagine, there will be counterpossibles about
some contradiction stated in terms of that negation.
We could create a hierarchy of laws that deal with the logical behavior of
counterpossibles, each new kind of negation defined from a previous negation operator.
Of course, Might* is not a logical principle, but rather a proposed definition for the ‘might’
counterfactual in terms of the ‘would’ counterfactual. If there is no stable definition for the ‘might’
counterfactual – if any proposed definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual cannot make sense of all
uses of the counterfactual – then we might worry about how we are even to think of the ‘might’
counterfactual.
20
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Nonetheless, we should not mistake one of these laws for a statement of the behavior of all
counterfactuals. Each step of the hierarchy only explains the behavior of counterfactuals at
the level “below” it. As soon as some principle is formulated, there is a recipe to create a
pair of conditionals that serves as a counterexample. Thus, rather than finding a principle
for the behavior of counterfactuals with respect to contradictions, we have found a family of
such principles. We can now start to see the beginnings of a response to these logical
problems that is at least open to the defender of a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles:
even if there are exceptions to principles that at first seemed plausible, there may be nearby
replacements for these principles that can be made sense of on non-classical grounds.
One lesson of the above considerations is that the failure of the vacuous theory of
counterpossibles to make sense of laws such as WLNC, MLEM, and WIMP does not
constitute a straightforward argument against the vacuous theory. After all, Lewis or
Stalnaker might not be able to endorse some or all of these principles, but neither can the
non-vacuous theories! Indeed, even reformulating these principles only puts off the
problem, since there will be problematic pairs of counterlogicals that make use of the same
kind of negation that is used to reformulate the principle. Nonetheless, there is some reason
to think that the non-vacuous theorist is at least somewhat better off than the vacuous
theorist of counterpossibles, since she is able to at least endorse this family of logical
principles. That is, Lewis’s semantics for counterpossibles hold that WLNC is violated for
every relevant pair of counterpossibles, while successful non-vacuous semantics for
counterpossibles can endorse WLNC in most cases, and offer a revised principle (such as
WLNC*) in the cases where it fails.

1.6 Conclusion
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Vacuous approaches to counterpossibles face various problems. They do not make
sense of our linguistic behavior or philosophical practice, and their treatment of ‘might’
counterpossibles is in tension with the very arguments that are used to support the view.
Indeed, no available approach is capable of endorsing all of the plausible principles of the
behavior of counterfactuals discussed above. Of the vacuous approaches, we can do best by
making all ‘might’ counterpossibles true and all ‘would’ counterpossibles false; nonetheless,
such an approach is unmotivated in light of arguments from philosophical and linguistic
practice. A non-vacuous approach to counterpossibles cannot endorse the above putative
principles, either, but it can endorse a family of logical principles that capture the intuitions
that make the original versions seem plausible. Doing so requires that we endorse a kind of
‘gap-or-glut filling’ negation that makes sense of what is ruled out in certain impossible
situations.
I am not suggesting that classical logic is not valid at this world with respect to
negation, or that we cannot consider impossibilities within some classical framework.
Indeed, the theory of counterpossibles that I ultimately endorse is classical, in the sense that
we can use classical logic to determine what is true at a world and to determine the logical
laws of impossible worlds. However, what makes a world impossible is that its propositions
are not closed under classical entailment; these worlds will contain contradictions.
Reasoning about what would happen if a contradiction were true involves ignoring certain
classical rules of logic if we are to avoid absurdity. To expect counterpossibles to respect
principles like Entailment or WLNC is to misunderstand what the antecedents of these
conditionals express.
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CHAPTER 2
COUNTERPOSSIBLES WITHOUT IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter contained a collection of arguments that suggest that
counterpossibles cannot be vacuous. If we are to make sense of linguistic intuitions as well
as philosophical and mathematical practice, we should admit that counterpossibles are
meaningful, and can be either true or false. Furthermore, the view that all ‘might’
counterpossibles are false stands in tension with some of the motivation for the view that
counterpossibles are vacuous, and the vacuous view of counterpossibles is in tension with
several plausible logical principles for the behavior of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals. A
non-vacuous view of counterpossibles is better able to make sense of our linguistic intuitions
and philosophical practice, and is capable of accounting for the failure of these logical
principles and offering suitable alternatives.
The analysis of counterpossibles that will ultimately be endorsed is one that expands
the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals in such a way as to allow impossible worlds
into the similarity metric; such an approach is also discussed by Nolan [1997], Yagisawa
[1987], Vander Laan [2004], Priest [2006], Mares [2004], and others. These impossible worlds
are worlds that contain true contradictions, but need not be worlds where, pace classical logic,
every proposition is true. Since there are now worlds that contain contradictions, evaluating
counterpossibles poses no special difficulty on this approach. A counterfactual is true, then,
iff the consequent is true in all of the nearest worlds – possible or otherwise – in which the
antecedent is true.
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Yet before such a view can be discussed in more detail, it should be noted that there
is some space between the view that counterpossibles are not vacuous and the view that
impossible worlds are required to give truth conditions to counterpossibles. This chapter
explores a family of options that attempt to give plausible truth conditions to
counterpossibles without any kind of commitment to the existence of impossible worlds.
Why might such a view be attractive? First, countenancing the existence of impossible
worlds, alongside the possible worlds, might be ontologically profligate. Believing in
possible worlds is, at least in some circles, already a large pill to swallow; adding impossible
worlds to the mix might be too much to bear. Not only are we adding many more mysterious
entities to our ontology, but these new entities are chaotic and unruly in a way that the
possible worlds are not. Second, it is not entirely clear in what ways these worlds would be
similar to our world, or similar to each other. How can we adjudicate the similarity of
worlds with contradictions? Which kinds of contradictions are more acceptable than others?
Can some world with a contradiction be more similar to the actual world than some world
without a contradiction?
Of course, these considerations are not decisive, and they will be addressed in later
chapters. Nonetheless, an alternate account that would provide non-trivial truth conditions
for counterpossibles, while avoiding the complications associated with the countenancing
impossible worlds would certainly be worth pursuing.

2.2 The consistent revisions approach
The first proposal relies on an analogy between the treatment of inconsistent belief
and counterpossibes. Insofar as we understand (and can reason from) the inconsistent
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antecedents of counterpossibles, we do so by construing them in a somewhat special
fashion.
One method of linking the analysis of counterfactuals to a treatment of belief is to
couch the antecedent and consequent of the counterfactual in belief reports. Rather than
attempting to determine what would follow from the truth of that I am a horse, we could
determine what would follow from that I believe that I am a horse. To get the proper truth
conditions for the counterpossible, we would couch the consequent under a belief operator
as well: if I were to believe that I am a horse, then I would believe that I have hooves. But
there are several serious problems with this approach. First, it is unclear whose beliefs are
relevant for determining the truth of the counterpossible: the utterer? the evaluator? an ideal
epistemic agent of some sort?
Even if we could settle this question, we would be holding the truth of these
counterpossibles hostage to broadly psychological considerations of what kinds of things
agents would believe given certain other, contradictory beliefs. Who knows what I (or even
some ideal agent) would believe if I were to actually believe that I am a horse? Maybe I’d
believe that I were a special hoof-less horse, or maybe my set of beliefs would be too
irrational and bizarre to make any real predictions about. And the problem is far worse if we
consider metaphysical theses: after all, determining what follows from necessarily false
philosophical theories is an important and substantive project, and one that we can be wrong
about. I could easily have false beliefs about what would follow from mereological nihilism
or Platonism that should not affect the truth or falsity of counterpossibles.
Rather than construing the antecedent and consequent of counterpossibles as
operating under belief operators, we could rather construe them as being comprehensible in
the fashion suggested by the compartmentalization approach to contradictory belief. Lewis
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[1982], Varzi [1997], Stalnaker [1987], and others suggest a strategy for giving content to
inconsistent beliefs within a possible worlds framework. Inconsistent beliefs pose a problem
for possible worlds theories of belief content, since an agent’s belief state is often taken to be
the set of possible worlds that are not ruled out by how the agent takes the world to be.21 If
the agent has contradictory beliefs, however, all possible worlds are ruled out, since no
possible world can represent the contradiction. On Lewis and Varzi’s approach,
contradictions are not accepted tout court, but are rather compartmentalized into consistent
sets of beliefs. An agent’s beliefs exist in these segregated compartments, such that she
believes different propositions in these separate compartments. No compartment contains a
belief of the form P-and-not-P, though one compartment may contain P, while another
compartment contains not-P. A proposition is believed by an agent when it is contained in
at least one compartment,22 though perhaps we might prefer to relativize what is believed to
a particular compartment or a particular situation; this matter need not be settled for present
purposes. Even when some agent has contradictory beliefs, then, we can give content to his
or her beliefs without resorting to impossible worlds; collections of possible worlds alone
can suffice.
The inconsistent antecedents of counterpossibles can be evaluated within a classical
framework by creating consistent revisions of the antecedent analogous to the consistent
revisions of belief states. We would thereby divide the counterpossible into two
counterfactuals, one for each revision of the antecedent.23 A counterpossible under
consideration would then be true when one of the resulting counterfactuals is true, just as a
See Hintikka [1962]
It should be noted that, on this approach, beliefs aren’t closed under conjunction. An agent may
believe P (since P exists in one compartment) and not-P (since not-P exists in another compartment),
but not P-and-not-P, since the contradiction isn’t present in any compartment.
23 If the consequent is also impossible (e.g., ‘If Graham Priest is right about logic, then there would
be true contradictions’), we would divide the consequent as well.
21
22
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proposition is believed by an agent if it exists in one of the belief compartments. Call such
an account of counterpossibles the consistent revision account.
The consistent revision account of counterpossibles is plausible for the same reasons
that the consistent revisions account of belief is plausible. Insofar as we are capable of
grasping contradictions, we do so by grasping some part of the contradiction. We believe in
contradictions by believing in something of the form P and something of the form P, and
are reduced to cognitive dissonance when we consider P & P at once. Similarly, we are
able to evaluate a counterpossible by determining whether some logical part of its antecedent
would result in the truth of the consequent, but are reduced to cognitive dissonance when
we attempt to evaluate what would result from the antecedent of the counterpossible taken
as a whole.
Before the consistent revisions account can get off the ground, an important
question must be addressed: how do we generate the revisions of the antecedent? The
obvious strategy is to construe the antecedent of the counterfactual as some conjunction of
the form P-and-not-P, and then make one revision of the counterpossible that takes P to be
the antecedent, and another revision that takes not-P to be the antecedent. But this will not
do. First, many counterpossibles do not seem to have antecedents that are conjunctive in
form; consider most of the examples that have motivated this project, such as ‘If Platonism
were true, then we would have no way of knowing about numbers.’ If there is something of
the form P-and-not-P “in” the antecedents of counterpossibles such as these, it would be hard
to find. This is not to say that it would be impossible to convert those counterpossibles into
conjunctions, but it does not seem plausible that there would be some principled way of
doing so. Second, many counterpossibles that do have explicitly conjunctive antecedents do
not seem to be amenable to this treatment; consider:
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(1) If I were to discover that the number of stars were even and odd, then I’d be
surprised.
The counterpossible should not divide into ‘If I were to discover that the number of stars
were even, I’d be surprised’ and ‘If I were to discover that the number of stars were odd, I’d
be surprised,’ since neither of these counterfactuals are true. I would not be surprised if the
number of stars were even, and I would not be surprised if the number of stars were odd;
I’m surprised only when the number is even and odd. The contradictory nature of the
antecedent is required to get the intuitive reading of the counterpossible. How can the
consistent revision account deliver the intuitively correct result?

2.3 The Best Revision Account
We might still think that the right approach to counterpossibles is one in which a
counterpossible is true if some related counterfactual is true. Perhaps the relevant
counterfactual is not one in which the antecedent is some conjunct of the counterpossible’s
antecedent, but rather some other related proposition. Such a related proposition would be
some related proposition from which we can recover the meaning of the contradictory
antecedent. We can find a “best revision” for some impossible antecedent such that it is
consistent (and thus amenable to the standard treatment of counterfactuals) while retaining
as much of the content of the original antecedent as possible. If this best revision
counterfactual is true, then the original counterpossible is true; if it’s false, then the
counterpossible is false.
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Take R(x) to be a function from propositions to propositions that results in the best
revision for the antecedent in question.24 If A is the antecedent of a counterpossible to be
evaluated, how do we determine the resulting proposition R(A)? Generally speaking, we
need to consider the context of utterance (or the context of evaluation) as well as the
antecedent itself to determine which proposition best captures the content of the antecedent.
Indeed, the same considerations used to evaluate the truth or falsity of ordinary
counterfactuals are in play here. When evaluating counterfactuals, we determine which
antecedent-world is most similar to the actual world in the relevant context, and then
determine whether the consequent holds in this world. Similarly, we use the context of the
counterpossible to determine what content can be gleaned from its antecedent. Replacing
the original antecedent with this consistent part of it will result in a counterfactual that can
be evaluated in the ordinary way.
However the consistent revisions of counterpossibles are derived, it should be noted
that this account gives a unified treatment to counterfactuals and counterpossibles.
Intuitively, when evaluating subjunctive conditionals, we grasp the antecedent by taking the
consistent revision of the antecedent that retains most of its content. If the antecedent is
already possible, then there need be no revision of the antecedent. The best revision of the
Note that, for this approach, we need some way of individuating propositions that is more finegrained than functions from possible worlds to truth-values. If propositions are merely these kinds
of functions, then all inconsistent propositions will be identical to each other; they will all be the
function that returns false for every possible world. This will mean that, however the “best revision”
function works, it will assign the same consistent revision to any inconsistent antecedent, since every
inconsistent antecedent is the same proposition. More fine-grained approaches to propositions are
required. Accounts of structured propositions such as that of [King 2007], or the interpreted logical
forms discussed in [Ludlow 2000] could suffice. The kind of structured propositions discussed in
this work in chapter 4 would suffice for this purpose as well, if our task is to individuate propositions
such as that 2 + 2 = 4 from that all bachelors are male. Note, however, that the kinds of structured
propositions discussed in chapter 4 are not as fine-grained as some other accounts, and thus cannot
differentiate a proposition such as that Superman flies from that Clark Kent flies, since Superman and
Clark Kent will be picked out by the same set of individuals across worlds. Intuitively, these
propositions ought to be differentiated, since one could believe one without believing the other, but
the kinds of impossible worlds described here are not the proper tool for that job.
24
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antecedent in such a case is the antecedent itself; if A is consistent, then R(A) = A. In this
fashion, we evaluate all subjunctive conditionals using the same method; the “best revisions”
approach need not be a separate analysis invoked only when the antecedent is impossible.
Furthermore, this method guarantees that our original judgments about counterfactuals are
unchanged; as long as the antecedent of the conditional is possible, the best revision of the
antecedent is the antecedent itself, so there would be no change to our analysis of
counterfactuals.
Of course, this is still just the outline of a theory of counterpossibles; more must be
said about how this function operates before the view can be evaluated.

2.3.1 The Best Revision and Similarity
One means of determining the best revision of the antecedent is to posit similarity
relations that hold between propositions; these similarity relations are analogous to the
similarity relations that hold between worlds. On such an approach, we determine which
consistent proposition is, in the contextually appropriate sense, most similar to the
counterpossible’s antecedent. Relying on the similarity of propositions to find the best
revision should not be seen as ad hoc; indeed, we already have a notion of comparative
similarity with respect to propositions that we employ in discussions about (imperfect)
translations or synonymy. A sentence can be very nearly the same as some other sentence, in
virtue of meaning very nearly the same thing. We can cash out such talk in terms of the
comparative similarity of the propositions that these sentences express.
Though we might have some intuitions about the comparative similarity of
propositions, such intuitions by themselves are not adequate to develop a general account. I
have no such general account of similarity to offer, but we should not expect any such
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account to match all of our intuitions about which propositions seem more similar to others,
any more than intuitive views of the similarity of worlds will be of use in determining which
possible worlds are closest to the actual world.
The proposal, then, is to take the similarity of propositions as unanalyzed, and use
that notion to determine how the function R(x) works. That is, given some context, R(A)
will be the possibly-true proposition that is most similar to the antecedent of the
counterfactual. We then evaluate the counterfactual R(A) C for truth; A  C is true
iff R(A)  C is true. If there is a tie for the proposition most similar to the antecedent,
then we could either say that the counterpossible is true when all of these nearby
propositions are such that the resulting counterfactuals are true, or we could say that the
counterpossible is true when at least some of the nearby propositions result in true
counterfactuals.
This view, however, is still disappointingly vague unless we can determine what
makes some proposition more or less similar to another. Perhaps one could hope to attach a
theory of the closeness of propositions to an extant theory of the closeness of worlds. One
proposition is similar to another if, by some measure, the possible worlds where the first
proposition is true are nearby, in logical space, to the possible worlds where the second
proposition is true. Of course, it would be very difficult to determine the degree to which
one collection of possible worlds is nearby to some other collection of possible worlds, but
we need not even attempt to address this. For our present purposes, we need to locate some
possibly-true proposition that is nearby to some necessarily-false proposition. Since there
are no possible worlds where the necessarily-false proposition is true, such an approach
could not even get off the ground. Some alternate approach is required.
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2.3.2 Qualitative Similarity and Counterparts
One approach for determining when some proposition is similar to another is the
qualitative similarity approach: a proposition is similar to another proposition to the extent
that the objects referred to by one proposition are qualitatively similar in relevant respects to
the objects referred to by the second proposition.25 Call the objects referred to in the revised
proposition the counterparts of the objects referred to in the antecedent of the
counterpossible. The counterpart of an object in this sense is one that is qualitatively similar
to it in relevant respects; these counterparts must share as many of these qualitative features
as possible, yet be such that the proposition that results from replacing the subject of the
antecedent with its counterpart is possibly true. In this sense, my counterpart can “play my
role” in some other world, even if in some worlds, my counterpart has properties that I
could not have. According to the current proposal, then, we determine which possible
proposition is most similar to the impossible antecedent by determining which possible
proposition ascribes the properties and relations in question to the object or objects most
qualitatively similar (in relevant respects) to those expressed by the counterpossible’s
antecedent. Thus, when we evaluate counterpossibles, we do not consider what would
happen if some object possessed a property that it could not possess, but rather consider
what would happen if some similar object bore the properties ascribed to it by the
counterpossible’s antecedent.
Of course, counterpart theory is nothing new with respect to understanding the
modal properties of objects.26 Yet its application here is quite independent of any theory of
the representation of de re modal properties. If one is a counterpart theorist already, then
one could accept this proposal as a kind of natural extension of the theory: this theory is an
25
26

Assume that a proposition is a structured entity comprised of objects, properties, and relations.
See, for example, Lewis [1968] and Lewis [1973].
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attempt to exploit the kinds of relations of qualitative similarity that are used to explain how
objects can be represented as existing at other world to explain how objects can be
represented as having properties that they could not have.27 Of course, one need not be a
counterpart theorist with respect to transworld identity to accept such an analysis of
counterpossibles: one could hold any view about how objects exist across worlds, but still
think that counterpossibles present a special case that require thinking about the objects in
question in a somewhat different way.
According to the counterpart theory of counterpossibles, when we grasp the
antecedent of a counterfactual such as
(2) If I were a horse, then I would have hooves.
we do not somehow imagine something that is essentially not a horse (viz., me) being a
horse; rather, we imagine something that is a counterpart of me as a horse. On such an
approach, then, we consider my qualitative properties and relations to determine the
appropriate counterparts of myself, and determine whether the counterfactual that results in
replacing me with such a counterpart is true. A counterpart of me that could be a horse
would be an object that has as many of the qualitative features that I have as possible, yet
could be a horse. Of course, specifying just what these features are is difficult, and much of
the discussion would hinge on what kinds of properties one thinks is essential to being a
horse or being a human. However this is to be spelled out, it should not be that my
counterpart has the same modal properties that I have: that is, we can assume for the sake of
the example that I am necessarily human, and my counterpart is not.

Assuming, of course, that there is no admissible counterpart relation according to which the object
in question has counterparts with the property ascribed by the antecedent. If counterpart relations
are tolerant enough to rule out all essential properties, then these kinds of conditionals will not be
counterpossibles.
27
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On this approach, to determine the truth of (2), we determine the truth of (2’):
(2’) If my counterpart were a horse, then it would have hooves.
In the nearest world where my counterpart, or something that plays my role, is a horse, that
thing has hooves; after all, if we assume that the counterpart in question is a horse at some
world, it would have the kinds of features we ordinarily associate with horses at that world.
Therefore, the revised counterfactual is true, and thus the counterpossible is true. Of
course, if such an approach were to be developed and defended, more would have to be said
about how we locate these counterparts and what their modal properties would be like.
Yet, however these questions are answered, this approach does not seem applicable
to cases of counterpossibles with antecedents that are logically or mathematically impossible.
It is unclear how to understand counterpossibles such as
(1) If I were to discover that the number of stars were even and odd, I’d be
surprised.
What are we supposed to find counterparts of? Presumably, not myself: there is no
counterpart of myself whatsoever that could discover that the number of stars were even
and odd, since ‘discover’ is factive: nothing could discover the impossible. It seems we
would have to find some counterpart for the number of stars that could be both even and
odd. What would this counterpart be? Clearly not some other number: no number could
possibly be both even and odd. Yet if the counterpart is not a number, then how could it be
even or odd at all? More generally, it seems difficult to imagine how this approach is
supposed to find the relevant kinds of qualitatively similar entities that could have collections
of properties that are logically or mathematically impossible.
It seems that the qualitative similarity approach is not capable of determining the
relevantly similar, revised antecedent for a wide range of counterpossibles. Of course, one
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could endorse some other “best revision” approach which attempts to determine the
relevantly similar proposition by some other means, but it is unclear what other strategy
could be plausible. Nonetheless, a more general argument against “best revision”
approaches could forestall an attempt to come up with a more plausible method of
determining how to revise the antecedent of counterpossibles.
2.4 Some objections: Surrogate Propositions and Inconsistency
At this point, one might object: perhaps this approach has merely avoided the
difficult problem by changing the subject, since we are no longer dealing with the truth
conditions of the counterpossibles, but rather with the truth conditions of counterfactuals
that are somehow similar to the counterpossibles with which we began. Instead of
evaluating conditionals with antecedents such as I am a horse or I have squared the circle we
evaluate conditionals with antecedents such as Something like me is a horse or, I come to believe that
I have squared the circle, and so on. The conditionals that we analyze for truth are, by design,
distinct from the original counterpossibles. By analyzing these surrogate conditionals, one
might complain, I have merely ducked the hard question of how we can deal with impossible
propositions in a Lewisian framework. But this objection misunderstands the enterprise.
This approach is merely an attempt to give non-vacuous truth conditions to
counterpossibles, and we have done so by identifying them with the truth conditions of
counterfactuals. The surrogates provided are not arbitrary conditionals unrelated to the
original counterpossibles; rather, they are selected to capture the cognitive content of the
impossibilities expressed by the impossible antecedents. A counterpossible has the truth
conditions it does in virtue of the nearby counterfactual. This does not mean that the
counterpossible is identical with the content of the counterfactual, or that we can never
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properly express counterpossible propositions. The claim is merely that counterpossibles are
true whenever their associated counterfactuals are true.
But there is a more serious worry in the neighborhood that does not have as easy an
answer. Perhaps some counterpossibles have the truth conditions that they do in virtue of
the contradiction expressed in the antecedent, and any attempt to avoid this contradiction by
way of replacing the antecedent with some possible proposition is bound to give us the
wrong results. That is, this entire family of approaches attempt to give the truth conditions
of the counterpossible in terms of the some counterfactual with a possible antecedent.
These approaches, then, are unable to give intuitively correct truth conditions to a
counterpossible whose truth depends on the impossibility of its antecedent.
At least one kind of case where the impossibility of the antecedent is salient to the
truth of the conditional does have an adequate response. Recall the ‘anything goes’ argument
discussed in chapter 1: on at least some ways of understanding the contradictory antecedents
of counterogicals, making the contradictory nature of the antecedent salient makes the result
that all counterpossibles are trivially true far more plausible. When we start to consider what
would happen if some contradiction were true, the argument goes, it becomes unclear just
what else would be true; indeed, given some impossible antecedent, maybe anything at all is
true. Yet this kind of special case is impossible according to the best revision approach,
since the antecedent will always be logically possible, and explosion will never result.
Furthermore, this trivial reading of the counterpossible is exactly what we require to make
sense of proofs by reductio. In such a proof, we can show that some assumption leads to a
contradiction, and thus the assumption must be false and its negation true. It is the
contradiction itself that gives us this result, and not some consistent revision of it that allows
us to draw this conclusion. Any form of the best revision approach to counterpossibles
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replaces the contradictory antecedent with something consistent, but in the case of an
“anything goes” context or a proof by reductio, it is precisely this inconsistency that is
required to derive the desired consequent.
The response is that presenting a proof by reductio must set a special kind of context
that is similar to the context set by the ‘anything goes’ argument. In this special case, the
consistent revision function will return an impossible proposition after all, such that
everything follows from it. Thus, reductios will be treated as a special context where R(A) is a
contradiction after all, but the contradiction will behave in a classical fashion, and explosion
will (rightly) result.
There is a more serious objection to this family of proposals, however. Consider a
counterpossible such as the following:
(3) If the number of stars were both even and odd, then some contradiction would
be true.
First, note that the consequent expresses an impossibility; if the analysis is to work, we must
also find some nearby contingent proposition for the consequent to express. The solution,
then, is to apply the revision function sketched above to the consequent in order to give (2)
the desired truth value. A counterpossible of the form A  C, then, would be true
whenever R(A)  R(C) is true.
It is not clear that moving toward some revision of the consequent will solve the
problem, however. In (3), it seems that any attempt to make the antecedent logically possible
will be inadequate to account for its content in such a way as to guarantee the truth of the
conditional. After all, intuitively, there would be a contradiction in the world of evaluation
because the antecedent is contradictory. That is, the link between the antecedent and
consequent of (3) that makes it seem (non-vacuously) true depends on the antecedent being
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impossible, and an analysis that treats the antecedent (and consequent) as possible would
miss this connection. This points toward a more general problem: however it is that we
decide what the best revision is, whether it be an approach that considers the beliefs of the
speaker, the counterparts of various objects, or some unanalyzed notion of a relevantly
similar proposition, it will be possible to come up with a counterpossible which cannot be
successfully analyzed by that approach. This is because the ‘best revision’ approach will
always leave some gap between the meaning of the antecedent and the meaning of the
revised antecedent, and this gap in meaning can be exploited in such a way as to produce a
counterexample.
In the case of (3), if we apply the consistent revision strategy to both the antecedent
and consequent, we will have no guarantee that the resulting counterfactual will have the
correct truth value. It seems implausible that a ‘best revision’ for the antecedent of a
conditional such as (3) would have much to do with our beliefs, or anything about the
counterparts of mathematical or logical objects. After all, it is difficult to say what I would
believe if I were to come to believe that the number of stars were even and odd, and as we
have seen, it is difficult to make sense of what the relevant counterpart relations in this case.
The best hope is to understand the best revision of the antecedent of this conditional in
terms of some unanalyzed “nearby” proposition.
One complaint, of course, is that there simply is not enough information about
propositional similarity to go on. What might this proposition “nearby” to the antecedent
be? My complaint is not that similarity in this notion of similarity is unanalyzed; everyone is
entitled to his or her primitives. Rather, the complaint is that it is difficult to imagine what
the most similar, logically possible proposition to some given impossibility could even look
like. It is difficult to make the case that a sentence such as (3) is analyzed correctly or not if
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we have no intuitive grasp of what the corresponding counterfactual would be. Thus, the
theory is completely untestable. Any attempt to elucidate the similarity relation for
propositions will open it up to easily generated counterexamples.

2.5 Counterfactuals and Logic
There is one further family of non-trivial analyses of counterpossibles to be
considered in this chapter. We might think that the counterfactual conditional is some kind
of entailment operator after all, and that Goodman-Chisholm analysis, according to which
we evaluate a counterfactual by determining whether the antecedent (as well as relevant
background information) entails the consequent, is nearly correct after all. One could then
argue that a counterpossible is true whenever its consequent can be formally derived from
the antecedent in the proper way. Since avoiding triviality is important, however, the notion
of entailment in such a theory cannot be classical, lest any consequent be true when the
antecedent is inconsistent. The entailment relation must in question must, at least, reject the
principle of explosion, according to which everything follows from a contradiction.
According to such an analysis, A  C is true whenever A L C, where L represents the
entailment operator of some language L.
Which language could we fill in for L? We need not commit ourselves to a particular
logic here, but it seems plausible that a relevance logic28 would be a strong candidate. Such
logics avoid explosion, and thus would not result in triviality; they also enforce a requirement
that the premises of an argument be “relevant” to its conclusion; the information contained
in the premises must be used in deriving the conclusion. There are various ways to enforce
this requirement, either syntactically (by marking premises in such a way that one must make
28

See, for example, Anderson and Belnap [1975] and Restall [2000].
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use of them in a derivation) or semantically (by using a so-called ternary accessibility
relation,29 which would hold that worlds can only be accessible to one another in such a way
that the information contained in the premises is present in the worlds where the conclusion
is true). What is important for our purposes is that there are plausible logical systems that
could be used in such a way as to give counterpossibles non-trivial truth conditions without
the use of impossible worlds.30
In order to accept such a view, one need not endorse some non-classical logic per se.
This view does not claim that, for example, the principle of explosion is invalid. One could
endorse this view as a classical logician and a non-pluralist, claiming that classical entailment
is the only game in town. Perhaps non-classical logics describe some other relation between
propositions, perhaps they are merely syntactic games. Yet so long as they describe some
kind of intelligible system, we can use that system to determine when counterpossibles are
true.
A more serious problem is that, even if we could decide on a plausible logical system,
it would never be adequate to describe the truth conditions of all counterpossibles. For any
choice of L, there will be some weaker logic, L’, such that we could use counterpossibles to
discuss the behavior of L’. Yet using the entailment relation of L to describe what follows
from L’ would clearly be mistaken. If, for example, we used relevant implication to
determine what would follow from intuitionistic logic, we would find that all the theorems
of relevance logic would be true. Clearly, any choice of L for counterpossible entailment will
not allow one to determine what would follow if other languages were true.

Due to Routley and Meyer [1983].
One might object that logical approaches do require the use of impossible worlds, since most of
the semantics for these logics makes use of worlds that are inconsistent or incomplete. But the
possible worlds of logical systems are set-theoretic entities, not worlds in the sense that (for example)
Lewis discusses in [1986].
29
30
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Perhaps there is a more modest kind of logical analysis of counterpossibles. Rather
than make use of some specific non-classical logic, one might hold that a counterpossible is
true if its consequent can be derived in classical logic, in some “reasonably direct” way. Of
course, what it is for a proof to be “reasonably direct” is quite vague, but it surely must avoid
use of principles such as explosion, lest the theory of counterpossibles be vacuous. Yet we
cannot merely rule out this rule of inference on its own, since explosion can be derived from
disjunction introduction and disjunctive syllogism, both of which seem to be unimpeachable,
even for paradigmatically “reasonably direct” proofs; a reasonably direct derivation could
easily include one or both of these principles and not lead to triviality. Furthermore, it
seems, sometimes the principle of explosion is an important part of reasoning, as in certain
proofs by reductio and in certain “anything goes” contexts. Thus, it seems quite hard to know
just what a “reasonably direct” proof would and would not rule out. Clearly, there are no
particular rules of inference to be denied, nor some number of steps of a formal derivation
that one is entitled to use. The notion of a reasonably direct proof simply seems too vague
to be of much use.
Of course, these arguments are not decisive; the defender of some logical account of
counterpossibles could attempt to come up with some theory of what a “reasonably direct
derivation” is in such a way that makes it at least as precise as counterpossibles, and at least
in theory testable. Yet as it stands, there seems to be no way to avoid the principle of
explosion without adopting a non-classical logic, and adopting any particular non-classical
logic will leave the theory incapable of dealing with all counterpossibles.

2.6 Conclusion
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An analysis of counterpossibles that aims to provide correct, non-trivial truth
conditions without countenancing the existence of impossible worlds is worth exploring.
Since such a theory does not rely on impossible worlds, it would not need not answer
uncomfortable questions about ontology or similarity among logically impossible worlds.
Rather, such an account offers an ontologically cheaper picture of how we reason about
counterpossibles that gives us intuitively plausible truth conditions by relying on less
problematic, nearby propositions in place of impossible antecedents.
These approaches, unfortunately, are ultimately inadequate to the task. If the
analysis of counterpossibles proceeds in such a way that ignores the inconsistent nature of
their antecedents, then it will be possible to find counterexamples to the theory that trade on
this gap between the impossible antecedent and the possible revision of it. After all, many
counterpossibles are true because the antecedent is impossible, and if that counterpossible is
to be analyzed in terms of some counterfactual with a possible antecedent, there is simply no
reason to assume that this counterfactual will have the appropriate truth value. If, on the
other hand, the analysis relies on some particular choice of a non-classical entailment
relation, one must be faced with the choice of which entailment relation to make use of,
which would close off the analysis to a large family of counterlogicals.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND SIMILARITY

3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of what makes a world – possible or
impossible – more or less similar to the actual world, so that truth conditions for
counterpossibles can be given in such a way as to extend the Lewis/Stalnaker semantics of
counterfactuals. According to the Lewis/Stalnaker account, a counterfactual is true iff its
consequent is true in the “closest” or “most similar” possible worlds where the antecedent is
true.31 That is, a counterfactual is true when the consequent of that counterfactual is true in
those possible worlds at which the “minimal changes” necessary are made to smoothly
accommodate the truth of the antecedent. A sentence such as, ‘If dinosaurs were to still
exist, then there would be fewer people’ is true, as there are fewer people in a world much
like this one (in relevant respects), yet where dinosaurs still exist. It would seem plausible
that such a “nearby” world is one where we change facts about how the dinosaurs actually
went extinct, as well as various facts about history and the environment that would have
been affected by the presence of dinosaurs; plausibly, we would change facts about
evolutionary development or predation that would affect the human population in this
world. Other facts that are not relevantly related to the presence of dinosaurs, such as the
color of snow or the shape of our planetary orbit, are not changed at such a possible world.
The Lewis/Stalnaker account of counterfactuals is developed in Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968]
and discussed in more detail in chapter 1. There are, of courses, differences between the way that
Lewis and Stalnaker analyze counterfactuals, such as the analysis of ‘might’ counterfactuals and
whether, given some counterfactual, there is a unique “closest” possible world or set of worlds.
These differences will not affect how the account of counterfactuals is developed here; I assume, for
the sake of exposition, that there may be “ties” with respect to which worlds where the antecedent of
the counterfactual are true are closest, but that there will always be at least one closest antecedent
world.
31
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Much of the disagreement about the analysis of counterfactuals, then, lies in determining
which facts vary and which facts are held fixed in the “most similar,” “closest,” or “nearby”
possible worlds.32 What kind of changes must be made in order to properly alter what is true
at a world so as to locate the nearest possible world where the antecedent of the
counterfactual is true?
As Lewis argues, it is possible to come up with a kind of “standard” similarity metric
that would allow one to determine how a world is minimally altered in this fashion. With
some minor refinements, Lewis’s analysis is capable of explaining the truth conditions of
counterfactuals and meeting some of the challenges that have been leveled against it.
Furthermore, with these refinements in hand, it also becomes clear how to extend Lewis’s
treatment in such a way as to give truth conditions to counterpossibles.

3.2 Lewis and Counterfactuals
It is clear that offhand intuitions about how similar some possible world is to the
actual world will not count for much. Lewis said this as early as his [1973:95], although
much of the early discussion of his account nevertheless relied on such judgments about
similarity. Of course, noting that our intuitions about the similarity of worlds are a poor
guide to transworld similarity does not bring us much closer to developing an account of the
phenomenon. The challenge of explicating this notion remains; indeed, it is exacerbated if
we think that our intuitions about similarity will play little if any role in determining the
comparative nearness of worlds.33

I will use locutions such as “similarity,” “nearness,” and “closeness” synonymously.
The kind of similarity that holds between worlds should not be confused with a notion of
“objective similarity” that holds between objects. When we say that two objects are similar in such a
way as to underwrite claims about counterpart theory, for example, we are not appealing to the same
notion of similarity that underwrites trans-world identity. There are, however, some common
32
33
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Consider the case of Fine’s Bomb, discussed in his [1975]. Imagine that, at some
time t, the President’s finger is poised over the button that would launch nuclear weapons at
Russia. Thankfully, she thinks better of it, and decides not to press the button. Intuitively,
the following counterfactual is true:
(1) If the President had pressed the button at t, there would have been nuclear war.
But how can we get this result with something like the view of counterfactuals sketched
above? If we think that the nearest possible world where the President presses the button is
like this world in relevant respects, then we should think that it is a world that is, at least as
much as possible, very much like the actual world. Yet, consider a few possible worlds. In
w1, the President presses the button, the mechanism works as designed, and there is nuclear
war. In w2, the President presses the button, but the firing mechanism fizzles in such a way
that no missiles are launched, and there is no nuclear war. If we are to rely on intuitions
about similarity, it seems clear that w2 is closer to the actual world than w1: after all, a world
with nuclear war is a world that develops in vastly different ways after t, and would look very
different from the actual world. A world without a nuclear war such as w2 deviates from the
actual world only in matters of comparatively little importance. The button may have the
President’s fingerprints, and she may have memories of pressing the button, but such
differences seem inconsequential compared to the nuclear holocaust present in w1.
As Lewis explains in his [1979], only certain kinds of matches of facts count toward
the closeness of worlds; not all such matches are created equal. Lewis presents a list of
desiderata in determining which kinds of matches are important:34

threads: for example, the requirement that there be a “perfect match” of matters of fact resembles
the requirement that the appropriately natural properties be duplicated.
34 For the purposes of this discussion, Lewis assumes that determinism is true. If the actual world is
indeterministic, then the picture will be at least somewhat more complicated; one must understand
the notion of ‘miracle’ that Lewis deploys in a somewhat different fashion, so as to count events that
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1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of law.
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout
which perfect match of particular fact prevails
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law
4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact
A world that contains a widespread and diverse violation of nomological law (or “large
miracles”) will never be as closeby as a world that does not contain such a violation. Second,
a world will be closeby to the extent that it has a large region of perfect match of matters of
fact, unless such a match comes at the expense of a large miracle; it is not important that a
world like w2 has approximately the same kind of history as the actual world, but it should
rather match the actual world perfectly. Third, a closeby world should minimize the
occurrence of “small miracles,” or more localized violations of nomological law.35 In some
contexts, it is at least somewhat important to achieve an “approximate” match of matters of
fact, but not in other contexts; we can ignore this complication for present purposes.
In light of this, Lewis’s response to Fine is now clear: we can imagine two ways in
which the nuclear-holocaust-free world could seem nearby to the actual world, but on either
way of understanding w2, a world such as w1 will end up as closer to the actual world
according to Lewis’s analysis. Both worlds will, of course, require a “small miracle” in order
to make it true that the President presses the button; there must, somehow, be an exception
to the laws of physics, perhaps localized in some region of the President’s brain, which

are nomically possible but are coincidental to the point of seeming to be conspiratorial. See his
discussion of ‘quasi-miracles’ in the postscript to [1979].
35 When a possible world is said to contain some violation of law, this should be understood as a
violation of our laws. If some miracle occurs that causes some possible world to deviate from our
word, then our laws of physics were violated; presumably, the possible world that contains this
miracle either has different laws, so as to account for this change, or no laws that apply to the
phenomenon in discussion.
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causes her to press the button that launches the nuclear weapons. But worlds like w2 will
either not perfectly match the future of the actual world, or they will also require a “large
miracle” so as to achieve this match.
Imagine a world w2A at which there is no nuclear war, but the myriad effects of the
President’s button-pressing still spread out into the future. Maybe that moment is recorded
in her memoirs; maybe her decisions later in life are profoundly affected by this dark
moment in her past. There will certainly be a great many mundane effects as well: the
President’s fingerprints will be on the button, the sound waves will emanate from the click
of the button, the heat will dissipate from the wire, the air will be disturbed, and so. Various
changes in the world will propagate from the button-pressing. The development of this
world after t will not perfectly match what happens in the actual world: while the past of the
actual world and w2A will be perfectly alike, the future of the two worlds will not be perfectly
alike, as the traces of the President’s actions spread through the world after t. Since this
match of fact in the future is not perfect, it will not count toward its similarity to the actual
world. World w1, then, is closer to the actual world than w2A. Both possible worlds match
the history of the actual world just prior to t perfectly, and neither matches the history of the
actual world after t. However, w1 requires only one small miracle (which causes the President
to press the button), while w2A requires two small miracles (one causes the President to press
the button, and the second causes the firing mechanism to fail.)
We could also imagine a world w2B at which the various traces of the President’s
button-pressing – the memories, fingerprints, sound waves, and so on – are all wiped clean
from the world. In worlds such as these, some diverse and widespread violation of law
would be required to eliminate all of the myriad traces of the President’s button-pressing; the
world would have to conspire to remove the memories, the sound waves, the heat from the
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wire, the disturbances in the air, and so on. Note that w2B does match the actual world
perfectly after t, but it does so at the cost of a large miracle. Thus, neither of these worlds
will be as nearby as w1, where there is nuclear war, but no large miracle.
It is important to note that Lewis does not offer this approach as some kind of
analysis of our intuitive notion of trans-world closeness. As Fine has shown, our intuitions
about the similarity of worlds will land us in trouble if they are used to evaluate the truth of
counterfactuals. A more technical conception of transworld closeness, divorced to at least
some degree from our intuitions, can be judged adequate to the extent that it is capable of
being deployed in such a way as to make sense of our intuitions about the truth values of
counterfactuals. If Lewis’s desiderata for the closeness of worlds does not seem intuitive, it
is merely because a theory of the closeness of worlds must ultimately answer to our
intuitions about counterfactuals such as (1).

3.3 Complications
Nonetheless, the account given by Lewis in his [1979] cannot be the last word on the
matter. The first kind worry for Lewis’s account is that, in at least some cases, there are
“deviant” possible worlds that contain a perfect match in matters of fact without requiring
some large miracle; in these cases, Lewis’s desiderata would give us the wrong truth values.
Consider a process that results in a “deviant” match of matters of fact, such that the
kind of analysis suggested in Lewis’s [1979] will get the wrong result. One such case is
presented by Elga in his [2001]. Imagine that, at the actual world, Greta cracks an egg on a
pan at 8:00; by 8:05, a fried egg sits on the pan. Consider the following counterfactual:
(2) If Greta had not cracked an egg at 8:00, there would be no fried egg at 8:05.

63

This counterfactual is presumably true: the nearest worlds where Greta does not crack an
egg in the pan are worlds where there is no subsequent fried egg. At such worlds, a small
miracle occurs, perhaps isolated in Greta’s brain, which results in her deciding not to crack
an egg in the pan, and thus, no fried egg results; call a world such as this w3. There are, to be
sure, possible worlds where Greta does not crack the egg, but a fried egg miraculously
appears in the pan at 8:05, but Lewis would claim that these worlds would either not match
the actual world’s history after 8:00 perfectly (if, for example, there are differences in Greta’s
memory or in the heat distribution in the kitchen), or would require a large miracle (so as to
ensure that all traces of Greta’s decision not to crack the egg are wiped from the world).
Consider, however, a world such as w4, where a fried egg appears on the pan at 8:05;
the history of w4 and the actual world match perfectly after 8:05, complete with all of the
apparent traces of Greta’s decision to crack the egg. Yet the fried egg that appears at 8:05 is
not the result of Greta having cracked the egg, or some large miracle that conspires to make
the world seem like Greta had cracked the egg, but is rather the result of a more lawful, antientropic process: prior to 8:05, the fried egg “unrotted” on the pan, forming in some
improbable-seeming way out of organic material around the pan. Prior to 8:00, the history of
a world like w4 will look quite different from the history of the actual world, yet at 8:05, the
worlds perfectly converge without the kind of large miracle that Lewis would object to.
Worlds such as w3 and w4 both match the actual world in an analogous way, since w3
perfectly matches the actual world from before 8:00 and w4 perfectly matches the actual
world after 8:05. It is clear why w3 requires only a small miracle: we require only some small
change in some region of Greta’s brain in order to make Greta decide not to crack the egg,
and the rest of the world evolves in some predictable way from there. But why think that w4
also requires only a small miracle, when the world contains some incredibly improbable
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event that results in a conspiracy of false memories and other seeming traces of Greta’s
decision?
Elga asks us to imagine the process that occurs in the actual world from 8:00 to 8:05,
in which Greta cracks an egg, the egg heats in the pan, and a fried egg results. Consider now
this process run backwards in time, from 8:05 to 8:00, in which a fried egg cools in a pan,
and eventually flies back into its shell; such a process is possible according to the dynamic
laws, but is fabulously improbable. Such a process is also fragile, in the sense that a small
change to some of the particles in the system will result in a wildly different result, in which
the egg will not return to its shell, but rather remain in the pan and continue to cool and rot
(albeit in reverse). Such a small change would constitute a small miracle; thus, a small
miracle change to the 8:05 to 8:00 process results in a very different world in which there is a
fried egg, but no egg-cracking. If we take the actual world, then, and make a small, localized
change to the particles in the pan at around 8:05, and then run the dynamic laws backwards,
the result will be a possible world w4 which differs from the actual world by a small miracle,
and in which there is a fried egg at 8:05, but no egg-cracking at 8:00. Since w3 and w4 are tied
according to Lewis’s metric, the defender of such an approach would not be able to claim
that a counterfactual such as (2) is true.36 A modification of Lewis’s account is required to
meet Elga’s challenge.

3.4 Causation and Explanation
There are, to be sure, other proposals that seek to modify Lewis’s account of the
similarity of worlds in such a way as to handle the kinds of objections that Elga and others
Elga’s example is a particularly persuasive case where reconvergence does not seem to require a
‘large miracle.’ Bennett discusses other such cases in [1984]. For other putative counterexamples to
the similarity metric described in Lewis [1979], see Wasserman [2006], Kment [2006a], and
Hawthorne [2005].
36
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advance against Lewis. The strategy is to locate some feature of the kind of match of
matters fact that is deviant; the kinds of match of matters of fact that Elga and others rely on
to formulate their counterexamples could then be ruled out in our similarity metric of
possible worlds.
According to Schaffer [2004], the only facts that count toward the comparative
nearness of possible worlds are those facts that are causally independent of the antecedent.
In the case of Elga’s egg, we should not consider w4 to be as nearby as w3, because while w4
perfectly matches the history of the actual world after the appearance of the fried egg, such a
match is not causally independent of the antecedent: whether or not there is a fried egg (in
the actual world) depends on the result of a causal chain that is anchored in the Greta’s eggcracking. Since, in the actual world, the fried egg is caused by Greta’s cracking of the egg,
any kind of match related to the existence of the egg (which includes much of the match that
exists between the actual world and w4 after 8:05) simply does not count toward trans-world
similarity. Thus, w3 will be closer to the actual world after all.
We might not be content, however, to accept Schaffer’s account of counterfactuals.
First, as Schaffer notes, it does not allow us to reduce causation to counterfactuals in some
clearly non-circular fashion. To be sure, the counterfactual account of causation faces some
trouble,37 but it seems premature to rule out such an account by building causation into our
notion of counterfactual analysis. This is no refutation of Schaffer’s analysis, but there is at
least some reason to look for some analysis of counterfactuals that does not rely on
causation, so as not to close off hope of any such analysis.
Another reason not to accept Schaffer’s analysis is that it does not seem general
enough for our purposes. Ultimately, our approach should be capable of making sense of
37

See, for example, Lewis [2000], Schaffer [2000], and Hall [2003].
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conditionals whose antecedents express nomological, metaphysical, or logical impossibilities.
But Schaffer’s account is concerned only with avoiding a certain kind of deviant match of
matters of fact that arises in cases such as Elga’s; it is not of much help when evaluating
counterfactuals whose antecedents express nomological impossibilities, since it gives no
explicit guidance with respect to how to measure the comparative similarity of worlds with
different laws. And, of course, it is not clear how such an approach can be extended to give
an analysis of when counterpossibles are true.
Perhaps causation is the wrong notion to hang our analysis on. According to Kment
[2006], the only facts that count toward the comparative nearness of possible worlds are
those that have the same explanation in both worlds. Thus, in the case of Elga’s egg, world
w4 will not be closer to the actual world than w3, since the presence of the fried egg has
different explanations in w4 and the actual world: in the actual world, there is a fried egg
because of Greta’s actions, and in w4, there is a fried egg because of some anti-entropic
process.38 Thus, the presence of the fried egg, and indeed the rest of the history that follows
from the existence of that fried egg, simply does not contribute towards the closeness of a
world like w4 to the actual world; worlds such as w3 will match the history of the actual world
perfectly prior to 8:00, but worlds such as w4 will not match the history of the actual world
after 8:05, since the events after that time have a different explanation than they do in the
actual world. The two worlds, then, are not tied for similarity to the actual world.
Kment’s approach places a lot of weight on the notion of explanation, so more must
be said about the notion of explanation that is capable of doing the work required. If the
kind of explanation is epistemic, then Kment’s analysis of counterfactuals is hostage to how
One could argue that we cannot explain the existence of an egg by some probabilistic mechanical
process, especially if the probability of that phenomenon is close to zero. Perhaps it would be better
to say that the fried egg has no explanation in w4. In either case, though, it is clear that it does not
have the same explanation that it does in the actual world.
38
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well we understand (or can understand) the world. Yet it seems that what would happen
under counterfactual circumstances does not depend on our knowledge or our cognitive
abilities. There is a fact of the matter about what would happen if I were to press a button
or crack an egg, and what would happen does not depend on whether we know how the
button is wired or what our present beliefs about of the laws of statistical mechanics are.
The notion of explanation, then, should be ontic; explanations should be understood in such
a way that they are somehow part of the structure of the world. Kment suggests as much,
proposing that we should understand explanation as Salmon does in his [1984]. Yet
Salmon’s account of explanation relies both on causation, since for him explanation is an
attempt at fitting the phenomenon to be explained into a causal structure, as well as
counterfactual analysis, since this causal structure is understood in terms of the ability of
objects to transfer “marks.” The possession of some ability seems to be a counterfactual
notion: something possesses the ability to transfer a mark if it would transfer a mark under
certain (generally) counterfactual conditions.
Insofar as the proposed account of explanation makes use of causation, it will inherit
the charges against Schaffer. More importantly, we cannot adopt Salmon’s account of
explanation in the analysis of counterfactuals without courting blatant circularity as long as
explanation is understood in counterfactual terms. Finally, it would seem that such an
account would leave us no closer to understanding the truth conditions of counterfactuals
with nomically or metaphysically impossible antecedents. Perhaps a proposal along the lines
offered by Kment and Schaffer could be made to work: one could attempt to reformulate
such an account of the similarity of worlds if one is able to elucidate a notion of explanation
(or causation) adequate for the project. The moral to be drawn for the purposes of the
present analysis, however, is that, even if laws and explanation can play a role in the
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similarity metric for counterfactuals, they cannot be used in the way that Schaffer and
Kment suggest.

3.5 Special Science Laws
Dunn [2010] suggests a different kind of way of amending Lewis’s similarity metric
in response to Elga. According to Dunn, the similarity metric should be changed by adding
a requirement that it is important to avoid violation of special science laws. This
requirement is inserted into Lewis’s desiderata after the third requirement, that it is
important to avoid “small miracles.” Dunn’s revised similarity metric, in full, is as follows:
1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of
fundamental, nomological law.
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout
which perfect match of particular fact prevails
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of
fundamental, nomological law
3.5) It is of fourth importance to avoid violation of special science laws.
4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact.
Note that, in the first and third requirements, we have made clear that Lewis seeks to avoid
violations of fundamental law, so as to differentiate these requirements from the kind of match
of special science laws that Dunn recommends.
This approach to the comparative similarity of possible worlds offers a
straightforward response to Elga’s challenge: a world such as w3 will be closer to the actual
world than a world such as w4, since w3 does not violate special science laws in the way that
w4 does. The anti-entropic process that occurs at w4 violates the second law of
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thermodynamics, and even though the laws of thermodynamics are not fundamental or
without exception, such a violation of law results in w4 being farther away from the actual
world than w3. Thus, even though w3 and w4 are tied with respect to violations of
fundamental law and tied with respect to the size of the region of perfect match of matters
of fact, w3 matches the laws of thermodynamics in a way that w4 does not.
Perhaps there is also another, related way of responding to Elga’s objection. Assume
that we can determine the laws of a world in a broadly Humean fashion, according to which
a world is associated with an ideal system that can be used to derive what is true at the world.
As Lewis describes the project:
“Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, better
systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative than others. These
virtues compete: An uninformative system can be very simple, an unsystematized
compendium of miscellaneous information can be very informative. The best
system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between
simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will depend on how kind nature
is. A regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the best system.” (1994: 231)
On such an approach, we distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations by
determining whether the generalization in question is a theorem of the system that achieves
the best balance of simplicity and strength. The strength of a system is a measure of its
informativeness, or the number of possibilities it rules out. Determining the simplicity of
the system is a somewhat more delicate matter: we certainly do not want an account of
simplicity that relies on the psychology of a collection of individuals, or on the syntax of
some language used by these individuals, lest the account of laws be too subjective. Yet we
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need not admit defeat so easily: there must be some notion of simplicity that supports the
judgment that, for example, “a linear function is simpler than a quartic function” (ibid).
The best system account is often favored by those with Humean scruples: we can use
such an approach, it is argued, to describe the laws of a world without appeal to any
“spooky” unanalyzed modality, either by way of counterfactuals are nomic necessities. The
fabric of the world is merely a collection of objects and their properties, and the laws of the
world are merely collections of generalizations about those objects. An account of laws
along these lines could make for good ideology. If these kinds of generalizations are to play
a role in a theory of counterfactuals, however, then a non-modal account of them is essential
to our theory: after all, if the analysis of counterfactuals contains an important role for laws,
then laws cannot be understood in counterfactual (or otherwise problematically modal)
terms on pain of circularity.
According to such an approach, the laws are the generalizations of this “best
system.” But what about the other theorems that comprise the system? Other kinds of facts
about the state of the word might earn a place in the best system, even if we would not want
to call these kinds of propositions laws. These facts are useful with respect to determining
what the world is like, even if they are not generalizations in the best system of the world.
Consider, for example, the past hypothesis, according to which the universe began in a state
of low entropy.39 The past hypothesis, along with the laws of statistical mechanics, can
explain why the entropy of large systems increases over time.40 Such a fact is necessary to

See Albert [2000] for a discussion of the past hypothesis.
The reduction of such laws to statistical mechanics by determining the comparative volume of
paths through phase space, along the lines of Boltzmann is not by itself sufficient to explain the
development of macroscopic systems. These paths through phase space are themselves governed by
the dynamic laws of motion, and are themselves time-reversible. It is true that the vast majority of
paths through phase space that begin in a region of low entropy wander into regions of high entropy
(and ultimately equilibrium), and that once a path is in a region of high entropy, it is highly likely to
39
40
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explain why systems evolve in the way that they do, and can be stated in a way that is quite
simple. It is likely, then, that the past hypothesis earns a place in the best system, given its
simplicity and its ability to explain the behavior of macroscopic systems.41
The idea, then, is to add the class of statements like the past hypothesis into the
similarity metric. Such claims are not laws, but rather theorems about the nature of the
world. Even though such theorems are not laws, they are still special kinds of claims about
the nature of the world, and thus worlds in which these theorems are false are worlds that
are importantly different from the actual world. Our revised similarity metric, then, would
be as follows:
1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of
nomological law.
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout
which perfect match of particular fact prevails
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of
nomological law

remain there. Noting this, however, does not give us anything like an arrow of time, since these
paths run both forwards and backwards through time. A low entropy state will probably be in a state
of higher entropy in the future, but it will have also probably have been in a state of higher entropy in
the past, if we can only judge how a system is likely to evolve by the comparative volume of these
paths.
41 One might argue that the past hypothesis would not be part of the best system of the world, since
even if it plays an important role in the reduction of the laws of thermodynamics, it is redundant if
the initial conditions of the world are also a part of the best system. Yet I would not want to be
committed to the claim that the initial conditions are part of the best system. First, they may score
poorly enough on the simplicity requirement that gains made in informativeness will not be
sufficient. Second, it may not be the initial conditions that are so highly predictive, but rather the
conditions of the universe at any time, if the fundamental laws are time-reversible. Nonetheless, even
if we concede that claims such as the past hypothesis would not be part of a “best system,” we could
still hold that such claims are important with respect to the evaluation of counterfactuals; that is,
there could be a category of sufficiently informative, sufficiently simple sentences that are “useful
hypotheses” even if they are not contained in the ideal system, and these useful hypotheses could be
used to evaluate the nearness of worlds.
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3.5) It is of fourth importance to avoid violations of the theorems of the best system
that are not laws.
4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact.
This would let us see why w4 is more distant than w3: at w4, the past hypothesis is not true. A
world such as w4 did not begin in a state of low entropy, but rather a state of high entropy (at
least in the “infected region”). Thus, even though this world has the same laws as the actual
world, w4 contains other conditions that are quite different, and would therefore be judged as
farther away from the actual world than w3.
Ultimately, either the addition of a requirement to match special science laws or a
requirement to match the theorems of the best system that are not generalizations could
provide the requisite response to Elga. Dunn’s proposal has the advantage of being able to
avoid difficult questions about which propositions at a world are part of its “best system,”
while my proposal has the advantage of avoiding difficult questions about how a Humean
ought to accommodate the special sciences into a “best system” of the world. Both
approaches, it should be noted, threaten Lewis’s project of locating the “arrow of time” in
counterfactuals: in the case of Dunn’s approach, this is because the arrow of time could be
embedded in the laws of the special sciences, and in my approach, this is because the arrow
of time is stipulated by the past hypothesis. Nonetheless, the strategy of adding
requirements to Lewis’s standard similarity metric in light of putative counterexamples
suggests that we could also add requirements to Lewis’s metric in such a way as to
accommodate counterpossibles. Furthermore, thinking of laws in Humean terms gives us
some insight into how to understand the different kinds of logical or metaphysical laws of
impossible worlds.

73

3.6 Counterpossibles
The discussion so far has been concerned with the truth conditions of counterfactuals
with metaphysically possible antecedents; it has merely been an assumption that a plausible
account of such counterfactuals could be generalized so as to make sense of the truth
conditions of counterpossibles. Modifying the account to respond to Elga’s objection is
necessary in the course of giving a complete account of counterfactuals, but we must also
make good on the promise of providing a similarity metric that makes sense of
counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. We have seen that a proposal in the spirit
of Lewis’s similarity metric is capable of meeting an array of challenges leveled against it.
Nonetheless, our ultimate goal is not to defend Lewis’s proposal for counterfactuals per se,
but to offer an analysis that can accommodate counterfactuals with metaphysically
impossible antecedents.
There have been few worked-out accounts of how transworld similarity might work
in light of the existence of impossible worlds. Nolan [1997], for example, seems to
alternately assume that Lewis’s account of ‘similarity-in-relevant-respects’ carries over more
or less straightforwardly in the case of impossible worlds at some points, and relies on
intuitive judgments about the similarity of worlds at other points. Brogaard and Salerno
[2008] hold that a world is nearby to the extent that it holds fixed “background facts” and
preserves “relevant” a priori consequences, which are relativized to a speaker and a context.
Yet even if this notion of a relevant a priori consequence can be made sense of, the resulting
account of counterpossibles is too speaker-relative to make sense of counterlogicals, or to be
of much use in discussions of metaphysical dependence (see chapter 5). The proper way to
see how we could expand Lewis’s account is to look at an example and see what kinds of
considerations may be in play.
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Consider, for example, a counterfactual whose antecedent is metaphysically
impossible. Consider an example from chapter 1:
(3) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be no tables.
Presumably, this counterpossible is true. On a ‘nearest worlds’ approach of counterfactuals,
this would mean that the nearest worlds where mereological nihilism is true are impossible
worlds where tables do not exist.
A few assumptions for the sake of this example: first, if we are to take (3) as a
counterpossible, we should assume that mereological nihilism is false in all possible worlds.
This is a substantive claim, of course: not only does composition occur, but it occurs in all
possible worlds that contain conditions favorable to how composition actually occurs.
Furthermore, we should assume that the antecedent of (3) does not entail a contradiction. It
is obviously not a formal contradiction, but we should also assume that no formal
contradiction could be derived from a statement of the theory, so as to separate (3) from the
class of counterlogicals.
Why should we think that the nearest worlds where mereological nihilism is true are
worlds without tables? There are, after all, impossible worlds where mereological nihilism is
true, but tables exist. One kind of world is w5: such a world is very much like our own, and
everything that is true in the actual world is true in w5 as well. But w5 is an impossible world
where we add the proposition that mereological nihilism is true to the set of truths of the actual
world. Such a world is, at least on one measure, very similar to the actual world: it differs
from the actual world by the truth of only one proposition!
Clearly, this kind of similarity cannot be a guide to the nearness of worlds. That is, the
kind of match of facts that a world such as w5 bears to the actual world does not make it
appropriately nearby because such a match comes at the expense of a violation of logical law.
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Recall that a world such as w5 contains all the truths of the actual world, with the addition of
the proposition that mereological nihilism is true. Since mereological nihilism is both true and
false, w5 contains a logical contradiction; any match of matters of fact it bears to the actual
world are not important, given this contradiction.
Of course, worlds such as w5 are not the only worlds at which mereological nihilism is
true, but where tables exist. Consider a world such as w6, which contains all the truths of the
actual world, with the exception of the proposition that mereological nihilism is false, and instead
contains the proposition that mereological nihilism is true. This world, then, lacks the logical
contradiction that gets us in trouble in w5, but it will have other logical inconsistencies
instead: consider, for example, the proposition that if there are composite objects, then mereological
nihilism is false. This proposition is, by hypothesis, true in w6, as is the proposition that there are
composite objects. Yet the consequent of this proposition is false in this world; thus, world w6
contains a clear failure of modus ponens. Once again, the impressive match of matters of fact
that this world bears to the actual comes at the expense of a violation of logical law.
It should now be clear how to approach the generalization of Lewis’s similarity metric:
just as Lewis earlier counseled that we avoid large violations of natural law, we can also hold
that it is important to avoid violations of logical law. A world cannot be relevantly nearby if
it achieves a match in matters of fact and matters of nomological law at the expense of
violating logical laws.
There are other ways in which mereological nihilism might be true, and that tables
would exist. Perhaps, in some worlds, tables are simples; call a world such as this w6. In
such worlds, there need not be any logical contradictions; it is not true, for example., that in
w6, the proposition that tables have parts is true and that tables do not have parts is true as well.
Rather, these are worlds where tables exist in virtue of violating some metaphysical, rather
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than logical, law. For example, w6 may be a world where tables are extended simples,42 or
worlds where tables are atoms and without extension. Nonetheless, even if a world such as
w6 does not contain a formal contradiction, it must be less similar to the actual world than a
world where mereological nihilism is true and tables do not exist. That is, the match of
matters of fact that occurs in light of there being tables in both the actual world and w6 is not
important, because a world such as w6 contains a larger “metaphysical miracle” than the
world where mereological nihilism is true and tables do not exist.
We have already seen that it is necessary that our similarity metric hold that matches of
matters of fact should not come at the expense of some logical contradiction; it is now clear
that such matches also should not come at the expense of larger changes in metaphysical law,
either. We are, then, in a position to state the revised similarity metric in full:
1) It is of first importance to minimize the degree of violation of logical laws.
2) It is of second importance to minimize the degree of violation of metaphysical
laws.
3) It is of third importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of
nomological law.
4) It is of fourth importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout
which perfect match of particular fact prevails
5) It is of fifth importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of
nomological law
6) It is of sixth importance to avoid violations of the theorems of the best system
that are not laws.
7) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact.
42

See, for example, McDaniel [2007].
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There is one last issue, however, that needs to be discussed: What is it for a violation of
metaphysical or logical law to be large or small? A violation of nomological law can be great
or small to the degree that such a violation is “large, widespread, and diverse;” this
formulation (at least arguably) makes sense because these violations of law occur in regions
of spacetime. But violations of logical or metaphysical law do not obviously have any
relation to regions of spacetime. So how could we judge their size?

3.7 Similarity and Laws
What counts as a greater or lesser violation of a logical or metaphysical law? The idea
is that a violation of law is great or small to the degree that the world in question has logical
or metaphysical laws that are very different from the laws of the actual world. It cannot be
that the expressions used to describe these laws resemble each other to a greater or lesser
degree. How these laws are represented, in terms of natural language or some language of
thought, is far too subjective for present purposes. But what other way of comparing the
similarity of laws is there? This is a version of a problem that the defender of a Humean
account of laws already faces, in the guise of presenting a suitably objective notion of
simplicity. As long as factors such as simplicity enter into the determination of what the
laws are, there must be some reasonably objective method of determining what makes one
candidate law more simple than another; such a determination of simplicity cannot rely on
anything speaker-dependent and remain objective enough for these purposes. The simplicity
of some candidate law cannot depend on how it is formulated, since simplicity cannot
depend on which linguistic representation we use or which (abundant) properties are used to
formulate the theory. In defense of a conception of simplicity that is not tied too closely to
our interests, Lewis suggests that we formulate the laws in terms of perfectly natural
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properties; doing so makes the simplicity problem at least tractable (see, for example Lewis
[1983] and Loewer [1996]). If such a suggestion can help determine how simple a law is, it
can also be used to determined how similar two candidate laws are: once we have a kind of
ideal language to formulate the laws, we can compare how these laws are expressed in that
language to determine how similar they are. Laws could be similar to the extent that they
refer to the same kinds of objects or the same properties or relations in this privileged
language. On one version of the story, some objects and properties are fundamental, and it is
the sharing of these fundamental objects, properties, and relations that make for objective
similarity.43
Determining the logical laws of a world, then, proceeds in a broadly Humean
fashion: the logical laws are the generalizations that represent how the propositions of a
world are related to one another in the best systematization of what is true at that world. We
can determine what the logical laws of a world are in a way analogous to how we might
determine the physical laws of a world. If an impossible world is a set of structured
propositions (as in chapter 4), we can evaluate candidates for a systematization of a world by
how well such a system accounts for the truths of that world. A good systematization of a
world will consist of a deductive system that derives the truth of propositions at a world
from its other propositions in such a way that strikes a balance of informativeness and
simplicity. The tradeoffs will look very familiar: a strong but complex system could simply
list all the propositions true at a world; a simple but weak system could only list one (nonmaximal) truth.

I advance this theory of the similarity of laws very tentatively. Such a theory might be problematic
in light of chapter 5, where I discuss fundamentality in terms of counterpossibles.
43
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A world that behaves classically with respect to conjunction, for example, is a world
such that whenever a proposition of the form    is true, so are the propositions  and ;
similarly, whenever propositions of the form  and  are true, so is   . Rules of
conjunction introduction and elimination, then, would be capable of systematizing the facts
of this world with respect to conjunction; we can account for the truth of the propositions in
this world (at least in part) by understanding how conjunction behaves. The (classical)
logical rules with respect to conjunction would earn their keep in the system that makes
sense of what is true at these worlds. A rival law of conjunction for this world could be
ruled out on the grounds that it is too complicated (such as, from     (  ), infer
that   ) or not as informative (such as, from   , infer that   ).
One should expect ties when determining the logical laws of a world: there may be
no way of determining which connectives to take as primitive and which to take as derived,
and there may be no way of determining whether it is better to derive the various atomic
truths of a world from a maximal truth, or vice versa. Perhaps there are many equally good
formulations of the laws of a world, or perhaps there is one proper formulation but no way
of determining which one is correct; we need not make this choice for present purposes.
What is important, however, is that we can determine some plausible candidates for the
logical laws of a world, and compare those candidates to the laws of other worlds. The
logical laws of a world are given by the best systems of those worlds that account for all the
logical facts; we then determine the degree of violation of logical laws in some world by
determining the degree to which the logical laws of that world differ from the logical laws of
our world.
The same approach is applied to determine the metaphysical laws of a world: the
metaphysical laws of a world are also determined by the “best system” that properly
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accounts for the facts of a world that relate to composition, the nature of properties, time,
and so on. Mereological universalism is true at a world when that theory best explains the
facts of how objects and their parts are related at a world: in particular, mereological
universalism is true at a world where any collection of objects compose a further object, as
the theory of mereological universalism is an apt generalization of how composition occurs.
Similarly, a world that contains no composite objects is a world where mereological nihilism
is true, as that law would be an apt generalization of the mereological facts of the world in
question. A world that contains exactly one object may be a world where the two theories
are tried with respect to determining the metaphysical laws of the world; perhaps both laws
are true of this world, or exactly one law is true, but we cannot know which. And once we
can meaningfully determine what the metaphysical laws of a world are in such a way that
account for all the metaphysical facts, we can determine which worlds have metaphysical
laws that are more or less similar to the laws of the actual world. The worlds whose
metaphysical laws are more similar to our metaphysical laws, as expressed in some suitably
canonical system, are worlds that contain smaller violations of metaphysical laws.
Even among worlds that have different metaphysical laws, there is room for these
violations of law to be greater or smaller. In the case of a counterpossible such as (3), we
should expect worlds where mereological nihilism is true to be worlds with different kinds of
objects than the actual worlds. But we should not expect these worlds to needlessly change
their metaphysical laws, as would be required in worlds such as w6, where metaphysical laws
about the nature of extension must be altered as well as laws related to composition.

3.8 Conclusion
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It is, of course, impossible to discuss every interesting counterpossible, and show
why the intuitively correct world is more similar to the actual world than any other
impossible world one might consider. Nonetheless, the above discussion should provide
sufficient guidance with respect to how the considerations of nearness discussed above
would bear on further examples. A world – possible or otherwise – is close to the actual
world to the extent that, first, in minimizes violations of logical laws; second, to the extent
that it minimizes violations of metaphysical laws; third, to the extent that it avoids large
violations of nomological laws; fourth, to the extent that maximizes the region of perfect
match of matters of fact; fifth, to the extent that it avoids small violations of nomological
laws, and finally, to the extent that it avoids violations of non-lawful theorems of the best
system (or violations of special science laws). Counterpossibles are evaluated just as
counterfactuals are: we determine what the laws of the world are in a broadly Humean
fashion, and judge how different those laws are from the laws of the actual world.
The approach to counterfactuals discussed above is unified, in the sense that there is
a single standard similarity metric for all counterfactuals. The similarity metric is also a
generalization of Lewis’s similarity metric, in the sense that it does not differ from his with
the respect to the truth of any counterfactual whose antecedent is possible, at least assuming
we amend his similarity metric in response to Elga’s challenge as discussed above. The
metric is derived both from considerations about the truth values of counterpossibles as well
as Humean approaches to law extended so as to make sense of logical and metaphysical
laws.
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CHAPTER 4
WHAT ARE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS?
It is well-known that the framework of possible worlds suffers from certain
difficulties if it is to be used as an analysis of certain philosophical phenomena. Possible
worlds are coarse-grained, in the sense that the space of possible worlds models only what is
logically or metaphysically possible. Thus, analyses that make use of possible worlds face
problems if they are to differentiate content that is logically equivalent. The propositions
that nine is prime and that I am a married bachelor are both impossible, but they are distinct. I
could, for example, believe one without believing the other; different things might be the
case if one of these propositions were true, but not the other. In this chapter, I address
some of these difficulties by supplementing the possible worlds framework with impossible
worlds, which represent ways the world could not be. I develop an account of impossible
worlds of a certain kind, and show how they allow us to give better analyses of philosophical
concepts than we would be able to do with possible worlds alone.
In section 1, I will briefly discuss some of the limitations of possible worlds and
potential applications of impossible worlds. In section 2, I will develop an account of
impossible worlds that is both ontologically innocent and robust enough to do the work
required of these worlds. In section 3, I respond to a version of an argument against the
existence of impossible worlds advanced by Lewis.

4.1 Uses of impossible worlds
Why believe in impossible worlds? One kind of argument aims to show that we are
already committed to the existence of impossible worlds. In his [1973], Lewis argues that
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possible worlds are simply ways things could have been. We all believe that there are ways
things could have been, and possible worlds are merely ways things could have been, so we
all believe that there possible worlds. Lewis backed off this argument, in least in part
because we also all believe there are ways things couldn’t have been, as pointed out by Naylor
in his [1986]. Since Lewis did not want to use impossible worlds to represent the ways
things could not have been, he rejected his original argument for possible worlds. But, we
could also easily turn Naylor’s modus tollens into a modus ponens. Since there are
obviously ways things could not have been, there are obviously impossible worlds.44
We might also think that we are committed to impossible worlds because their
existence is entailed by other theoretical commitments. As King argues in [2007], depending
on what we take possible worlds to be, we should accept the existence of impossible worlds
as well. If possible worlds are complete and consistent sets of sentences or propositions or
states of affairs, there is no principled reason why we shouldn’t also believe in incomplete or
inconsistent sets of sentences, propositions, or states of affairs.
The argument I want to defend here, however, does not rely on how we are to
understand “ways,” nor does it rely on our commitment to sets and propositions. Rather, I
hold, with Lewis, that possible worlds earn their ontological keep by the use they can be put
to in most fields of philosophy, playing an important role in explicating concepts in logic,
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Yet the work done by possible worlds could be better
done with the addition of impossible worlds. Consider, for example, the kind of work Lewis
puts possible worlds to in his [1986]. Lewis holds that possible worlds are extremely useful
in explaining modality, closeness, content, and properties. If we consider each of these

44

.

This argument is made in more detail by Vander Laan in his [1997]
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applications in turn, we can see that our understanding of each of these families of concepts
can be improved with the addition of impossible worlds.45

4.1.1 Modality
The most obvious application of possible worlds is to explain modality. By
quantifying over worlds, we can develop a much better understanding of what it is for
something to be possible, necessary, or actual.46 We can understand the sense in which the
laws of physics are necessary (and thus locutions such as ‘It is not possible to travel faster
than the speed of light’) as restricted quantifications over possible worlds. That is, ‘Nothing
can travel faster than light’ is true because in all nomically accessible worlds (i.e., worlds which
have the same laws of physics that our world has), nothing travels faster than the speed of
light. Of course, there are possible worlds that have different laws of physics, and at these
worlds, some things travel faster than light; nonetheless, these are not the worlds we were
quantifying over. If we say, ‘The coin could land tails,’ we usually mean that there are
nomically accessible possible worlds where the coin does land tails. Similar stories can be told
for other flavors of necessity: some worlds share our history, some worlds share facts about
what is practical, some worlds correspond to our moral or legal obligations, and so on.

This kind of argument is similar to that of Yagisawa [1986], though I reject his account of extended
modal realism.
46 It is worth noting that Lewis does not think that acceptance of possible worlds is required for the
semantics of modal and non-standard logic: we can make sense of the “possible worlds” invoked by
the semantics of logic with set theory alone. Nonetheless, a more robust notion of possible worlds
could be useful to make better intuitive sense about what is being claimed about accessibility (and
thus, modal claims) by the supporters of different logical systems in a given discussion [1986: 18-20].
If we need “real” possible worlds to make sense of what kind accessibility relation to accept in an
account of modal terms, then it is obvious that we need “real” impossible worlds to make sense of
arguments about which non-classical logic to accept in an analysis of belief revision, for example.
Most semantics of intuitionist or relevance logic, for example, make use of non-standard worlds that
contain truth value gaps or gluts.
45
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Epistemic possibility, however, presents a challenge. How are we to make sense of
sentences such as ‘Goldbach’s conjecture could turn out to be false,’ or ‘relevance logic
could be correct?’ Assuming that Goldbach’s conjecture is true and that classical logic is the
proper analysis of the entailment relation, these are mere epistemic possibilities: for all we
know, there could be some very large even number that is not the sum of two primes; it
could turn out that the conclusion of some formal argument has to be relevant to its
premises. There is (presumably) no possible world where Goldbach’s conjecture is false, and
no possible world where relevance logic is correct. Nonetheless, these claims certainly seem
to be existential quantification over worlds, in the same pattern as ‘The coin could land tails.’
Impossible worlds would provide an attractive and straightforward way of understanding
claims about epistemic possibility. A logically impossible proposition could still be
epistemically possible if we can quantify over impossible worlds. The claim that Goldbach’s
conjecture could be false, then, should be understood as ‘At some epistemically accessible
world, Goldbach’s conjecture is false,’ even if there is no such possible world. The
epistemically possible worlds are just the worlds we think are possible.47

4.1.2 Closeness
Possible worlds are also required to make sense of closeness. An account of closeness
is required to make sense of counterfactuals: when we say something like, ‘If I had missed
the bus, then I would be late for class,’ I plausibly mean something like ‘In the closest
To be sure, impossible worlds aren’t the only way of understanding epistemic possibility, though
they probably are the simplest. Other accounts face various problems. Perhaps the leading
contender for understanding epistemic possibility is two-dimensional semantics (see, for example
[Chalmers 2004], according to which we can make sense of some epistemic possibilities by analyzing
the primary intensions of the propositions expressed. This strategy is helpful in understanding some
epistemic possibilities; two dimensions semantics is helpful in understanding how we could conceive
of water as not being H2O. It is less clear, however, how two dimensional semantics would help us
understand how Goldbach’s conjecture or how some non-classical logic could be true.
47
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situation where I miss the bus, I am late for class.’ The best way to make sense of such a
‘closest situation’ is to think of possible worlds ordered by some closeness relation, as in
[Lewis 1973]. We can then determine whether a counterfactual is true (roughly) by
determining whether the consequent is true in the closest possible world where the
antecedent is true. But, it seems that there can be counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents. Consider ‘If nine were prime, then it would not be divisible by three.’
Impossible worlds allow us to retain the structure of Lewis’s account of counterfactuals: we
can say that this sentence is true because, in the nearest (impossible!) world where nine is
prime, it is not divisible by three.48
Similar considerations apply to the comparative closeness of theories. False physical
theories can also be close to the truth to varying degrees, and we can model this in terms of
the comparative closeness of possible worlds where these theories are true. This seems quite
plausible, but we might also wonder how we are to analyze our intuitions about certain
necessarily false theories being closer to the truth than other necessarily false theories.
Impossible worlds allow us to retain the analysis offered above: impossible worlds where
some necessarily false theories are true are closer to the actual world than other impossible
worlds where different necessarily false theories are true.

4.1.3 Content
Possible worlds are also useful in discussing the content of propositional attitudes
such as belief. We can represent what some agent believes as the set of possible worlds that
she thinks might be actual. We can say that some possible worlds are doxastically accessible to
some agent: these are the worlds that the agent think might be the actual world. An agent
This proposal is discussed in [Nolan 1997], [Vander Laan 2007], and, of course, chapter 3 of this
work.
48
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thinks some propositions might be true iff that proposition is true in some of her
doxastically accessible worlds; she believes some proposition iff that proposition is true in
every doxastically accessible world.49 We then represent how an agent makes inferences by
updating the set of doxastically accessible worlds with the acquisition of new information: as
an agent learns something about the world, she narrows the set of worlds she takes to be
actual.50
This picture, however, makes several unreasonable assumptions about the rational
behavior of agents. Agents are represented as being logically omniscient and perfect
reasoners. They believe all logical truths, since logical truths are true at every possible world,
and therefore true at every doxastically accessible world. The agents described in this model
believe no contradictions, since contradictions are not true at any possible world, and
therefore not true at any doxastically accessible world. Finally, these agents believe the
logical entailments of all their beliefs, since if P entails Q, and P is true at every doxastically
accessible world, then Q is true at every doxastically accessible world as well. Assuming we
want these agents to be more realistic in these respects, we should look for ways to relax
these assumptions. Realistic agents must be permitted to believe the impossible, fail to
believe the necessary, and fail to believe some things that follow from their other beliefs.51
Impossible worlds provide the most straightforward remedy for this problem. There
are impossible worlds at which contradictions are true, impossible worlds at which not all

See, for example, [Hintikka 1962]. The model presented is a simplification of Lewis’s scheme,
which makes better sense of belief de se.
50 See, for example, [Stalnaker 1987].
51 Some might cede these points, and hold merely that the formal model described here is merely an
epistemic ideal; the model describes perfect reasoners, and thus describes a kind of normative goal
for reasoning. It is certainly useful to keep the Hintikka model as a kind of ideal for rationality, but
the extended model with impossible worlds will allow us to model more than just ideal rationality. If
we can describe the behavior of realistic agents, we can use it to make predictions about how people
will behave and update beliefs, for example.
49
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tautologies are true, and impossible worlds at which some propositions are true without their
(classical) entailments. It would, therefore, be easy to represent agents who are not logically
perfect if we allow the doxastically accessible worlds to include impossible worlds. If an
agent believes in some contradiction, then all of her doxastically accessible worlds are
impossible worlds that contain some contradiction. If she fails to believe in some logical
truth, then some of her doxastically accessible worlds are impossible worlds that lack this
logical truth. If an agent fails to believe some proposition Q that is entailed by some
proposition P that she believes, then P is true in all of her doxastically accessible worlds,
though some of her doxastically accessible worlds are impossible worlds where P is true but
Q is not.

4.1.4 Propositions
Possible worlds are also useful in providing an analysis of propositions. Possible
worlds also allow us to analyze propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth
values (or, equivalently, as sets of possible worlds). The proposition that grass is green is the
set of all worlds according to which grass is green.
There are, however, intuitively distinct propositions that pick out the same set of
possible worlds: that all bachelors are unmarried and that 2 + 2 = 4 pick out the same set of
worlds, viz. the set of all possible worlds. Impossible worlds could differentiate these
necessarily equivalent propositions or properties: there are, after all, impossible worlds where
bachelors are married, and impossible worlds where 2 + 2 does not equal 4. At some
impossible worlds, both of these are true; at other impossible worlds, one of these
propositions is true, but not the other. Thus, the set of all worlds (possible and impossible)
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where bachelors are unmarried is not the same set as the set of all worlds where 2 + 2 = 4.52
One could then either hold that a proposition is a non-empty set of worlds, or if there were
good theoretical reason to do so, use the empty set to represent the content of certain nontruth evaluable expressions.
To be sure, the defender of a possible worlds account of properties and propositions
has tools at her disposal to represent these entities in a more fine-grained fashion. For
example, one could use possible worlds to describe structured propositions, which allow us
to individuate necessarily coextensive properties and propositions. Though there are many
accounts of this kind of structured entity,53 we can illustrate this strategy with the system
Lewis sketches in [1986:56-59]. The project is to augment the possible worlds account with
some kind of structure that mirrors the structure of the language used to express the
proposition. On an unstructured account of propositions, for some proposition P, the
propositions P and ~~P pick out the same set of possible worlds (viz., the set of all worlds
where P is true). A structured account of propositions could represent negation as a relation
N that holds between unstructured propositions and the sets of worlds where that
proposition does not hold. The structured proposition ~P could then be represented as
<N, P>, while the structured proposition ~~P could be represented as <N, <N, P>>. On
the structured account of propositions, P and ~~P are distinct propositions, since they pick
out different ‘tuples. 54

Impossible worlds can also be used to distinguish necessarily coextensive properties. We might
think that triangularity and trilaterality are distinct properties, even though every three-angled figure is
also a three-sided figure across all possible worlds. Impossible worlds allow us to represent figures
that are triangular but not trilateral, or vice versa; thus, the two properties pick out different figures in
different impossible worlds.
53 See, for example, King [2007] and others.
52

To be sure, structured propositions will not solve every problem of hyperintensionality. One could
believe one, but not the other, of two necessarily equivalent and structurally isomorphic structured
54
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If structured propositions give us a fine-grained notion of properties and
propositions, why do we need impossible worlds? If we can come up with some entity that
enables us to make the distinctions we need to make between properties and propositions,
why not simply make use of them and not take on the additional ontological burden of
impossible worlds? Because we can do more with worlds than we can with structured
propositions alone. It is, of course, useful to give some perspicuous account of propositions
in the course of metaphysics. But we cannot simply point to some class of set-theoretic
structures that identify and differentiate content in the right way and think that our work is
done. Our account of propositions must differentiate distinct propositions, but it must also
do more: it must also pick out the objects that are able to play the role that is required of
them by modality, counterfactuals, the content of propositional attitudes, and so on.
Structured propositions alone cannot do this work. As seen above, worlds are required to
give an account of modality, content, and closeness. It is worlds that stand in the similarity
relations discussed in chapter 3; it is worlds that can be used to model how agents (ideal or
otherwise) reason; it is worlds that represent ways what a believer takes to be true. Structured
propositions can give us fine-grained entities to individuate certain properties and
propositions, but they cannot be put to the same use that worlds are.

propositions. Whether or not this is a problem for the defender of the structured proposition
account depends on whether there is some plausible alternative treatment for such cases. For
example, if the equivalent and isomorphic propositions in question are that London is pretty and that
Londres est jolie, then it is plausible that the reason that Pierre would assent to one but not the other
are metalinguistic in nature. Certainly, if Pierre realizes that the two sentences are equivalent (or even
that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are names for the same city), then he would retract his acceptance of
one of these propositions. To be sure, this account is threatened if all hyperintensional content can
be treated metalinguistically, but this does not seem to be the case. Pierre’s confusion about
‘London’ and ‘Londres’ is not akin to how some logicians understand non-classical entailment
relations, and it would border on absurdity to hold that nobody grasps the meanings of their terms,
since everyone falls short of ideal rationality.
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An adequate account of propositions is one on which we can put them to the kinds
of uses argued above. Propositions are not idle pieces of metaphysics, but rather objects
that have modal properties, stand in entailment relations, counterfactually entail other
propositions, are the proper targets of certain propositional attitudes, and so on. If an
impossible proposition is merely some ordered set, we do not have any handle on how to
understand epistemic possibility, counterpossibles, or belief in the impossible. To say that if
A were true, B would be true, for example, is to say (roughly) that in the nearest world where
A is true, B is true. It is unclear what to make of these instructions if A and B are merely
sets: there is no theory on the table of the comparative nearness of sets. Of course, one
could attempt to develop such a theory, but the considerations that are generally in play with
respect to the nearness of worlds (e.g., matching regions of matters of fact or preserving
laws) are more naturally applied to worlds than they are to sets. If we have impossible
worlds, however, these questions of how to understand the work done by these propositions
become tractable, since worlds provide the kind of framework that allows us to meaningfully
talk about modality, entailment, counterfactuals, belief content, and the like.

4.1.5 Impossible worlds and triviality
There is at least one serious worry about these uses of impossible worlds. The
reason that possible worlds play such a central role in describing modality, closeness, belief
content, properties, and propositions is that possible worlds allow us to discuss all and only
possible scenarios. If impossible worlds are to play a role in our treatment of these concepts,
we risk trivializing our analyses. For example, we can use impossible worlds to distinguish
the proposition that nine is prime from that some bachelor is married, since there is some
impossible world where that nine is prime is true, but not that some bachelor is married; thus, the
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sets of worlds are not the same. However, it seems that we will also be forced to distinguish
the propositions that some bachelor is married and that some bachelor is wedded since, at least
depending how the worlds are specified, there could be impossible worlds where one is true,
but not the other. Intuitively, however, these are the same proposition; the content of what
is said should not be affected merely by how we express it. Similarly, our models of belief
should not license outlandish inferences, and any realistic agent should be expected to make
certain simple inferences, even if she fails to make more complex ones. Formal
epistemology would be trivialized if the structure provided no norm for how agents should
reason, and provided no predictions for how agents likely will reason. This seems true even
if there are cases in which it is vague whether two propositions are the same, or vague
whether some inference is outlandish or reasonable. If the space of impossible worlds lacks
the inferential structure of the space of possible worlds, then it is unclear what sense we can
make of how agents update their beliefs. The worry, then, is that impossible worlds lack the
kind of logical structure that makes possible worlds an attractive tool for explaining many
philosophical concepts.
The solution is to restrict which impossible worlds are used when giving our
accounts of modality, properties, propositions, beliefs, and so on. We determine which
impossible worlds are relevant to our analysis by considering the worlds that are close to the
actual world in some relevant sense. For example, a proposition can be analyzed as the set
of some restricted class of worlds where it is true; context determines whether we analyze
the proposition as the set of all possible worlds where it is true, the set of possible worlds
and some impossible worlds, or the set of all worlds, possible and impossible. My response
to the worry of triviality is that our analyses are only trivial when we allow too many
impossible worlds into the analysis. Rather than allow all impossible worlds to factor into
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our analyses of modality, propositions, content, and the like, context selects the impossible
worlds that are relevant to the task at hand.55

4.2 The ontology of impossible worlds
4.2.1 Ersatz Impossible Worlds
It is plausible to think of impossible worlds as ersatz constructions of some sort. On
pain of contradiction, they cannot be concrete.56 Perhaps they are mere fictions of some
sort,57 but even if they are, it would be important to better characterize this fiction if it is to
do any explanatory work.
If impossible worlds are constructions, what are they constructed from? Brogaard
and Salerno, in their [2008], argue that they are constructions out of sentences of some
world-making language. This kind of impossible world is intuitively plausible, since we use
language to describe impossible scenarios in a way that cannot be done with concrete worlds
or (perhaps) pictures.58
A linguistic ersatzist account of impossible worlds inherits many of the difficulties
faced by the linguistic ersatzist program in general. Most importantly, it is not clear that a
world-making language would have the resources required to describe all the impossible
worlds. The linguistic ersatzist faces embarrassing questions about how the appropriate
world-making language represents content related to alien individuals or alien properties.
Furthermore, it is unclear how one could understand the meanings of the terms of the
Context could also select a relation among the structured propositions that would individuate them
for the purposes at hand. Perhaps the structured propositions would be divided into equivalence
classes, but it is also likely that which propositions bear the same content will be vague, even holding
a context fixed.
56 See [Lewis 1986, fn 3]. I return to this argument below.
57 See, for example [Rosen 1990].
58 See, for example, [Sorensen 2002]
55
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world-making languages without the kind of semantic tools that already rely on possible
worlds: the referring terms and predicates of the world-making language cannot express a
function from possible worlds or individuals at possible worlds, as they traditionally do. The
ability of this language to express impossibilities would be constrained by its ability to name
individuals and properties that do not exist in the actual world, as well as the grammar of the
world-making language. An account of ersatz impossible worlds that does not rely on
language would be more fruitful.

4.2.2 Worlds as simple set theoretic constructions
A more promising account of impossible worlds is one in which impossible worlds
are set-theoretic constructions of possible worlds, where possible worlds are not themselves
set-theoretic constructions. Creating impossible worlds in this fashion has many advantages:
it is as ontologically innocent as possible worlds, as they are merely constructions of possible
worlds. Furthermore, if the possible worlds remain basic in a way that the impossible worlds
are not, then we can continue to use the possible worlds to describe metaphysical possibility
and necessity without threat of circularity. We can consider a few ways of constructing these
impossible worlds to determine whether they will be able to play the role required of them in
section 1.
Rescher and Brandom, in their [1979], describe what they call schematic worlds, at
which there are truth value gaps, and inconsistent worlds, at which there are truth value gluts.
These worlds are created from the possible worlds. Consider two possible worlds, w1 and w2.
Some proposition P is true at w1, and ~P is true at w2. We can now describe a schematic
world by a process they call schematization, or world conjunction: w1  w2 describes a world such
that, for any proposition ,  obtains in the world iff  obtains in w1 and w2.
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 is true at w1  w2 iff  is true at w1 and  is true at w2.
Note that, in this schematic world, P does not obtain, since P is not true at w2 and ~P does
not obtain, since ~P is not true at w1. We can describe an inconsistent world by a process
they call superposition, or world disjunction: w1  w2 describes a world such that, for any
proposition ,  obtains in the world iff  obtains in w1 or w2.
 is true at w1  w2 iff  is true at w1 or  is true at w2
Note that, at this inconsistent world, P is true, since P is true in w1, and ~P is true, since ~P
is true in w2.59
Not that, even though P and ~P can both be true in an inconsistent world, P  ~P
will not be true at any world, since that conjunction is not true at any possible world;
similarly, even though neither P nor ~P can be true in a schematic world, P  ~P will always
be true, since that disjunction is true in all possible worlds.
Can Rescher-Brandom worlds do the work required of impossible worlds? These
inconsistent and schematic worlds describe ways things couldn’t be, since they give us
worlds where P and ~P are both true, or where neither P nor ~P is true. As we have seen,
however, they do not give us worlds where contradictions are true. This means impossible
worlds do not describe some of the ways the world couldn’t be: namely, they don’t describe
worlds where P  ~P obtains, or worlds where P  ~P fails to obtain. Rescher-Brandom
worlds, then, would conflate all of these impossibilities; if propositions are represented by
the set of all worlds where they obtain, we would not be able to differentiate intuitively
distinct contradictions, since they all pick out the set of no worlds. Similarly, Rescher-

Note that schematization and superposition can also be applied to the non-standard worlds, so a
world can be both schematic and inconsistent, if we take the superposition of two schematic worlds,
or the schematization of two inconsistent worlds.
59
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Brandom worlds would be unable to represent the beliefs of logically imperfect agents who
believe contradictions or fail to believe tautologies.
We could attempt to answer this problem by modifying the approach in such a way
that the semantics given above hold only for atomic formulae, and changing our semantics
for the evaluation of complex formulae60. Roughly following the approach of [Restall 1997],
we create non-standard worlds by superposing or schematizing the atomic formulae of
possible worlds, which gives us the truth of atomic formulae, but not the complex formulae.61
Instead, we can define how the connectives work at worlds the following way:
~ is true at w iff  is false at w62
   is true at w iff  is true at w and  is true at w.
   is true at w iff  is true at w or  is true at w.
Thus, we can have inconsistent worlds where P  ~P is true: in our original example, the
superposed world w1  w2 describes such a case. Since P is true at w1 and ~P is true at w2, P
 ~P is true at w1  w2. Analogously, at schematic worlds, P  ~P will not be true: at the
schematized world w1  w2, P is true at w1 but not w2, and ~P is true at w2, but not w1. Thus,
on such a system, we are able to describe non-standard worlds where logical falsehoods are
true and worlds where tautologies are not true.

Note that we shift here to discussion of atomic and complex formulae, rather than propositions.
This is also similar to the approach of [Priest 1979]. Restall and Priest only consider worlds that are
inconsistent. The impossible worlds described here, however, can be inconsistent or schematic. See
also [Berto 2009], whose impossible worlds are also built from sets of possible worlds.
60
61

It might seem more natural to define negation as w ~ iff w  , but this rules out the possibility
of P and ~P being true at some world together. If we want P and ~P to be true at some inconsistent
world, then we cannot tie the truth of ~P to the lack of truth of P. Rather, the model must ascribe
falsity to some proposition independent of whether it has also ascribed truth to it. Another strategy
to allow P and ~P to be true at a world would be to make ~P true when P is not true at some world
w*. See, for example, [Dunn 1993].
62
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This proposal still does not provide the kind of worlds required to represent all
logical contradictions. Our logic is weak, but it will certainly have some theorems: for
example, the law of double negation (~~  ) is valid in this framework. In all worlds as
described above, ~~P is true whenever P is true. Thus, these impossible worlds do not
describe some ways things could not be.
We cannot respond to this problem simply by weakening the logic we have chosen,
either. We could stipulate, for example, that the law of double negation is not a theorem,
and include in our model worlds where some proposition P can be true without ~~P being
true, and vice versa. But this does not address the central worry. As long as we provide
some system of worlds that describes some entailment relation, the theorems associated with
that entailment relation will be true in all worlds described by the system.
If propositions are sets of worlds as described by this kind of system, then, they
simply will not be fine-grained enough. Such a system will conflate the meanings of any two
sentences that are true in the same set of worlds, given some system. If it seemed wrong
that all propositions that are logically true in classical logic are indistinguishable, then it
should seem wrong that all propositions that are logically true in some weaker system are
indistinguishable. Thus, if impossible worlds are to let us differentiate properties and
propositions that are necessarily coextensive, the structures provided so far are simply not
up to the task.
If impossible worlds are to capture the phenomenon of epistemic possibility, these
worlds simply do not go far enough. As we have seen, the law of double negation is valid in
this system. A formula such as (~~P  P) will be true in all worlds, and thus we cannot
make any sense of the notion that the failure of the law of double negation is epistemically
possible in some scenario.
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Similarly, these impossible worlds will not solve the problem of logical omniscience.
To be sure, since agents can now be doxastically related to Restall worlds, they can be
represented as believing some logical falsehoods such as P  ~P. They cannot, however, be
represented as believing other logical falsehoods, such as ~(~~P  P). The agents
represented by this model will be logically omniscient with respect to the theorems of
whatever logic is described by the worlds posited by the model: they will believe all of its
logical truths, they will fail to believe anything that is logically impossible in the system, and
they will accept all the relevant entailments of their beliefs.
A further problem with this kind of proposal is that it is not applicable to many of
the potential applications that motivated our project. The kinds of impossible worlds
discussed above are all ways of representing various kinds of formal impossibilities: RescherBrandom worlds give us structures where propositions such as P and ~P can be both true or
both false, and Restall worlds give us structures where propositions such as P  ~P are true
and P  ~P are false. These worlds might be sufficient if our project is to provide a
structure to represent certain logical falsehoods, but our ambitions are greater than this. We
are not concerned merely with formal contradictions, but impossibilities in general.
Consider propositions such as that nine is prime or that some bachelor is married.
Presumably, it is impossible that nine is prime, or that some bachelor is married, but we still
want to be able to represent these propositions in a non-trivial way, if they are to serve as
potential targets for belief (‘Bob believes that nine is prime’), antecedents of
counterpossibles (‘If some bachelor were married, his wedding would be well-attended’) and
so on. But these propositions do not seem to be conjunctions of contraries. At least on the
surface, they attribute a property to some object. It would be strange, then, to attempt to
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use schematic or inconsistent worlds to describe some scenario where nine is prime: just
what would be conjoined or disjoined to make nine prime?
To be sure, the proposition that some bachelor is married could be complex in a way that
is not evident from its syntax when expressed in English. Perhaps ‘bachelor’ is to be
represented as ‘man’ and ‘not married,’ and thus the proposition is analyzed as that some not
married man is married, which does seem to involve a conjunction of contraries. Under analysis,
all impossibilities reduce to contradictions; once we have such a formal contradiction, we can
analyze it as the superposition of the possible worlds expressed by the contradiction’s
conjuncts. At some point, however, it becomes unclear how to carry out this strategy. It is
simply implausible that all impossibilities can be analyzed as contradictions. How can we tell
a similar story for that nine is prime? If there is a formal contradiction there, it is harder to
uncover, and it is certainly more difficult to argue for some specific formulation of this
contradiction as the “correct” representation of the proposition.

4.2.3 Worlds as complex set-theoretic constructions
An adequate account of impossible worlds, then, builds them not from the possible
worlds, but rather from something capable of representing formal contradictions as well as
impossibilities in a more general sense. Impossible worlds are not merely set-theoretic
constructions out of possible worlds, since the schematization or superposition of possible
worlds does not allow us to express all the impossibilities required of a robust account of
impossible worlds.

4.2.3.1 From Possible Worlds to Structured Propositions
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We have already seen one method of using possible worlds to build structured
propositions in section 1.4. We can continue to use this system for purposes of illustration,
though not much hangs on our choice of how we build structured propositions. This
system is able to differentiate intuitively distinct propositions better than the simple settheoretic impossible worlds. That is, for some proposition P, P and ~~P pick out the same
set of worlds for Restall, since the law of double negation holds at all worlds in that system.
Lewis’s account of structured propositions, however, is able to distinguish the two: <P> and
<N, <N, P>> are, after all, distinct ‘tuples.
These structured propositions are also capable of representing the impossibilities that
Restall cannot: the structured proposition that some bachelor is unmarried can be represented
simply as the ‘tuple <E, <B, M>>, where E is a relation that holds between some property
and the worlds where something instantiates that property; B is the unstructured property of
being a bachelor, and M is the unstructured property of being married.
Of course, our work is not done yet. For the reasons discussed above, we need
impossible worlds if we are to make better sense of modality, closeness, and belief content.
Nonetheless, structured propositions such as these are useful in order to describe and
differentiate propositions in a more fine-grained way than would be otherwise available.
Furthermore, structured propositions give us the tools necessary to construct the impossible
worlds that are capable of giving complete accounts of epistemic possibility, the analysis of
counterpossibles, and the contents of belief.

4.2.3.2 From Structured Propositions to Impossible Worlds
Structured propositions are ordered sets composed of possible worlds, collections of
entities at possible worlds, and relations between and among them. We can then form sets
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of these structured propositions to create worlds, which would be able to describe ways
things could (or could not!) be. Call these worlds structured worlds. Structured worlds are built
from structured propositions, rather than from worlds or superpositions or schematizations
of worlds. A structured proposition is true at a structured world iff that proposition is a
member of the set that composes the world. A structured world could be complete and
consistent, but a structured world that is not complete and consistent is an impossible world.
If some impossible world is described by the set {A, B}, where A and B are two
unstructured propositions, then all that is true at this world are A and B. It does not follow,
for example, that ~A is not true, that A  B is true, or that A  A is true, since these
complex propositions are not members of the set {A, B}.
There’s little more to say about the behavior of structured worlds. Previous
accounts described a logic of impossible worlds, giving truth conditions for the behavior of
logical operators and connectives, but there can be no such logic given for structured worlds
in general. This is because these impossible worlds are anarchic by design: any set of
structured propositions is an impossible world. Thus, there is no interesting logical structure
to the space of these worlds. Any proposition could be true at some world if that
proposition is a member of the set that describes the world; any other proposition could fail
to be true at that world if that proposition fails to be a member of that set. Thus, principles
such as the law of double negation and modus ponens will not be valid in these worlds.
Since there is no logic of structured worlds, they are flexible in a way that their
competitors are not. Impossible worlds are capable of describing any way that the world
could not be, since structured propositions have the resources to express content in a way
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that is arbitrarily fine-grained. Impossible worlds will therefore be capable of representing
epistemic possibilities that possible worlds by themselves cannot.63
Furthermore, worlds such as these can give a formal epistemologist the structure
required to represent agents that are not logically omniscient with respect to any logical
system. Since anarchic impossible worlds are arbitrary fine-grained, there are worlds that can
represent any contradiction; an agent can be doxastically related to worlds where any logical
principle fails; an agent can fail to be doxastically related to any world where any given
logical truth holds; an agent can believe some proposition without believing some other
proposition that is entailed by it in any logical system.
If structured worlds are these kinds of set theoretic constructions, it is clear that we
should accept them in our ontology. They are cheap: they are merely sets composed of
things we already accept. We should believe in structured propositions because they are
merely set-theoretic constructions of possible worlds, the entities in then, and relations
between and among these things; we should believe in impossible worlds because they are
sets of structured propositions. Furthermore, they are useful: if we can argue from the utility
of possible worlds to their existence, then the same kind of case can be made for structured
worlds. If we want to understand epistemic possibility, model the beliefs of rationally fallible
agents, analyze propositions and properties in a more fine-grained fashion, give truth
conditions to counterpossibles, and so on, structured impossible worlds are up to the task.

4.2.3.3 Structured Worlds and Counterpossibles

As mentioned above, it is likely that a separate account will have to be given for certain other cases,
such as the beliefs of agents who do not know the meanings of the terms they use to describe their
beliefs.
63
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Of course, if structured impossible worlds can accomplish all these tasks, they would
be ideal vehicles to represent the impossible worlds needed for an analysis of
counterpossibles. Since they are merely sets of structured propositions, sets of impossible
words could represent the impossible antecedents of counterpossibles in an appropriately
fine-grained fashion. Furthermore, as collections of structured propositions, they are
capable of being systematized in the way suggested in chapter 3; we can meaningfully
describe the logical laws of an impossible world, not because these laws are imposed by
some logical system used to describe truth at impossible worlds, but because we can impose
deductive systems on these worlds in such a way as to account for their facts. It is in this
sense that these worlds can be said to be lawful, and could therefore stand in similarity
relations to other worlds, based on how closely their laws resemble ours and how closely the
propositions of these worlds match the propositions true in the actual world.
There is one further complication to discuss: an impossible world could represent
some impossibility about modal space. An impossible world could, for example, represent
the claim that the structure of the space of possible worlds is best described by S3, even
though (we can assume) it is actually described by S5; an impossible world could represent
the claim that all worlds accessible to it are worlds where some proposition P is true, even
though P is false in some accessible worlds; an impossible world could represent the claim
that, if A were true, then C would be true, even if the nearest A-worlds are not C-worlds.
But this leads to an immediate worry: earlier, I had claimed that a structured proposition is
true at a world iff it is a member of the set that comprises that world, but now it seems that
an impossible world can “misrepresent” the modal truths of that world.
One kind of response to this worry is to concede that the modal truths of these
worlds are problematic in just the way they claim to be: some counterfactual can be true at
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an impossible world even if its consequent is not true in the nearest worlds where its
antecedent is true. Any attempt at giving an analysis of counterfactuals (or claims about
necessity and possibility) assumes that the world of evaluation of these claims is a possible
world. Thus, questions about which counterfactuals would be true if some impossibility
were to obtain, or questions about what would be necessary or possible from the standpoint
of an impossible world, result in answers that are at odds with how we ordinarily understand
our modal vocabulary. The space of these worlds is too anarchic for us to make good sense
of.
A more optimistic response is that we can make sense of such modal claims in cases
where the world of evaluation is an impossible world. Unlike claims about matters of fact at
these worlds, however, the truth of these claims might not depend on whether the
appropriate structured proposition is contained in the set that comprises the world, but
rather by the shape of modal space around that world. Claims about whether a
counterfactual is true or not might depend on what the closest worlds where the antecedent
is true look like; claims about whether some proposition is necessary or possible might
depend on what is true at the set of worlds that are accessible to the world of evaluation.
There are, at least with respect to these modal facts, two different notions of truth, and
whether the relevant notion of truth is that of truth qua set membership or truth qua features
of the worlds around it depends on our interests.64 If, for example, we are interested in
representing the beliefs of an agent that is less than ideally rational, it is important to
determine which structured propositions are true in the set of structured world that the
agent takes to be actual; if we are interested in representing what would actually follow from
the truth of how this agent takes things to be, it is important to determine which impossible
Assuming that we can determine which worlds are close to an impossible world, of course; one
such proposal is offered in chapter 3.
64
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worlds are really close to (or accessible from) the worlds that the agent thinks might be
actual.

4.3 Truth and Falsity in Impossible Worlds
4.3.1 Lewis’s Puzzle
In footnote 3 of his [1986], Lewis argues that impossible worlds, if they existed, would
spread contradictions to the actual world.65 Consider a world w where both P and not-P are
true. It seems that both ‘In w, P’ and ‘In w, not-P’ are true. Lewis claims that ‘In w, not-P’
entails ‘Not: in w, P’. The result will be that both ‘In w, P’ and ‘Not: in w, P.’ are true. Thus,
the contradiction is not merely contained in w, but spreads to the actual world as long as we
are able to use an ‘in w’ operator to discuss what is true at w. In other words, we contradict
ourselves when we describe the goings on of impossible worlds.66
The solution to Lewis’ problem, as he suggests and as is discussed in more detail in
Stalnaker [2003] and Lycan [1994], is simply to accept a less robust metaphysics of
impossible worlds that will block the inference from ‘In w, not-P’ to ‘Not: in w, P.’ For
Lewis, the inference is generally valid because possible worlds are concrete entities, so an
operator such as ‘in w’ is a restrictive modifier. When we say that something is true at some
world w, what we say is very much like what we would say if something were true in
Massachusetts. If it is true that, in Massachusetts, there are no Republicans, then it is not
true that, in Massachusetts, there are any Republicans. But impossible worlds need not be
like Massachusetts, and operators that let us refer to the truths of impossible worlds need
not function as restrictive modifiers. Indeed, once we grant that impossible worlds are
Of course, putting the point this way makes it seem like Lewis is presenting some non-trivial
counterpossible claim.
66 Of course, not everyone would object to the threat of contradictions at the actual world. Dialetheists
such as Priest and Beall would not object to this result, nor might Yagisawa.
65
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neither complete nor consistent, we find very little reason to hold that the ‘in w’ operator
functions in such a way as to validate the inference in question.
The notion of impossible worlds here, for example, is one according to which a world
is a set of structured propositions. It simply does not follow from the claim that not-P is in
some set to the claim that it is not the case that P is in that set. Indeed, the inference clearly
fails when both P and not-P are in that set together. If a world fails to be consistent, then
we should expect failures of the inference from ‘in w, not-P’ to ‘not: in w, P’; if a world fails
to be complete, then we can expect failures of the inference from ‘not: in w, P’ to ‘in w, notP.’ Thus, the present conception of impossible worlds simply does not face Lewis’s threat
that contradictions at impossible worlds will spread to the actual world.

4.3.2 Dialethic Contamination
There is, however, another kind of contradiction contamination problem that this
account of impossible worlds may face. Note that we have only explicitly discussed what is
true at an impossible world, and not what is false. Presumably, some impossible worlds
contain propositions that are both true and false: this is necessary in order to represent the
beliefs of a dialetheist, or to represent the antecedents of counterpossibles that discuss
dialethic logic. Consider, then, an impossible world w1, at which some proposition P is both
true and false. What can we say about the truth of the claim, ‘in w1, P’? Presumably, this
claim is true: after all, P is true at w1. But, presumably, this claim is also false, since P is false
at w1. Thus, it would seem that the claim ‘in w1, P’ is both true and false at the actual world, and
thus the contradiction in w1 has spread to the actual world. This puzzle forces us to say
more about what it is for something to be false in a world.
Assuming that a proposition can be both true and false in a world, it cannot be the
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case that a proposition is false in a world iff it fails to be a member of that world. After all,
set membership is classical: either a structured proposition is a member of a world or it is
not. Thus, if a proposition were false at a world whenever it failed to be a member of that
world, no proposition could be both true and false at some world. It would make more
sense, given this system, to say that a proposition is false at a world when its negation is true.
So, to say that some proposition is false in a world is to say that its negation is a member of
that world.
Of course, this still does not give us an analysis of the ‘in w’ operator. Inspired by
what has been said above, we might hold that, for some proposition P and world w1, it is
false that ‘in w1, P’ whenever ~P is true at w1. More generally, ‘in w, ’ is false iff ‘in w, ~’ is
true. This allows a proposition to be both true and false at some impossible world, since a
proposition and its negation could both be members of that world. Yet this operator lands
us in trouble, since the claim ‘in w1, P’ is both true and false; this is true because P is a
member of w1, and false because ~P is a member of w1. Thus, the contradiction within w1
would spread to the actual world.
The next option, then, is to hold that some proposition is false in a world iff it is not
true at that world. That is, ‘in w, ’ is false iff not: (in w, ). The negation in the
metalanguage is ordinary, classical negation. On this reading of the falsity conditions of the
‘in w’ operator, a dialethia in some impossible world will not create a dialethia in the actual
world. Some proposition P can be both true and false in a world w1, in virtue of that world
containing both P and ~P. But that dialethia will not spread to the actual world, because ‘in
w1, P’ is true (since P is a member of w1), but not false (since it is not true that it’s not the
case that, in w1, P is true.) The contradiction, then, would not spread to the actual world,
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since a statement made using that operator will be false whenever it is not true.67
Note that it would also have been possible to define the ‘in w’ operator by first
describing its falsity conditions (in terms of set membership), and the describing its truth
conditions (in terms of the negation of its falsity). These operators, of course, are not
equivalent: if P is both true and false in w1, then ‘in w1, P’ would turn out to be only false if
the operator were described in this second way. What are we to make of these different
ways of defining the ‘in w’ operator?
One could argue that it is better to define the operator in terms of truth, since truth is
metaphysically or conceptually prior to falsehood. That is, even though truth and falsity are
duals of one another, truth is somehow privileged in the structure of the reality, and thus
when we consider what the facts of worlds are, it is appropriate to make use of a logical
operator that conceptually privileges the truths of a world over its falsehoods.
If one is not comfortable with this metaphysics, one could also keep both operators.
A locution such as ‘in w’ is ambiguous between describing a world (roughly) in terms of its
truth and in terms of its falsehoods. Some contexts might favor one reading over the other;
in other contexts, it would not matter which operator we use, and so there would be
harmless semantic indeterminacy.
Regardless of how the details are filled in, it should be clear that the defender of
impossible worlds has nothing to fear from other-worldly contradictions. The problem
raised by Lewis is not an issue for this account of impossible worlds, since they would not
license the kind of inference from ‘in w, ~P’ to ‘~in w, P’ that Lewis discusses. The modified
problem, restated in terms of truth and falsity, would not be a problem either, since there is a
This analysis also makes sense of truth value gaps. Consider now a world w’, where P is neither true
nor false. This is a world of truth value gaps, rather than truth value gluts. What are we to make of a
statement such as ‘in w’, P’? It is not true, since P is not a member of w’. Since the ‘in w’ operator’s
falsity conditions are classical, it will be only false that ‘in w’, P.’
67
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reasonable, classical reading of these operators that does not result in any contradiction at
the actual world.

4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for a particular conception of impossible worlds. We
should accept impossible worlds so construed because they are ontologically cheap and
theoretically useful. We can use these worlds to describe ways the world could not be.
Moreover, we can use these worlds to make better sense of epistemic possibility, the analysis
of counterpossibles, the content of belief, and the analysis of properties and propositions,
and we can use these worlds to distinguish properties and propositions that would otherwise
be conflated.
This proposal is also capable of answering objections related to the “spread” of
contradictions from impossible worlds into the actual world. Lewis’s argument against
impossible worlds will not work because these worlds do not allow one to reason from ‘in
some world, not-P’ to ‘not: in some world, P.’ Furthermore, the version of the argument
that makes use of what is true and false at impossible worlds can be met if one is careful to
introduce operators that allow one to describe what is true and false at these worlds.
Thus, structured impossible worlds are both adequate to the task of serving as the
impossible worlds needed in our theory of counterpossibles, and are immune to several
kinds of objections one might level against impossible worlds. They are robust enough to
represent the kinds of content they would need to represent; they are capable of standing in
similarity relations; they do not “spread” contradictions to the actual world; and they are
easily added to our ontology because they are merely set theoretic constructions of possible
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worlds. In short, this kind of impossible world should be accepted because it is serviceable,
cheap, and logically unproblematic.
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CHAPTER 5
DEPENDENCE AND COUNTERPOSSIBLES

5.1 Introduction
Discussion of grounding or metaphysical dependence is common in philosophical
discourse, and one often invokes the notion of grounding or dependence in the course of
giving an analysis of some class of objects, properties, or phenomena. Moral properties
might be said to be grounded in or depend on physical properties; the existence of some
object might depend on the existence of its parts (or vice versa); mental properties might be
grounded in physical properties; semantic facts might depend on facts about usage; the
beliefs of some agent might depend on her credences, and so on. Other cases are somewhat
more subtle. Sometimes, a philosopher will argue that we should countenance some entity
in our ontology, at least in part because it is ‘nothing over and above’ things we already
believe in. In other cases, a philosopher will consider herself entitled to accept a certain
collection of facts because they are true ‘in virtue of’ some other collection of facts. In all of
these cases, there is either an implicit or explicit appeal to the grounding relation.68 Having a
better understanding of the grounding relation would give us a better understanding of what
is at stake when we reduce some phenomenon to some other phenomenon, believe that
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One might worry, of course, that there is more than one notion that corresponds to our
locutions of dependence, and thus hold that talk of “the grounding relation” is misleading.
Perhaps there is no single notion that corresponds to such a relation (see, for example,
Hofweber [2009]), or perhaps there is a family of such relations (see, for example, Bennett
[forthcoming] on building relations). Nonetheless, I will optimistically assume that there is a
notion of dependence to which we can give a unified analysis. If attempts to give such an
analysis falter, or seem wildly disjunctive, then we could treat that as evidence that there is
more than one dependence relation after all.
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some objects depend on some other objects, or accept some truths as holding ‘in virtue of’
other truths.
The grounding relation itself might also play a role in the analysis of other concepts
in philosophy. For example, we might hold that grounding plays a role in a developed
theory of truthmaking (see Schaffer [2010]), if we hold that truthmakers are the fundamental
entities that ground the truth of propositions. Rosen [2010] and Trogdon [2010] describe
intrinsicality in terms of grounding. Nor is discussion of grounding new to philosophy; the
Euthyphro dialogue, for example, seems to involve a discussion of whether piety is
grounded in the attitudes of the gods, or whether the attitudes of the gods are grounded in
piety.
Most accounts of grounding or dependence attempt to explicate it in modal terms, as
in supervenience accounts, or merely take it as primitive. Yet there are well-known
problems with the supervenience account of grounding, and an attempt to take such a
crucial notion as primitive might strike some as disappointingly unilluminating. The
approach favored in this chapter is a hybrid account that analyzes the notion of dependence
in counterfactual terms as well by explanation. A depends on B iff a) if exactly one of either
A or B were true, then it would be B that is true, and b) A is explained by B. Developing
and defending this view, however, will require a discussion of the counterfactual conditional
stated above, as well as the role to be played by explanation.
Some preliminaries: I will use locutions such as ‘dependence,’ ‘metaphysical
dependence,’ and ‘grounding’ interchangeably. I also assume that this is the same relation
that others refer to with locutions such as ‘is true in virtue of’ or in discussions about
metaphysical or ontological priority. Thus, at least for present purposes, ‘A depends on B,’

113

‘A is grounded in B,’ and ‘A is true in virtue of B,’ and ‘B is prior to A’ all mean the same
thing.
I take the grounding relation to hold between propositions. When we say that A
depends on B (or A is grounded in B), we should construe A and B as standing for
propositions. Some authors with stricter ontological scruples might balk at this. To be sure,
nothing here hangs on any particular conception of propositions, as long as they are finegrained enough to represent the content of necessary truths and falsehoods; we could easily
substitute equivalence classes of sentences for propositions. For some purposes, one might
prefer a grounding relation that takes the relata to be objects or properties, so as to make
sense of claims such as, ‘The whole is grounded in its parts’ or ‘mental properties depend on
physical properties,’ respectively. Such claims can be construed as propositions about the
existence of these objects or instantiation of these properties, such as that the whole exists is
grounded in that its parts exist or that mental properties M are instantiated depends on that physical
properties P are instantiated.69

5.2 Some Theories of Dependence
5.2.1 Against Supervenience
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Claims about the dependence of one object on another might not always reduce to claims
about the existence of one object being dependent on the existence of another. Perhaps
something stronger is being claimed: when we say that a house depends on its bricks, we are
not merely saying that the existence of the house depends on the existence of its bricks. We
might also be claiming that the house depends on the bricks and their particular arrangement; we
might also be claiming that any change in the house’s intrinsic properties must correspond to
some change in the properties of the bricks. Of course, none of this is to say that a
reduction of object-dependence to property-dependence is impossible. Rather, it seems that
determining the exact properties that stand in the dependence relation might depend on
what one means by a particular claim of object- or property-dependence.
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Claims about dependence were once analyzed as claims about supervenience. One
might claim that we can understand metaphysical dependence in terms of patterns of
existences, or the instantiations of properties, or the truth of certain propositions across
worlds. Different supervenience claims will correspond to different grounding relations, to
be sure, but assuming that the relata of the dependence relation are propositions, there is a
very straightforward account of dependence by way of supervenience:
(Dependence as Supervenience) A depends on B iff no two possible worlds differ
with respect to the truth of A but agree with respect to the truth of B.
On such an account, metaphysical dependence is the necessary co-variation of truth. This is
in line with a project of attempting to secure a theory of reduction without adopting any
kind of heavy-weight or spooky notion of ontological dependence; there is no dependence
relation apart from what is true about the various entities across worlds.
As pointed out by Schaffer [2009] and others, the supervenience relation has the
wrong formal features to capture the notion of dependence in question: supervenience is
reflexive and non-asymmetric, while metaphysical dependence is not. Supervenience is
reflexive because everything supervenes on itself: there can be no change in something
without a change in that very thing; supervenience is non-asymmetric because when A and B
co-vary necessarily, A supervenes on B and B supervenes on A. Dependence, on the other
hand, is irreflexive and asymmetric, since nothing depends on itself, and if A grounds B,
then B cannot ground A.70
There might be an easy fix for these formal problems, however. The spirit of a
supervenience account, after all, is merely that we explain dependence in terms of what is
70

It is possible that in some cases, something can ground itself. But we presumably do not
want this to always be the case, nor should it be the case that something is the sole ground of
itself.
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true at various possible worlds. If the simple supervenience account fails, then perhaps a
small modification is in order:
(Dependence as Asymmetrical Supervenience) A depends on B iff a) A supervenes
on B (as described above), and b) B does not supervene on A.
This account neatly solves the worries of reflexivity and symmetry. On this account, nothing
depends on itself, since the second clause of the analysis cannot be satisfied when A=B.
Similarly, the relation is now asymmetric, since there must be some difference between the
A-worlds and B-worlds for A to depend on B.
Even our revised account of dependence by supervenience, however, is inadequate
as an analysis of metaphysical dependence. The grounding relation is hyperintensional in a
way that supervenience is not. Even though all necessary truths trivially supervene on my
existence, it should not be the case that (say) the truth of 2 + 2 =4 depends on my existence.
Furthermore, the null set grounds other pure sets, {Socrates} is grounded in Socrates, and
so on. Yet, since each of these pairs exists in the same possible worlds, (Dependence as
Supervenience) would hold that they depend on each other, while (Dependence as
Asymmetrical Supervenience) would hold that neither one depends on the other.

5.2.2 Against Naturalness
According to Bricker [2006], A metaphysically depends on B if A supervenes on B,
and B is perfectly natural. Note that Bricker offers this as merely the basis of an analysis of
grounding. First, this is merely a sufficient condition for metaphysical dependence: the
analysis requires that the more basic proposition be perfectly natural, yet this will not be the
case in many interesting examples of metaphysical dependence. Second, this account
requires a notion of naturalness that is appropriate in the discussion of propositions.
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Naturalness, after all, is generally thought of as applying to properties and relations. A
derived notion of naturalness that can apply to propositions must be deployed if this notion
is to be of use in a discussion of propositions depending on other propositions.71
These problems are not insurmountable. At least at a first pass, it would be quite
easy to generalize Bricker's account so as to make sense of a great many more of the kinds of
examples we are interested in: A depends on B iff A supervenes on B and B is more natural
than A. A proposition is perfectly natural if it attributes some perfectly natural property to
some perfectly natural object; one proposition is then more natural than another if it
contains fewer conjunctions or disjunctions of perfectly natural propositions, as in Lewis
[1983]. As long as one can make sense of this notion of naturalness, then this analysis of
dependence seems tempting. If we are inclined to think that mental facts depends on
physical facts, it is because the mental facts supervene on the physical facts, and the physical
facts are more natural (in Lewis’s sense) than the mental facts.
What can be said about the Socrates/{Socrates} dilemma? Presumably, the defender
of the naturalness approach would want to say that the existence of {Socrates} depends on
the existence of Socrates, and not the other way around. This is because, in the first place,
the existence of {Socrates} supervenes on the existence of Socrates: no two worlds differ
with respect to the existence of {Socrates} and Socrates. Furthermore, the proposition that
Socrates exists is more natural than the proposition that {Socrates} exists.
But what licenses the naturalness theorist to claim that Socrates is more natural than
{Socrates}? It cannot be, of course, that {Socrates} depends on Socrates; saying this would
blatantly court circularity. Nor does it seem that the suggestion of counting the number of
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Similarly, we would need some derived notion of fundamental objects if we are interested
in how objects depends on other objects.
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conjuncts or disjuncts of perfectly natural properties is appealing. It is, after all, entirely
unclear how to build up the property of being {Socrates} out of the perfectly natural
properties. It is even more difficult to see how to do this if the perfectly natural properties
are the properties used by fundamental physics.72
It would be better to describe naturalness in terms of metaphysical dependence,
rather than the other way around. After all, the notion of naturalness in play is itself rather
mysterious. Indeed, the notion was mysterious enough when applied to properties and
relations; it is only more mysterious when applied to propositions. Once we have an analysis
of the notion of grounding, we can use it to determine which properties are more or less
natural; the more natural properties are those that ground the less natural properties. One
may well reply that the notion of metaphysical dependence is at least as mysterious as the
notion of naturalness, and so we gain nothing by complaining about the mysteriousness of
the notion of naturalness employed by Bricker. This charge, however, is premature: if we are
unable to come up with a satisfactory account of dependence in terms that are more
tractable than naturalness, then this reply would have force. But there are still more tools
that we might use in our analysis, and these tools might yet give us a better understanding of
how grounding works than we would have if we analyzed grounding in terms of naturalness.
Perhaps one could argue that naturalness is of use in other domains, and so we
should accept naturalness for the sake of its usefulness: a notion of metaphysical naturalness
72

One could claim that Socrates is more fundamental than {Socrates} because, however
many conjunctions and disjunctions of natural properties are required to make sense of the
proposition that Socrates exists, one more – namely set membership – is required to make
sense of the proposition that {Socrates} exists. But this does not seem like the proper way of
determining the degree of naturalness of impure sets. First, it is a matter of some dispute
whether {Socrates} has many of the kinds of properties that Socrates has, such as mass or
spatial location. Even if the set did inherit Socrates’s physical properties, this approach to
naturalness would have the result that {Socrates} is as fundamental as Socrates-plus-someelectron, or that {Socrates} is more fundamental than the singleton of any “simpler” entity.
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is useful with respect to giving an answer to Kripkenstein- or Goldman-related problems of
induction, for example, or in an account of duplication and similarity. Yet rather than being
an argument for accepting the notion of naturalness as is, this might rather be construed as a
more urgent demand to explain naturalness by way of other, better-understood notions. If
there is an account of metaphysical dependence, and that account can be used to explain
naturalness, then we can freely appeal to the notion of naturalness to solve these puzzles.

5.2.3 Against Explanation
One might also attempt to analyze the dependence relation by way of explanation.
According to the simplest version of such a view, A depends on B iff B explains A. The
relation of metaphysical dependence, then, is analyzed solely in terms of the relation of
explanation. Such an account holds some promise if we are to overcome the difficulties of
the supervenience approach. It is at least plausible that explanation is hyperintensional in a
way that supervenience is not; for example, the existence of Socrates has a different
explanation than the existence of {Socrates}, even if the two entities exist in the same set of
possible worlds. Furthermore, intuitions about explanation seem to capture many of the
fundamental features of the relation of metaphysical dependence: if the truth of some
proposition is explained by the truth of some other proposition, then it seems that the
explananans is more fundamental than the explanandum, and perhaps the explanandum is true in
virtue of the explanans.
Of course, a complete defense of such a view would require saying much more about
what it is for the truth of one proposition (or collection of propositions) to explain the truth
of another. Doing so would be outside the scope of this paper, but a few comments are in
order. The notion of explanation in question cannot be pragmatic, such as that of Van
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Fraassen [1977], lest the account of metaphysical dependence be similarly pragmatic. Nor
can explanation be strictly causal, as in Lewis [1986b] or Scheffler [1957], as our account of
explanation must be general enough to make sense of the dependence facts of propositions
that lack causal histories, such as logical and mathematical propositions.73 This is not to say
that many instances of explanation are not causal in nature, or that causation can play no role
in the analysis. Nonetheless, if our account of explanation requires that causation play some
central role, and that logical, mathematical, and metaphysical truths do not stand in causal
relations, then it is not clear how these necessary propositions could stand in explanatory
relations, and thus not clear how they could stand in relations of metaphysical dependence,
either.
There are, however, accounts of explanation that could meet these challenges. One
account of explanation that can answer these kinds of challenges is a unificationist approach,
such as that of Friedman [1975] and Kitcher [1989]. According to such an account of
explanation, one provides an explanation of some phenomenon by showing how it fits into a
unified theory of the entire world, where a unified theory is one that contains relatively few
primitives or argument types. To be sure, our present account of dependence does not
require a unificationist account of explanation; it merely requires that there be some theory
of explanation that is appropriately hyperintensional and non-pragmatic.
How could the account of dependence as explanation function in practice? For
some kinds of cases, the explanation account of dependence seems to be on the right track: a
collection of facts about some microphysical system explains the facts of the corresponding
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Indeed, if causation were sufficient for dependence, then there would be many spurious
instances of dependence. For example, a dualist who holds that physical events can cause
mental events could wrongly be said to hold that those mental events thereby depend on
physical events.
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macrophysical system, and thus the microphysical system grounds the macrophysical system.
Depending on how our theory of explanation is ultimately formulated, we could say that the
world as described in terms of microphysics uses a smaller vocabulary of entities and their
properties and relations. In the case of Socrates and his singleton, this proposal is
committed to the claim that the existence of Socrates explains the existence of {Socrates},
and that the existence of {Socrates} does not explain the existence of Socrates. Intuitions in
this case seem somewhat less straightforward, to be sure, but one certainly could argue that
the existence of an individual explains the existence of a set that contains that individual, and
not vice versa. It is more economical to describe the world in terms of individuals and their
relations rather than it is to describe it in terms of sets and their features. This is easiest to
see if we assume that impure sets are not located in space and time and do not have the
physical properties of their concrete elements such as mass: it would not be clear, for
example, how to recover physical features of Socrates such as his location and mass and
lineage from truths about {Socrates}, while determining the features of {Socrates} requires
no tools that are not provided by the principles of set theory. Thus, we could describe the
world in terms of objects such as Socrates and derive truths about the sets that contain
them, but we cannot describe the world in terms of objects such as {Socrates} and then
derive truths about their members. What if impure sets have the physical properties of their
members? If we allow that sets such as {Socrates} could have the physical properties of
their members and stand in causal relations, then we lose the kind of asymmetry mentioned
above. But there is a different kind of asymmetry: Socrates has the property of being a
member of {Socrates}, while {Socrates} has the property of containing Socrates as an
element. The question of which kind of property makes for a more economical description
of the world would then come down to a debate over whether describing the world in set121

theoretic facts (and then deriving the physical facts) is easier (e.g., makes use of fewer
primitives) than describing the world in physical facts (and then deriving the set-theoretic
facts). I assume a description of the world in set-theoretic terms will face difficulties with
respect to various modal and other properties of sets, but if the world could ultimately be
described just as easily in set-theoretic terms, then I would accept this as evidence that
Socrates might not ground {Socrates} after all.
Other kinds of cases are more problematic for a reduction of dependence to
explanation. One paradigmatic kind of explanation is that of explaining the present state of
the universe by citing a previous state and the laws: some state of the universe at t0, in
conjunction with the laws of physics, explains a latter state of the universe at t1. Yet it does
not seem right to say that some previous state of the universe (along with the laws) grounds a
latter state of the universe; there is a causal and explanatory connection between the past and
the present, but not a connection of metaphysical grounding. Thus, it seems that even if the
notions of explanation and dependence are related, they are not equivalent; explanation is
not a sufficient condition for dependence.
Of course, the advocate of a view of dependence as explanation has a number of
ways of revising the theory to accommodate this challenge. One could attempt to combine
the explanation requirement with a modal requirement, or one could attempt to focus on a
particular kind of explanation that is not present in the past-present case. I will discuss both
of these options in turn.
If explanation is not sufficient for metaphysical dependence, then perhaps the
account should be supplemented with one of the modal notions discussed above. The most
straightforward strategy would be to combine the requirements of explanation and
supervenience, which would result in something close to Horgan’s relation of
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superdupervenience:74 such an approach, however, would still wrongly hold that the past and
the laws ground the present state of the universe. At least if determinism is true, the state of
the world at some earlier time t0 and the laws explain and entail some subsequent state of the
world at time t1, and thus the state of the world at t1 also supervenes on the state at t0 and the
laws. This is because if some previous state (at t0) and the laws entail the present state (at t1),
it then follows that the state of the world at t1 could not be different unless either the laws or
the state at t0 were also different. 75
It also will not help to analyze metaphysical dependence in terms of explanation and
asymmetrical supervenience. Such an approach would still wrongly hold that the present
metaphysically depends on the past and the laws, since some state of the world asymmetrically
supervenes on the laws and a past state of the world. This is because one cannot alter the
present without altering the laws or the past, but the opposite is not true: state of the world
at t1 could be derived from more than one set of initial conditions and dynamic laws.76
Furthermore, recall that other paradigmatic cases of grounding do not meet the asymmetrical
supervenience requirement: the existence of {Socrates} supervenes on the existence
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Horgan discusses this relation is his [1993], and defines it as “ontological supervenience
that is robustly explainable in a materialistically explainable way,” where to give a robust
explanation of supervenience “is to explain it qua ontological, rather than explaining it
merely as a feature of the “logic” of the higher-order terms and concepts.” Such an account
is meant to make sense of physicalist-friendly reductions (or pseudo-reductions) of higherorder properties to lower-order properties. If we are to approach metaphysical dependence
in full generality without commitment to physicalism, we need not hold that the explanations
in question need to be “materialistically explainable.”
75
What if determinism is false? If the laws are merely stochastic, then our theory of
explanation would also have be different so as to make sense some previous state of the
world and laws making some latter state highly probable, rather than being guaranteed. The
supervenience claim would then return, restated as a claim about probability: there can be no
change in the objective chance of the current state obtaining without some change in the
previous state of the world or the laws.
76
This is not to be confused with the claim that the past supervenes on the present state and
the laws, which may be true depending on how the physical laws are formulated.
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Socrates, and the existence of Socrates supervenes on the existence of {Socrates}, and thus,
according to such a proposal, Socrates will not ground {Socrates}.
Perhaps the dependence relation cannot be analyzed as explanation per se, but rather
as some non-causal kind of explanation. Assume that there is some sense to be made of a
specifically non-causal notion of explanation: could this kind of explanation (perhaps in
concert with a further modal requirement) be capable of analyzing the relation of
metaphysical dependence? Such a theory would not hold that the present depends on the
past and the physical laws, since such an explanation would certainly be causal. Yet there are
also cases of non-causal explanation that do not seem to be cases of metaphysical
dependence.
One might attempt to explain why, in some population, for each male born, there are
1.04 females born. One could attempt to explain this causally, by citing facts about sperm
and egg cells, but one could also offer a non-causal explanation that cites evolutionary
factors: it is advantageous to the population to have a 1:1 ratio of males to females at
reproductive age, and, for various reasons, males are somewhat more likely than females to
die before reproducing. This explanation is not causal: rather than citing earlier facts about
features of the population and relevant dynamic laws, we cite certain facts about features of
the population in the future to explain the sex ratio. Yet perhaps one could argue that this
evolutionary kind of explanation is simply not a real explanation, as the evolutionary
explanation appealed to is plausibly a stand-in for a far more complex explanation about past
populations and their genetic features and reproductive successes.77

77

This example is discussed in Kitcher [1989], and a closely-related example is discussed in
Sober [1983].
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A clearer example is Hempel’s pendulum [1965]: consider that the period of a
pendulum is explained by the length of its rod, as well as the formula t = 2πl/G. This
explanation is not causal: the length of the rod is not a cause of its period having a certain
value; the pendulum’s period is simply a function of the length of the rod and gravity. In
this case, there seems to be a non-causal explanation of the period of pendulum from its
length and from gravity; there is also (asymmetrical) supervenience of the period of the
pendulum on the length of the rod and the force of gravity, but we should not say that the
length of the rod, the force of gravity, and the equation above ground the pendulum’s period.
The length of the rod is not metaphysically prior to the period of the pendulum, nor is the
period of the pendulum prior to the length of the rod.
We could also consider another kind of example. One might try to explain why a
star has ceased collapsing by citing the Pauli Exclusion principle: given constraints on the
properties that collections of subatomic particles can have, there is simply no possible state
in which the star collapses further. Such an explanation cites certain nomic laws, but it does
not refer to any causal or dynamic law; there is no claim about how the system develops
given some previous state, but rather a claim that a certain range of states of the system are
simply not possible.78 Yet we would not want to say that the failure of the star to collapse
further metaphysically depends on the Pauli exclusion principle. Once again, there can be a noncausal explanation, (asymmetrical) supervenience, but not metaphysical grounding.79

78

Note that Lewis [1986b] holds that this is not an example of genuine explanation; rather,
stating that the Pauli exclusion principle holds that the star cannot collapse further merely
denies that there is any possible explanation for why the star cannot continue to collapse.
79
Note that the pendulum example and the collapsing star example are also cases of
synchronic explanation: we need not appeal to some system at different points in time to give
an explanation of the explanandum. Thus, it does not seem possible to gloss ‘non-causal
explanation’ as ‘synchronic explanation.’
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This notion of non-causal explanation is not the only option on the table for the
defender of the explanation view of grounding. Perhaps the kind of explanation in question
should be a version of what Cummins refers to as a property theory or what Poland refers to as
a realization theory. For Cummins, a property theory is best viewed in contrast to a transition
theory: a transition theory explains why a system is in the state that it is in, given some
previous state; a property theory, however, explains “What it is for S to instantiate P, or in
virtue of what does S have P” [Cummins 1985: 15]. For Poland, a realization theory is
something that, for some higher-level attributes N, “abstractly characterizes the kinds of
attributes that are sufficient for the realization of N and that shows how such attributes can
combine to actually constitute N in particular cases.” [Poland 1994: 210]. Note that both of
these views of explanation are very difficult to state without slipping into locutions such as
‘in virtue of’ or ‘realizes,’ and ‘constitute,’ which are themselves the very target of this
discussion. This is not to say that there is no way of making sense of a notion of explanation
that is capable of making sense of the dependence relation, but it does not seem that any of
the plausible contenders are up to the task.

5.2.4 Against Primitivism
One tempting response to worries about the nature of the dependence relation is
simply to take it as primitive. Rosen [2010] and Schaffer [2009] hold that the notion of
metaphysical dependence is clear enough to use in without an analysis. After all, we have a
reasonably intuitive grasp of what is meant by the kinds of locutions of dependence
mentioned above, even if they are difficult to explain in a perspicuous fashion. We agree on
certain paradigm cases, such as that the existence of {Socrates} depends on the existence of

126

Socrates. If we have availed ourselves of the notion of dependence for thousands of years, it
would seem odd to now hold that the notion is too mysterious on its own.
While I am rather sympathetic with these remarks, it simply does not follow that we
should abandon our pursuit of an analysis of the grounding relation. After all, we have
reasonably robust intuitions of what knowledge is, and there is broad agreement about the
paradigm cases of knowing and not knowing. Yet this fact does not stop philosophers from
attempting to better understand knowledge in other terms (pace Williamson).
Epistemologists are still in business, and still providing accounts that seek to provide
plausible and informative theories of knowledge that could then be used to better
understand the concept and settle other debates in and around epistemology.
Furthermore, we might hope that an analysis of the dependence relation in other
terms might illuminate why it functions in the way it does. Perhaps a successful analysis
would give us some guidance in understanding more contentious examples of grounding; a
good account of grounding might then be useful in determining whether, for example, the
existence of a heart depends on a body, or if the existence of a body depends on the heart
(inter alia). More interestingly, an account of grounding could then be used to help settle a
debate such as that between the priority monism and pluralism, or between the reductive
and non-reductive materialist. If this is too much to ask of our theory, we might also have a
more modest task for our analysis of dependence. If the analysis determines why the
dependence relation seems vague or contentious in certain kinds of cases, then that too
would be an interesting result. Even if the proper analysis of dependence cannot resolve
long-standing debates, it could still explain why these debates seem so difficult, and point
toward the deeper sources of disagreement that spur these arguments.
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To be sure, if our best attempts at analyzing the dependence relation fail, we could
adopt primitivism about grounding as a kind of fallback position. It would be misguided to
stop providing philosophical analyses of phenomena in terms of other phenomena just
because we cannot explain the grounding relation. Nonetheless, if some account of
grounding does seem plausible, and provides guidance in more problematic cases, then such
an account would be a welcome improvement over primitivism about grounding.

5.2.5 A Simple Counterfactual Approach
Schaffer, in his [2009], suggests (though does not endorse) a counterfactual strategy
for dependence. According to such a strategy, metaphysical dependence is a species of
counterfactual dependence:
(Counterfactual) A depends on B iff, if B were not true, then A would not be true,
but if A were not true, then B might still be true.
This proposal could either be construed as an independent account of dependence, or as an
additional requirement to shore up the supervenience account. In either case, such an
account has some clear advantages: it provides the asymmetry required of the metaphysical
dependence relation and it casts metaphysical dependence in a similar light to that of
counterfactual dependence. Perhaps the dependence relation is similar to, or even a
generalization of, causation, and perhaps (something like) a counterfactual analysis is
appropriate for causation. Thus, a kind of counterfactual analysis should be on offer for
metaphysical dependence.
Of course, Schaffer does not endorse anything like this counterfactual account of
dependence. For one thing, such an account would clearly require the use of
counterpossibles, or counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents: the antecedents of
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both the ‘might’ and ‘would’ conditionals will often be metaphysical impossibilities. For
example, it is quite plausible that {} depends on the empty set. It is, however,
metaphysically impossible that either {} or the empty set does not exist, so both
counterfactuals have necessarily false antecedents. Schaffer assumes that such
counterfactuals are either vacuous (as Lewis, Stalnaker, and others do), or otherwise
unsuitable for use in a theory of dependence. By this point, however, such worries might
not move us deeply. I have argued at length that a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles
is necessary, and even if the particular account offered here fails, it seems that some nontrivial account is needed to make sense of our linguistic and philosophical practice.
Setting aside worries related to the proper analysis of counterpossibles, the question
of whether the simple counterfactual analysis is adequate remains. Consider again the case
of Socrates and his singleton. Since they exist in the same possible worlds, the existence of
either one supervenes on the existence of the other. But it does not seem that the
counterfactual account suggested here will provide the correct result, either.
Consider the first part of Counterfactual: If Socrates were to not exist, then
{Socrates} would not exist. This is presumably true, since it seems plausible that if Socrates
did not exist, then his singleton would not exist, either. The nearest worlds where Socrates
does not exist are presumably worlds where philosophy develops differently, worlds where
the history of Greece and Greek culture diverge from ours, and so on; they are not worlds
where impure sets get formed differently. Since Socrates does not exist, the set composed of
Socrates does not exist, either, as there is no individual to form that set. So far, so good.
Consider now the second part of Counterfactual: If {Socrates} were to not exist,
then Socrates might still exist. Is this ‘might’ counterfactual true? It does not seem so. If
{Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates would not exist, either. All of the nearest
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worlds without singleton Socrates are worlds without Socrates around to form the set; again,
they are worlds with different historical or cultural truths, but not worlds with different
mathematical truths. Worlds without the singleton are worlds without the philosopher to
create the set, rather than worlds where set theory somehow does not allow one to create a
set out of some individual.80
Something like Nolan's doctrine of the Strangeness of Impossibility81 could be
driving these intuitions: no impossible world is closer than any possible world. Since there is
a sphere of possible worlds where {Socrates} does not exist – the worlds that lacks both
Socrates and {Socrates} – we need not consider any of the impossible worlds that contain
Socrates but not {Socrates} when evaluating these conditionals. The Strangeness of
Impossibility doctrine is quite plausible, but nothing so strong is required here. The only
thing to note here is our firm intuitions about the truth values of the counterfactuals being
employed: it simply does not seem that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, Socrates himself
might still exist.
Consider the similarity metric for counterfactuals discussed in chapter 3. According
to such a view, a world is nearby to the extent that it matches the laws of the actual world
and the facts of the actual world, with greater weight placed on matches of law. Locating the
closest sphere of worlds where {Socrates} does not exist means locating worlds without
{Socrates}, but that preserve our laws and facts as much as possible. There are, to be sure,
80

There is, to be sure, some disagreement about how to understand the semantics of the
‘might’ counterfactual used here. For Lewis, a ‘might’ counterfactual is the dual of a ‘would’
counterfactual, so to say that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates might still exist
is to say, ‘It is not the case that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it is not the case that
Socrates would still exist.’ For Stalnaker, a ‘might’ counterfactual is to be understood as an
epistemic modal operating on a ‘would’ counterfactual, so we should read the sentence as
(something like) ‘For all I know, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates would still
exist.’ Both of these might claims seem false.
81
See [Nolan, 1997]
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impossible worlds that lack {Socrates} but contain Socrates, but these worlds would achieve
a match in matters of fact (viz, facts about the philosopher) at the expense of altering settheoretic laws about how impure sets can be formed. Thus, all the closest worlds that lack
{Socrates} will also lack Socrates, and so the ‘might’ counterfactual is false.

5.3 Counterfactual Exclusion
5.3.1 The Counterfactual Exclusion Requirement
There is an important role for counterfactuals to play in the analysis of dependence,
but as we have seen above, it cannot be the one that Schaffer suggests. The failure of the
counterfactual approach to dependence seen above could be attributed to the fact that we
are simply using the wrong counterfactuals. A counterfactual analysis can, after all, give us
the tools required to meet the challenges faced by an account of dependence that relies on
supervenience. Recall that metaphysical dependence cannot be analyzed by supervenience
alone, since dependence is asymmetric and irreflexive, while supervenience can be symmetric
and is reflexive. A counterfactual analysis of the metaphysical dependence relation will allow
it to be hyperintensional in a way that supervenience is not. That is, if two propositions P
and Q are true in the same possible worlds, then P and Q will supervene on each other, and
thus (if the supervenience account of dependence is true) metaphysically depend on each
other. But, as I have argued previously, counterfactuals are hyperintensional: counterfactuals
with impossible antecedents have non-trivial truth conditions, for example. Thus, if two
propositions P and Q are true in the same possible worlds, it does not follow that they
would behave the same way as antecedents in counterfactuals.82

82

There are other ways that counterfactuals are hyperintensional. Consider, for example, the
pair, ‘If I were the President, then I would live in the White House’ and, ‘If the President
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The problem with the counterfactual account sketched above is that, at least in many
cases of metaphysical dependence, the more- and less- fundamental entities exist at the same
possible worlds. Thus, if either one were to fail to exist, then so too would the other. But it
would be a mistake to conclude that this is a problem for every counterfactual account of
dependence. Rather than making use of the kinds of counterfactuals mentioned above, the
right theory of dependence must use counterfactuals to highlight some other modal property
of the entities in question. The requirement I favor can be called counterfactual exclusion: rather
than ask what would happen if the more fundamental proposition were to be false, we
should ask what would happen if only one, but not the other proposition were to hold:
(Counterfactual Exclusion) A depends on B iff, if exactly one of either A or B were
true, then B would be true.
According to Counterfactual Exclusion, for one proposition to depend on another, we must
determine what would happen if one of those propositions were true and the other false. In
the language of the nearness of worlds, if A depends on B, then the nearest worlds where A
is false and B is true are closer (according to some plausible metric of the similarity of
worlds) than worlds where A is true and B is false. In such cases, we could say that A is
more “modally fragile” than B. This modal fragility introduces the kind of asymmetry and
hyperintensionality required for our analysis, and does so in a way that suggests the right
kind of modal relationship between the grounded and grounding entities.83

were me, then I would live in the White House.’ Even though the antecedents are logically
equivalent, the truth values of these counterfactuals are different.
83
Asserting that A is more modally fragile than B is not to assert that B might exist without
A, at least on the most natural reading of ‘might.’ I do not doubt that there are contexts
according to which the nearest sphere of worlds where A is false is one that contains some
worlds where B is nonetheless true, but this is not to say that, in ordinary contexts, a claim
such as ‘If either A or B were to be false, then A would be false’ entails ‘If A were false, B
might be true.’ The former counterfactual forces us to evaluate the worlds at a sphere where
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How would this account handle the case of the dependence of {Socrates} on
Socrates? According to the counterfactual requirement, for {Socrates} to depend on
Socrates, it should be that, if only one of the two were to exist, then it would be Socrates
that would exist. This seems quite plausible. After all, {Socrates} seems more “modally
fragile” that Socrates; it is easier to delete a set from a world than a human being; the world
without Socrates would look far more different to us than the world without {Socrates}. Of
course, this is no true defense of the claim, and one might hold that there is no real
difference in “ease of deletion” or that it is mere bias to hold that differences in how a world
“looks” physically are more important than differences in how it looks set theoretically. I
will attempt to defend this judgment about similarity at below. Nonetheless, it is plausible
that the impossible worlds that differ only with respect to set theory are smaller deviations
from actuality than those that differ only with respect to the history of the physical world.
It is also clear that there is no threat of Socrates also depending of {Socrates}
according to the counterfactual account of dependence. The counterfactual requirement is
not met in this direction: if exactly one of either Socrates or {Socrates} were to exist, it
would surely be Socrates, and not {Socrates} that would exist.

5.3.2 Similarity and Counterfactual Exclusion

either A is true and B is false, or A is false and B is true; the later counterfactual makes no
such demand. To put the point in a more concrete manner, I am not committed to the claim
that Socrates might have existed without {Socrates}. Claims about what is possible and
impossible are understood in the ordinary way, by what is true at various possible worlds.
There is no possible world where Socrates exists without {Socrates}. When one evaluates a
conditional such as, ‘If exactly one of Socrates or {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it
would be {Socrates} that would not exist,’ one is forced to evaluate the conditional with a
different system of spheres of worlds that contains impossible worlds; we are thus not
committed to any corresponding claim about possibility.
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This account of dependence faces an immediate challenge: we must be able to
provide a reasonable account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals with necessarily false
antecedents. Many of the conditionals expressed by the counterfactual exclusion
requirement will be counterpossibles. In the case of Socrates and {Socrates}, for example, it
is impossible that Socrates should exist without {Socrates} or vice versa, since (presumably)
the laws of set theory are metaphysically necessary, and would entail that {Socrates} exists
whenever Socrates exists.84 Furthermore, such a theory of the truth conditions of
counterpossibles should be at least at least as objective as the metaphysical dependence
relation: counterfactuals, after all, are famously vague and context-sensitive, while
dependence is not. Even if there are some cases where the facts about dependence seem
unclear, it would be a mistake to think that we can make something more or less
fundamental merely by re-describing it or raising a question of dependence in a different
conversational context. It is, therefore, important that there be a “default” reading of the
counterfactuals, and that, at least in most cases, we can use this default metric to analyze the
truth of dependence claims.
Such an account was offered in chapter 3; the standard similarity metric for
counterpossibles discussed is a descendent of Lewis’s similarity metric for counterpossibles,
from his [1979]. Lewis’s standard metric is generalized so as to make sense of the kinds of
laws and matters of fact that are relevant to the similarity of impossible worlds. We determine
the logical and mathematical laws of a world by determining the best logico-mathematical
system for a world, and then hold that a world is nearby to the extent that, first, it matches
the logical and metaphysical laws of the actual world; second, that it matches the logical and
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The (restricted) axiom of comprehension would guarantee that {Socrates} exists whenever
Socrates exists, since Socrates would satisfy the predicate ‘is Socrates.’
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metaphysical matters of fact of the actual world; and third, that is nearby according to
Lewis’s metric for the relative nearness of possible worlds. On such a view, no world which
contains {Socrates} but not Socrates will be closer than any world that contains Socrates but
not {Socrates}.
Consider the world that contains Socrates but not {Socrates}; call this world w1.
This world contains a violation of mathematical law, since in this world, there is no set
created out of Socrates; the (restricted) comprehension principle has an exception with
respect to Socrates. Nonetheless, this need not be a “large” miracle. There is no reason to
think that this violation of the principle of comprehension will require any further changes
to set theory in general. And while there is at least one change in the space of mathematical
facts (viz., the existence of {Socrates}), it is unclear to what extent this change will ramify
through the rest of set theory.85 However the facts of set theory work out in these worlds,
none of the facts about history or culture or physics would change.
Compare this world to the nearest world that contains {Socrates} but not Socrates;
call this world w2. This world will have violations of mathematical law analogous to those
mentioned above, since there will be a set such that its sole element does not exist.86 But
this is not the only way in which this world is different from ours: it diverges from our world
in all the historical and cultural ways that would come along with the disappearance of the
philosopher Socrates. This world would diverge radically from the history of the actual
world at 469BCE. Thus, w2 contains not only a small logical “miracle” required to create a
set with a member that does not exist – much like w1 – but also a very large divergence in

85

We may remain neutral on the question of whether, say, {{Socrates}} would exist at the
nearest worlds where Socrates exists without {Socrates}.
86
This world might also require iterating this violation of law in such a way as to eliminate
the existence of sets such as {{Socrates}}. See the previous footnote.
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matters of fact. The worlds, then, are alike with respect to the size of logical miracles,
analogous with respect to matches of mathematical fact, but w1 achieves a match of matters
of historical fact that w2 does not.
In short, the world that contains Socrates but not {Socrates} contains a "small"
violation of mathematical law, so as to block for the formation of the set {Socrates}. The
world that contains {Socrates} but not Socrates also contains a similar "small" violation of
mathematical law, so as to create a set out of non-existing members. At this point, our
similarity ledger is even between these two worlds, since their laws depart from the actual
world in analogous ways. However, world w1, like the actual world, is a world that contains
Socrates, and has a history influenced by Socrates; world w2 does not have such a history like
ours. Both worlds contain a similar “small” miracle, but w1 matches the actual world in a
way that w2 does not. Thus, the world w1 will be closer to the actual world than w2.
It should be noted that, even if the present analysis of counterpossibles fails, our
intuitions about counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents are robust enough to at
least be a guide to dependence. That is, insofar as we are inclined to agree that, if either
Socrates or {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it would be {Socrates} that did not exist,
the counterfactual exclusion analysis of dependence is on the right track.
We are now in a position to see how this theory of dependence can handle other
examples of grounding. We have an intuition that the empty set grounds the existence of
the set composed of the empty set, that {} grounds the existence of {{}}, and so on.
The analysis of dependence as counterfactuals supports this judgment: if only one of either
 or {} were exist, then it would be  that would exist. The nearest worlds that contain
 but not {} are closer than any world that contains {} but not . This
counterfactual, to be sure, is somewhat less intuitive than the analogous counterfactual about
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Socrates and {Socrates}. Nonetheless, the default similarity metric might be called on to
provide some guidance.
Call a nearby impossible world that contains  but not {} w3; call a nearby
impossible world that contains {} but not  w4. Both of these worlds must contain some
kind of violation of mathematical law, either to prevent the creation of {} from , or to
allow a set to exist without one of its elements. Thus, both of these worlds contain an
analogous violation of mathematical law. However, the violation of law in w4 extends much
farther than just the creation of some set from a non-existent element. After all, a
systematization of the mathematical facts of this world must look quite different from a
systematization of our mathematical facts, since our mathematical facts make use of the set
theoretic hierarchy, which is itself founded on the null set. Since there is no null set in w4,
some other way of systematizing the natural numbers and other facts related to them is
necessary. By comparison, a world such as w3 will still have different mathematical laws by
virtue of lacking {}, but this change need not result in changes to how we understand the
set-theoretic hierarchy. Other natural numbers, for example, need not be built from {},
and the non-existence of {} need not mean that {{}} is problematic. Thus, a world
like w3 will be closer to the actual world than w4; the existence of {} is more “modally
fragile” than the existence of . The counterfactual requirement is met, and so it is true
that {} depends on , and not vice versa.87

5.4 Explanation and Counterfactual Exclusion
87

Can we say that {{}} depends on {}? This seems more difficult to show. Perhaps it
is still more difficult to systematize the mathematical fact of a world that lacks {} than it is
to systematize the facts of a world that lacks {{}}, but it is unclear that this judgment can
be sustained. More would have to be said about how simple mathematical facts ground
more complex mathematical facts.
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This theory of dependence is not complete as it stands. The counterfactual
exclusion requirement tracks a relation that I have referred to as “modal fragility,” which is
not the same as dependence. That is, counterfactual exclusion is only useful in determining
which of some pair of propositions can more easily be true without the other; this seems to
correspond to which proposition of this pair is more basic than the other. But one
proposition can be more basic than the other without the more basic proposition grounding
the less basic proposition: consider the propositions that the moon exists and that 2 + 2 = 4.
Perhaps we could wed the supervenience requirement to counterfactual exclusion so as to
capture the idea that the grounded and grounding propositions are properly related to one
another: the supervenience requirement, after all, would rule this out as a case of grounding,
since the existence of the moon does not supervene on the truth of 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, the
supervenience requirement handles the above case, since one can alter whether the moon
exists without altering whether 2 + 2 = 4. However, we can consider another pair, such as
that 2 + 2 = 4 and that properties are universals (assuming that properties are universals). The
supervenience requirement is met, because there is no possible world that differs with
respect to the truth of arithmetic but does not differ with respect to the truth of the nature
of properties; the counterfactual exclusion requirement is met since, plausibly, the nearest
impossible world where one of these is true but not the other is a world where properties are
not universals, but 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, according to a hybrid theory of dependence that
combines supervenience with counterfactual exclusion, the truth of properties as universals
depends on the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, but this seems obviously false. If supervenience cannot
be called upon to solve this problem, how are we to understand these examples?
This challenge can be met, but only with some additional machinery. It is not
enough that the grounded propositions are more “modally fragile” than the grounding
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propositions, and adding a supervenience requirement does not seem to help. In the kinds
of cases described above, the counterfactual exclusion account goes wrong because the
relation between propositions in the grounding relation needs to be stronger than that of
relative modal fragility; the dependence relation must also capture the intuition that the less
fundamental proposition is true because (in some sense of because) of the more fundamental
propositions. The notion of explanation discussed above in section 1.3 capture this sense of
“because.” Thus, our final analysis of metaphysical dependence is a combination of
counterfactual exclusion with explanation:
(Counterfactual Exclusion With Explanation) A depends on B iff, a) if exactly one of
either A or B were true, then B would be true, and b) A is explained by B.
This approach combines the counterfactual exclusion requirement with the modal
requirement; the explanation requirement provides the requisite “because” link between the
explanandum and explanans, while the counterfactual exclusion requirement provides the right
kind of modal link between the two.
Consider once again the case of Socrates and his singleton. We have seen above that
the counterfactual exclusion requirement is met: if only one of Socrates or his singleton were
to exist, then it would be Socrates, and not {Socrates}, that would exist. We have also seen
that the explanation requirement is met as well: describing the world in terms of physical
objects and their properties, and using those to then derive truths about set theoretic entities
is more economical than a description of the world in terms of set theoretic entities that
attempts to derive facts about physical objects from facts about sets. Thus, the present
theory preserves the result that {Socrates} depends on Socrates.
Such an approach provides an answer to the worry that complex truths about
properties should not turn out to be grounded in simple truths about arithmetic. Even
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though the truth of some theory of properties is more modally fragile than some simple
truth of arithmetic, there is no relation of dependence between them because truths about
arithmetic do not explain truths about the nature of properties. That is, even if the
counterfactual part of the analysis of dependence is met in this case, the requirement than
the more-fundamental proposition explains the less-fundamental proposition is clearly not
met.88
Analyzing dependence as counterfactual exclusion and explanation is also an
improvement over an account of dependence as explanation alone. Recall that at least some
of these accounts wrongly hold that the present depends on the past and the laws, since the
past and the laws explain the present. This is not a problem for dependence as
counterfactual exclusion and explanation: though the state of the world at some time t1 is
explained by the laws and some previous state at t0, the counterfactual exclusion requirement
is not met. Is the world where the state of the world at t1 does not obtain, but the laws and
the state of the world at t0 are held fixed closer than the world where state of the world at t1
is held fixed, but the state of the world at t0 or the dynamic laws are different? It seems that
there is no basis to favor one result over the other. Assuming that determinism is true, the
first scenario represents a failure of some state of the world and dynamic laws to produce
some subsequent state of the world, while the second scenario represents a failure of some
later state of the world and the dynamic laws (run backward) to produce a previous state of
the world, and thus both worlds represent the same kind of failure of some state of the
world and dynamic laws to derive other states of the world.89 Furthermore, both of these
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The same reply can be given to the challenge that the truth of that 2 + 2 = 4 should not
ground the truth that the moon exists.
89
I assume that, when we hold fixed the state of the world at t1 but change the state of the
world at t0 or the dynamic laws, we will, at least in the default context, change the state of the
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worlds would provide the same degree of match of matters of fact, either from t1 into the
future, or from t0 into the past. Since the counterfactual exclusion requirement is not met,
we need not say that the some state of the world depends on a previous state and the laws.
Non-causal versions of the explanation theory seem to be committed to the claim
that facts about the period of a pendulum are grounded in facts about the length of the rod,
the force of gravity, and math, or that facts about the collapse of a star are grounded in its
state and the Pauli exclusion principle. The present theory does not face these difficulties
because, once again, the counterfactual exclusion requirement is not met. There is no reason
to think that that there is any clear answer about what would be the case if we were to either
change the period of a pendulum but hold fixed facts about the length of the rod and the
relevant laws, or change the length of the rod or relevant laws but hold fixed facts about the
period of the pendulum: there seems to be no reason to favor one kind of change over
another. Similarly, there is no reason to think that we should change facts about the present
state of the collapsing star and hold fixed the Pauli exclusion principle and the star’s previous
state, rather than changing facts about the previous state of the star and hold fixed the Pauli
exclusion principle and the star’s present state. This proposal, then, represents an advance
over our previous theories of dependence in so far as it gets the central cases right and
avoids the counterexamples discussed above.

5.5 Physicalism
One of the central examples of metaphysical dependence is the dependence of the
mind on the body. The Counterfactual Exclusion with Explanation account faces at least
world at t0 and hold the laws fixed. On the current way of talking about the comparative
similarity of worlds, gratuitous changes in laws represent larger divergence from the actual
world than changes of matters of fact.
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two problems with respect to the treatment of this kind of case. First, when we say that the
mind depends on the body, we are making a counterfactual exclusion claim that, if only one
of either the mental facts or physical facts were to obtain, then it would be the physical facts
that would obtain. In the language of the similarity of worlds, we should say that the worlds
that contain our mental facts, but not physical facts are not as similar to the actual world as
the worlds that contain our physical facts, but not our mental facts. But how can one argue
for this claim? Perhaps zombie worlds are closer than ghost worlds, but this would mean
rejecting the claim that ghosts are metaphysically possible while ghosts are not or the claim
that metaphysically impossible worlds are more distant than metaphysically possible worlds.
Though one certainly could reject either of these claims, doing so would represent a
significant cost for the theory.
Another worry arises from the multiple realizability of mental states. For example,
some mental state might depend on a corresponding physical state, such as when my pain
depends on my brain being in a certain physical state. But the moral of the multiple
realizability arguments is that a creature might experience pain, even though it does not have
the particular brain state associated with the way that some other creatures experiences pain;
a mental state such as pain could be realized in the way that it actually is in humans (say, as cfiber stimulation), or it could be realized in other ways in non-human animals or aliens. But
recall the counterfactual exclusion claim: if my pain depends on my brain state, it would
follow that, if I were to either to have the particular brain state that I have and not be in pain
or be in pain but not have the particular brain state, then I would have the brain state but
not be in pain. Is this true? Not according to the multiple realizability argument: after all, I
might still be in pain but be in some other brain state, e.g. if I were a Martian experiencing
Martian-pain. Such a world is presumably closer than one in which I have the brain state
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that I actually have, but am somehow not in pain. If this is the case, then the counterfactual
exclusion analysis fails, because my experience of pain would not depend on my particular
brain state.
Maybe such a change in my biological make-up is a great change indeed, and would
result in a drastically different kind of world with different kinds of laws related to physics
and biology. If I am essentially the kind of being that I am, and thus necessarily experience
pain in the way that I do, then such a world is metaphysically impossible. Thus, even though
pain could be realized in many different ways, my pain (or, more generally, the mental state of
any being capable of mental states) could only be realized in the way that it actually is.
Worlds where I experience pain without c-fiber stimulation, then, are quite distant indeed,
and could well be more distant than worlds where I experience c-fiber stimulation without
experiencing pain. Perhaps an account along these lines could ultimately be developed and
defended, though these essentialist claims do not strike me as highly plausible, and I do not
attempt to mount such a defense at present.
If this theory of dependence is to be extended to such cases, then the counterfactual
exclusion requirement would have to be changed in some way. Either the requirement
would have to be re-written in such a way as to get around these problems, or the similarity
metric associated with these counterfactuals will have to allow that (say) zombie worlds will
be closer than ghost worlds and that worlds where pain is instantiated by some other
physical system are quite distant. Both ways of amending the theory could be spelled out,
but would significantly complicate the theory. Further work along these lines is necessary
before such a theory of dependence can be applied to the case of mental states depending on
physical states.
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5.6 Conclusion
It is possible to analyze the relation of metaphysical dependence in terms of
counterfactuals and explanation. Thus, when we say that A depends on B, we say that, first,
that if only one of either A or B were to be true, it would be B that would be true, and
second, that the truth of B explains the truth of A. Note that this account puts a large
weight on our ability to understand and evaluate these counterfactuals, as well as the notion
of explanation. At least in many of the paradigmatic cases of dependence, however, our
intuitions about counterfactuals and explanation are firm enough to bear this weight. In
other cases, the standard similarity metric for worlds discussed in chapter 3 might be relied
upon to illuminate the truth of these counterfactuals.
On the account of similarity proposed in chapter 3, the notion of lawhood plays a
very important role. In addition, the notion of explanation is required to make sense of
many of these cases of dependence. Thus, it is plausible then debates about grounding and
dependence will turn out to be debates about laws or debates about explanation. Arguments
about reductionism in mind or morality, or about priority in mereology, then, are really
arguments about how the laws function or about what the facts of explanation are:
evaluating these claims involves determining what the best systematization of the laws are in
this world, or in some impossible world, and determining what role these laws may play in
providing explanations for the various things that are true at this world.
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